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The central aim of this PhD project is to provide empirical research on the impact of more refined cost and 
management accounting information on buyer-supplier relations and outcomes. 
 
Until recently, buyer-supplier relations received little attention of management accounting practitioners and 
researchers because prices for inputs simply flowed through the firm’s accounts and there was no need or 
opportunity for exercising “management control” beyond the legal boundaries of the firm. Procurement was 
simply a matter of negotiating the best price (Anderson, 2006).  
 
However,  over  the  last  decades,  companies  have  begun  to  see  the  wisdom  of  collaborating  with  key 
suppliers,  partly  due  to  the  cost  pressure  caused  by  decreasing  price  levels  and  partly  due  to  firms’ 
concentration on their core competencies. Firms increasingly outsource activities that do not belong to their 
core  competences  (Baiman  et  al.,  2001;  van  der  Meer-Kooistra  &  Vosselman,  2000).  As  activities  are 
outsourced, intra-firm relationships are replaced with inter-firm relationships.  
 
This has major implications for the business environment: over the past decades the median Fortune 500 
industrial company has shrunk almost 40% and the value of purchased materials and services has grown 
from 20% to more than 50% of the selling price of finished goods (Rajan, 2006). Given the fact that a typical 
industrial  buyer  spends  more  than  half  of  every  sales  dollar  on  purchased  products,  the  potential  for 
purchasing to impact the bottom-line is self-evident: a one percentage-point saving in purchasing costs can 
improve the margin on sales by half a point (Degraeve & Roodhooft, 1999; Ellram, 2002; Noordewier et al. 
1990).  
 
Due to this quantitative significance and due to the recognition of the implications for organizational design 
and management control within and between organizations, the topic is drawing increasing interest of current 
management accounting and control research (Anderson, 2006; Anderson & Sedatole, 2003; Dekker, 2003a; 
Hopwood 1996; Otley 1994).  
 
Management accounting may play a key role in the management of inter-firm relationships. Recognizing this 
gap in the literature, Tomkins (2001, p.164) calls for an increased focus on the management of inter-firm 
relationships, by arguing that "the area warrants more empirical research with a greater emphasis upon 
business processes and the use of accounting in action/negotiation."  
 
This is exactly the aim of this PhD dissertation, which provides three empirical studies on the impact of 
(management accounting) information on inter-firm relationships.  
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The first two manuscripts are based on experiments and assess to what extent more refined information (in 
these  studies  operationalized  as  Total  Cost  of  Ownership  information)  can  be  useful  in  inter-firm  cost 
management between buyers and suppliers in different business settings. While the first manuscript focuses 
on the use of information in different power settings, the second manuscript investigates the influence of 
information on buyer-supplier negotiations in different inter-firm management control settings. These two 
manuscripts are studied from a Social Exchange Theory (SET) perspective and use experiments as a research 
method because this allows us to study the way in which trust is built at the level of the relationship (i.e. the 
negotiation process) and, more importantly, the role that (accounting) information plays in this process. We 
choose this perspective and research method because the negotiation process and the role of information 
have received scant attention in the existing literature on inter-firm relations. One key conclusion that we can 
draw from these experiment-based manuscripts is that information can serve as an important governance 
mechanism in inter-firm relations.  
  
Once information has been identified as an important inter-firm governance mechanism (manuscript 1 & 2), 
manuscript 3 discusses how information relates to other inter-firm governance mechanisms (trust and formal 
controls) in inter-firm relations. This third manuscript is survey-based, which prevents us from studying the 
negotiation process, but, which allows us to test some of the findings in the experimental studies with real 
company data, while taking into account transaction and partner characteristics that have been identified in 
prior (mainly Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Organization Theory-based) frameworks on inter-firm 
relations (e.g. Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Das & Teng, 2001a; Dekker, 2004; van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman,  2000).  Manuscript  3  extends  these  models  by  explicitly  incorporating  information  as  a 
governance mechanism for inter-firm relationships. 
 
The remainder of this introduction is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews some of the main 
theoretical frameworks and concepts that have emerged in the literature on inter-firm relationships and that 
are used throughout this dissertation. Then, the research method is discussed. Finally, a general overview of 
the manuscripts is provided.  
  
1.  Review of important theoretical frameworks and concepts in inter-firm relations 
 
The aim of this section is to briefly review some important concepts that have emerged in the literature on 
inter-firm cost management and control and that are used throughout this dissertation.  
 
1.1 Inter-firm cost management  
 
Inter-firm  relationships  introduce  new  challenges  for  management  accounting,  such  as  the  provision  of 
information for coordinating and optimizing activities across firms in a value chain (Dekker, 2003a; Gulati & 
Sighn, 1998). One of the requirements for any buyer-supplier relationship development is that information  
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between the firms is shared (Cachon & Lariviere, 2001; Tomkins, 2001). From the management’s point of 
view, information on activities and cost structures is important when analyzing and developing a firm's 
operations.  Inter-firm  information  sharing  therefore  often  includes  something  about  activities  and  costs 
(Kulmala, 2004). Shared cost information can be used to carry out a Value Chain Analysis (VCA) in order to 
reveal the cost-reduction potential of suppliers’ operations and to exploit cost reduction potentials across the 
boundaries of companies (Cooper & Slagmulder, 1999). 
 
VCA  is  described  as  a  technique  that  can  play  an  important  role  in  the  management  of  supply  chain 
relationships.  This  analysis  was  developed  by  Porter  (1985),  and  in  the  accounting  literature  further 
developed by Shank (1989) and Shank & Govindarajan (1992 & 1993). VCA is used to analyze, coordinate 
and optimize linkages between activities in the value chain, by focusing on the interdependence between 
these activities (Dekker, 2003a).  
 
Accounting information is an important constituent of VCA. Accounting information needed for a VCA 
takes into account the linkages in the wider value chain, such as the causes of the purchasing price, the costs 
of activities related to the product, and the consequences of the product for the buyer's activities (Dekker, 
2003a).  
 
Traditional management accounting practices are unable to adequately support a VCA (Hergert & Morris, 
1989; Porter, 1985) as they are based on the internally oriented concept of “value added”, which hinders 
firms in taking advantage of the opportunities to coordinate interdependence in the value chain. The value 
added perspective focuses on (maximizing) the difference between the firm's purchasing costs and selling 
price. Traditional management accounting practices typically only track the purchase price associated with a 
particular product or supplier and they bury the costs of ordering, expediting, receiving, inspecting, and using 
purchased  goods  in  overhead  accounts  or  general  expenses  (Carr  &  Ittner,  1992).  By  obscuring  these 
additional costs, traditional management accounting systems encourage purchasing managers to focus on 
price and to select the lowest bidder without taking into account additional costs the supplier may introduce 
in the value chain of the purchasing organization (Degraeve & Roodhooft, 1999). Traditional management 
accounting systems ignore thus linkages in the wider value chain (Dekker, 2003a).  
 
In contrast, Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) accounting systems start from a value chain perspective (Shank 
& Govindarajan, 1992). TCO accounts for costs that are caused by buying from a certain supplier, such as 
the cost of purchasing (including the costs of ordering, freight, and incoming quality control), the costs of 
holding (including the costs of storage, insurance, obsolescence and the cost of money), the cost of poor 
quality (including the costs of rejection, re-receiving, scrap, rework, repackaging, downtime, and warranties) 
and the costs of delivery failure (including the costs of expediting, premium transportation and downtime) 
(Carr & Ittner, 1992). The TCO concept attempts thus to quantify all of the costs related to the purchase of a 
given quantity of products or services from a given supplier (Ellram, 1995a). In this respect, it is important  
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not to focus solely on production costs (internal suppliers) or price (external suppliers), but also to take into 
account the more difficult costs to assess qualitative factors (Anderson et al., 2000).   
 
The TCO approach received considerable attention during the last decade (for a review see Wouters et al., 
2005). Recent theoretical models from the operations management literature also start to tackle the problem 
on how buyers should design their procurement process to achieve minimum total cost through an effective 
balance of procurement costs and operating costs (Cachon & Zhang, 2006). 
 
Recognizing that price represents only a fraction of the cost of doing business with suppliers, a growing 
number of companies are now measuring both purchasing department and supplier performance based on the 
TCO.  
 
Many different types of TCO systems have been reported (for a classification see Ellram, 1995b). A recent 
survey study even suggests that a generic model of Total Cost of Ownership is not appropriate (Ferrin & 
Plank, 2002). TCO-based models basically consists of summarization and quantification of all or several 
costs associated with the choice of supplier and subsequently adjusting or penalizing the unit price quoted by 
the supplier with this figure in some way (De Boer et al., 2001). Some firms have applied a dollar based 
approach while others have kept it to some form of weighted point method to circumvent quantification 
problems (Ellram, 1994 & 1995b).  
 
In weighted-point based systems a number of evaluation criteria are selected, and their relative weights are 
expressed in numerical terms so that a composite performance index or score can be determined and supplier 
comparisons can be made. Monczka & Trecha (1988) and Smytka & Clemens (1993) combine a total cost 
approach with rating systems for criteria such as service and delivery performance for which it is more 
difficult to obtain the cost figures. Holloway et al. (1996) report on Sun Microsystems’ TCO system, which 
is also based on a weighted point score. The TCO is calculated as follows: TCO = [(100-score)/ 100] + 1. 
The TCO is interpreted quite literally: if a supplier has a score of 86, corresponding to a TCO of 1.14, the 
supplier is informed that every dollar Sun spends with the supplier actually costs Sun $1.14.   
 
Although these rating based models take into account other costs than the price and although they facilitate 
communicating performance to the supplier, they also have some important shortcomings (Roodhooft & Van 
den Abbeele, 2005): this method (i) appoints weights in an arbitrary way, while it does not account for the 
real weights of these costs in the total costs, (ii) can lead to incorrect scores because often not all relevant 
cost  information  is  used  and  (iii)  takes  not  automatically  all  constraints  (such  as  production  capacity 
problems) into account. Practitioners’ literature indeed mentions that purchasing professionals evaluate these 
systems  as  inaccurate  and  that  they  need  more  sophisticated  accounting  systems  to  consistently  and 
accurately spread overhead costs (Milligan, 1999). 
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Lalonde & Pohlen (1996) assert that combining TCO and Activity Based Costing (ABC) can provide a more 
accurate image of the activities and resources consumed in dealing with specific suppliers. Many other 
researchers have also coupled ABC to purchasing decisions and supply chain management (Bennett, 1996; 
Degraeve & Roodhooft, 2000; Degraeve et al., 2005; Dekker & Van Goor, 2000; Roodhooft & Konings, 
1997; Ellram, 1995a). TCO systems nowadays are often ABC supported. Recent literature even defines TCO 
as an extension of ABC to a boundary-spanning context (Wouters et al., 2005). They assert that TCO can be 
seen as an application of ABC that quantifies the costs that are involved in acquiring and using purchased 
goods and services.  
 
In an ABC-based TCO analysis, as in activity-based costing, cost drivers can be at various levels, such as 
unit level (e.g., purchase price), batch level (e.g., costs of creating a purchase order) and supplier level (e.g., 
cost of identification and certification of a supplier) (Degraeve & Roodhooft, 2001). A notable difference 
between TCO and typical ABC applications is that costs need to be captured at a greater level of detail: by 
supplier and by item purchased (Ellram, 1995a). 
 
Important  advantages  of  an  ABC-based  TCO  approach  over  other  methodologies  exists  in  arriving  at 
objective cost measures in a systematic way and in enabling companies to develop inter-organizational 
activity based management opportunities (Degraeve et al., 2000). A disadvantage of the approach is that 
determining the TCO for selecting a supplier for the delivery of a certain item based on ABC information 
requires an extensive management accounting system that captures the relevant costs of the activities by 
supplier and item purchased.  
 
In the remainder of this dissertation we take a deterministic approach to TCO. The aim is neither to describe 
a value chain and ABC analysis or to discuss how the data are collected and what the problems related to this 
aspect are (cf. Degraeve et al., 2005), nor to identify and categorize important TCO cost drivers (cf. Ferrin & 
Plank, 2002) or to discuss the drivers for successful adaptation of TCO systems (cf. Wouters et al., 2005). 
The focus is on the use of TCO data and on how this information influences buyer-supplier negotiations. In 
this respect, we adopt a view on TCO as it is described by Wouters et al. (2005): they explain that TCO 
presumes the existence of boundary spanning activities and that the intent of TCO information is to detect 
trade-offs along the value chain and to improve profitability by modifying how partners do business with 
each other, such as, which firm undertakes which activities. The operationalization, and the limitations of 
this operationalization, are discussed in more detail in manuscript one and two.  
 
In sum, best practice by purchasing managers is now informed by a "cost of ownership" approach (Anderson 
et al., 2000; Seal et al., 2004) that explicitly calculates the complete costs of acquiring a component, where 
the piece price is only the most visible part of cost, with delivery, product support, quality control, stock-
holding, inspection, materials handling and all activities that contribute to total cost. The recognition of the 
importance of these activities enriches the modalities of interaction in the supply chain beyond price and  
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quantity bargaining with negotiations ranging over quantities, quality, delivery timings, supply continuity, 
and even product development (Seal et al., 1999). 
 
Although, other inter-firm cost management techniques exist (see for instance Cooper & Slagmulder (2004) 
and Kulmala (2004) for several case studies on different inter-firm cost management practices), the focus in 
this dissertation is on TCO and VCA for specific reasons.  
 
First,  in  the  management  accounting  literature  VCA  is  regarded  as  a  core  analytical  tool  of  strategic 
management accounting. The development of VCA in the literature, however, has primarily been conceptual 
and anecdotal and since little empirical evidence of its use in practice is available, the relevance of the 
concept for practice has been criticized (Lord, 1996). In addition, although a VCA conceptually spans the 
entire value chain, crossing organizational boundaries, its role in inter-firm relationships has received scant 
attention, with Dekker’s (2003a) extensive case study at Sainsbury as a notable exception. Second, the 
academic  accounting  literature  recurrently  depicts  TCO  analysis  as  an  important  and  useful  tool  for 
negotiation between buyers and suppliers (Ellram, 1995a & 1995b; Monczka et al., 2002; Roodhooft et al., 
2003 & 2005). The idea is that the refined cost and cost driver information resulting from a TCO analysis 
can  be  used  to  optimize  and  better  coordinate  the  performance  of  activities  across  the  supply  chain. 
However,  empirical  evidence  for  this  claim  has  yet  to  be  provided.  The  first  two  manuscripts  in  this 
dissertation provide experimental evidence on the use of TCO information as a VCA tool for inter-firm cost 
management  and  resulting  negotiations  between  buyers  and  suppliers.  Contrary  to  what  is  popularly 
believed, more refined information (i.e. TCO information) does not always result in better outcomes (cf. 
manuscript 1). On the other hand, (accounting) information and information exchange have an important 
impact on the development of the inter-firm relationship and on outcomes such as joint profits and trust (cf. 
manuscript 2). Finally, these experiments allow us to look at the impact of information on the negotiation 
process of inter-firm relationships. Two elements that have received scant attention in the extant inter-firm 
literature (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994) and that will be discussed in more detail in the remainder of this 
introduction.  
 
1.2  Inter-firm management control 
 
To structure and control inter-firm relations, suitable management control systems and processes need to be 
established. Important questions are: how to set up inter-firm relations, with which partner, within which 
contractual framework, how to coordinate the relationship, and which management control mechanisms can 
be used for supporting, planning, measuring and assessing the activities and results.  
 
1.2.1 Transaction cost economics (TCE) 
The most common theoretical framework used in research on inter-firm relationships is transaction cost 
economics (TCE). TCE takes as its point of departure Coase’s (1937) assumption that managers make their  
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governance decisions to minimize costs. These costs include the search cost to find a partner and the costs of 
preparing, executing and monitoring a contract or agreement, including the cost of enforcement and applying 
sanctions and loss of specific investments if the relation is terminated. Assuming equal production costs, 
TCE predicts that the governance structure associated with the lowest transaction costs will be chosen to 
govern the transaction (Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1991). Transaction costs depend on a combination of 
certain  characteristics  of  the  transaction  taking  place  (i.e.  the  specificity  of  assets  dedicated  to  the 
relationship,  the  level  of  environmental  uncertainty  and  the  frequency  of  transacting)  and  certain 
characteristics of human nature (i.e. bounded rationality, opportunism and risk neutrality).  
 
While TCE has been widely used to guide inter-firm research, it has been criticized for its singular focus on 
the notions of opportunism and for its under-emphasis on process (i.e. its static nature) that has resulted in 
negligence of the social mechanisms of governance (e.g. Dekker, 2004; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Gulati, 
1995; Madhok, 1996).  
 
In the next paragraphs we explain how several researchers have criticized TCE, combined TCE with other 
theoretical perspectives and have used a modified form of TCE for studying inter-firm relations and for 
better understanding the design of management control systems. We then explain how manuscript 3 extends 
these “modified TCE” models with information as a governance tool.   
 
1.2.2 Critique on TCE 
A  first  important  criticism  on  TCE  is  related  to  its  emphasis  on  opportunism  and  transaction  cost 
minimization  (e.g.  Dekker,  2004;  Lorenzoni  &  Lipparini,  1999).  This  has  resulted  in  a  focus  on  one 
particular purpose of control in inter-firm relations (Gulati & Singh, 1998), which can be described as the 
management of appropriation concerns (Williamson, 1985). This purpose of control concentrates on the 
argument that partners in inter-firm relationships need to safeguard their interests against the potentially 
opportunistic behavior of the other(s). While appropriation concerns can clearly be an important concern, 
managing transaction risks is only part of the control challenges in inter-firm relationships. A second purpose 
of  control in inter-firm relations can be described as the coordination of interdependent tasks between 
partners (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999). To create transactional value, inter-firm 
partners determine tasks to be performed, pool resources and decide on a division of labor. Organization 
theory  (Thompson,  1967)  suggests  that  the  need  for  coordination  varies  with  to  the  degree  of 
interdependence and the uncertainty of tasks performed within the inter-firm relationship. Gulati & Singh 
(1998) stress the importance of using control mechanisms for managing task interdependence because the 
concerns about anticipated coordination costs are particularly salient in inter-firm relations because these 
types of relations can entail significant coordination of activities between partners and because they have to 
be  managed  without  the  benefit  of  formal  authority  relationships  that  typically  characterize  intra-firm 
relations. Summarizing, appropriation concerns and coordination requirements are powerful concepts in  
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explaining inter-firm management and control and governance mechanisms are useful in the management of 
these problems (Dekker, 2004). These two control problems are addressed in manuscript 3.  
 
A second line of criticism on TCE is related to its static nature (Gulati & Singh, 1998) that has resulted in a 
negligence of the social context within which transactions are embedded (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). It has 
been  argued  that  social  embeddedness  not  only  influences  the  design  of  the  control  systems,  it  also 
influences  the  relationship  and  each  party’s  behavior  (Granovetter,  1985;  van  der  Meer-Kooistra  & 
Vosselman, 2000). Several researchers have therefore modified or extended TCE to include some important 
characteristics of the relationship such as power and trust. Buvik & Reve (2002), for instance, extend the 
TCE perspective by combining resource-dependence theory (RDT) and TCE, and examine the role of the 
buyer's bargaining power on the alignment of the contractual safeguarding of relations-specific investments. 
But  in  particular  trust  has  emerged  as  an  important  factor  in  the  design  and  study  of  control  systems 
(Gietzmann, 1996; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Several researchers have used a modified form of TCE, 
which takes account of the role of trust (e.g. Chiles & McMackin, 1996; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; 
Madhok, 1995; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000).  
 
To summarize, the extant literature on inter-firm relations has examined the roles of accounting, control and 
trust in inter-firm transactional relationships from different perspectives. However, until now the literature 
has failed to fully explore the way in which trust is built at the level of the relationship (the how of the trust 
building  process),  and,  more  importantly,  the  role  that  (accounting)  information  plays  in  this  process 
(Vosselman & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2004). Although the links between trust, information and control have 
been questioned (e.g. Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Dekker, 2004; Tomkins, 2001) there is hardly any 
research  on  how  formal  controls  relate  to  trust  building  processes,  which  is  typically  characterized  by 
information exchange.  
 
1.2.3 Studying the role of (accounting) information in the negotiation process 
Given uncertainty and complexity in inter-firm relations, an understanding of the decision process as it 
gradually shows through actors’ behaviors is essential. Management accounting may play a key role in this 
process.  
 
Although  accounting  information  is  widely  acknowledged  to  provide  the  basis  for  many  contractual 
agreements, the impact of accounting information on bargaining behavior has received little attention (Luft et 
al., 1998). The existing research on accounting negotiation has focused on intra-firm issues such as transfer 
pricing, budgeting, and collective bargaining (Peffer, 2000). Research on the role of information in inter-firm 
relationships, however, has remained limited and needs to be addressed (Tomkins, 2001). 
 
Exchange models offer some perspective here. Social exchange theory (SET) has been extensively used by 
marketing scholars to explain business-to-business relational exchange (for an overview see Lambe et al.,  
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2001). Research on relational exchange has focused on the process by which relationships are developed 
(Anderson & Narus, 1984 & 1990). These works rely on social exchange theory (SET) (Homans, 1974; 
Thibault & Kelley 1959) to explain how firms are able to develop relationship variables such as trust, 
cooperation, and commitment to an extent where the partners can work together to make relational exchange 
successful.  
 
Exchange models generally describe bargaining and negotiation as a “process”, characterized by information 
exchange, joint-problem solving and persuasion (Alexander et al., 1994). In this framework, negotiation 
outcomes (e.g. level of satisfaction, profits, whether or no agreement is reached) are seen as a complex 
interaction of three constructs: negotiator characteristics, situational characteristics, and the characteristics of 
the negotiation process itself (Campbell et al., 1988). In this view, negotiator characteristics and situational 
characteristics are seen as affecting both process-related behaviors and performance outcomes. 
 
1.3 Bringing everything together: the general research framework 
 
In manuscript 1 and 2 experimental research methods are combined with the foundations of social exchange 
theory.  This  allows  us  to  control  for  negotiator  characteristics  and  to  focus  on  several  situational 
characteristics of interest, in particular accounting information (operationalized by TCO information). In 
both  experiments  we  test  the  influence  of  the  availability  of  detailed  accounting  information  on  the 
negotiation process and the resulting impact on the negotiation outcomes. As can been seen in Figure 1, 
manuscript 1 focuses on the influence of the relative power structure of a buyer and its interaction with cost 
information, whereas Manuscript 2 investigates the effect of control systems and cost information on trust.  
  
Manuscript 1 and 2 give insights into how information is employed to (jointly) solve problems, to share 
information and to be co-operative. This approach allows us to clarify the mechanism by which a partner 
signals his non-opportunistic behavior to the other partner in the relationship, thus signaling trustworthy 
behavior. Accounting information proves to be able to serve an important function in relational signaling and 
thus in building trust. In other words, manuscript 1 & 2 allows us to demonstrate the role of accounting 
information as a governance mechanism for inter-firm relationships. 
 
Once information has been identified as an important inter-firm governance mechanism (manuscript 1 & 2), 
manuscript 3 discusses how information relates to other inter-firm governance mechanisms (trust and formal 
controls) in inter-firm relations and how these three types of governance mechanism reduce perceived risk in 
inter-firm relations. This third manuscript is survey-based, which allows us to test some of the findings in the 
experimental  studies  with  real  company  data,  while  taking  into  account  transaction  and  partner 
characteristics that have been identified in prior (mainly TCE and Organization Theory-based) frameworks 
(e.g. Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Das & Teng, 2001a; Dekker, 2004; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman,  
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2000).  Manuscript  three  extends  these  models  by  explicitly  incorporating  information  as  a  governance 
mechanism for inter-firm relationships.  
 
These elements are brought together in Figure 1. The figure is broken down into two panels in order to 
clearly visualize the scope of the three studies. The upper panel of the figure indicates what is studied in the 
first two manuscripts, namely a set of situational characteristics (power, information and inter-firm control 
systems) and how they influence the negotiation process and outcomes. The lower panel charts the topic of 
the third manuscript (namely what type of governance mechanisms are used to reduce two specific inter-firm 
governance problems or risks).  
 
 
Figure 1: Research framework 
 
Manuscripts 1 & 2: Experiments grounded in Social Exchange Theory to isolate the effect of information and to study the 





Manuscript 3: Survey research extending Transaction Cost Economics and Organization theory based literature by explicitly 
introducing  information  as  an  inter-firm  governance  mechanism  for  studying  the  combined  effect  of  information and other 
governance mechanisms on inter-firm relations in a more natural setting 
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The two panels are not independent from each other. In the first two manuscripts the focus is centered on the 
negotiation process while the situational characteristics are regarded as “given”: these are experimental 
variables and we disregard what determines them. In this regard, the lower panel should be seen as a “loupe” 
on the situational characteristics box of the upper panel. In the third manuscript, the focus is no longer on the 
negotiation process, but on what type of governance mechanisms are used to counter different types of 
perceived risks, while controlling for several transaction characteristics. The elements in the lower panel 
should  thus  be  regarded  as  situational  characteristics  that  influence  each  other  (as  studied  in  the  third 
manuscript) and that may influence the negotiation process (as studied in the first two manuscripts). 
 
 
2. Research method 
 
This dissertation combines experimental research with survey research. Both research methods are discussed 
in more detail. 
 
2.1 Experimental research method 
 
Experimental  design  is  particularly  useful  for  investigating  whether  and  how  managerial  accounting 
practices affect the behavior and decision process of individuals within the organization (Sprinkle, 2003; 
Waller, 1995). It is often difficult to use archival or field data to assess the effects of an organization's 
managerial accounting system on the behavior of its members (Ittner & Larcker, 2001). First, archival data is 
often unavailable or difficult to obtain. Firms are not always willing (or even able) to provide information on 
their management accounting systems and more specifically on how it is used as a tool for decision making. 
Second, the independent variables under investigation may be contaminated because their effects cannot be 
disentangled from other effects, including self-selection biases and sample-selection biases. Finally, the 
dependent  variables  and  independent  variables  may  contain  both  random  noise  and  systematic  bias 
(measurement error).  
 
Controlled laboratory experiments can help overcome these limitations (Brownell, 1995). First, experiments 
allow us to control and isolate causal factors of interest (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Experimental design 
can be distinguished from all other types of research in that it involves the manipulation or control of the 
independent variables which enable us to isolate causal effects of accounting information, from other factors 
influencing the inter-firm relation. Second, experiments are particularly useful to investigate the impact of 
management accounting and control variables on behavior and the decision making process (Sprinkle, 2003; 
Waller, 1995).  
 
The two manuscripts based on experiments allow us to study the way in which trust is built at the level of the 
relationship (i.e. the negotiation process) and to isolate the role of information. This is important because the  
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negotiation process and the role of information have received scant attention in the existing literature on 
inter-firm relations.  
 
2.2 Survey research method  
 
While creating high internal validity by isolating only a few experimental factors from the general natural 
environment, experimental designs may impose constraints to the external validity of certain findings. To 
address this problem to a certain extent, the third manuscript is survey-based which allows us to validate 
some of the findings from the experimental studies while studying the phenomena in a more natural setting.  
 
Because surveys are in general used to study naturally occurring phenomena, it is rarely possible to randomly 
assign  subjects  or  respondents  to  systematically  treatments  on  explanatory  variables  as  in  experiments 
(Brownell, 1995). While this implies that our survey study is less well suited to isolate the causal affects of 
information on the inter-firm negotiation process, the survey method is capable of producing results that 
vastly enhances the generalizability of results of the experiments (Brownell, 1995).  
 
Surveys  in  management  accounting  research  have  been  criticized,  with  the  central  concern  being  the 
reliability  of  the  data  obtained  (Young,  1996).  However,  if  surveys  are  constructed  and  administered 
appropriately, then they can be a source of large-scale, high-quality data which allow a cross-sectional 
investigation of a rich set of management accounting variables (Van der Stede et al., 2005). Extreme care 
was therefore taken to adhere to the principles of good survey design and administration. This is discussed in 
more detail in the research method section of manuscript 3.  
 
Since no research method dominates the others on all criteria, it has been argued that multiple research 
methods should be used to investigate management accounting phenomena (Ittner & Larcker, 2001). As the 
extant empirical literature on inter-firm relations has mainly been inspired by case study research (especially 
in accounting research) and by survey-research, we believe that the multiple-research method design used in 
this dissertation contributes to existing literature on inter-firm relations as it enables us to isolate information 
as an important governance mechanism for inter-firm relations (the experiments) and to extend the existing 




3.  Overview of the three manuscripts 
 
In this dissertation we present three different manuscripts. Each manuscript tackles one specific research 
problem and is written so that it can be read independently of the other manuscripts. Therefore there may be 
some overlap in the discussed literature. In this section, we give a brief overview of the different manuscripts 
and highlight the connection between them. When reading the manuscripts, it becomes clear that our work is 
far from completed and that many interesting pathways remain to be discovered. A concluding chapter, 
immediately following the three manuscripts, will highlight some interesting avenues for further research 
and will explain the practical implications of this dissertation.  
 
Manuscript 1 
The first manuscript was mainly inspired by recurring claims in the literature on the usefulness of Total Cost 
of Ownership (TCO) information as a tool for negotiation between buyers and suppliers (Ellram, 1995a & 
1995b; Roodhooft et al., 2003 & 2005). The idea is that the refined cost and cost driver information resulting 
from a TCO analysis can be used to optimize and better coordinate the performance of activities across the 
supply chain.  
 
The  strategic  importance  of  purchasing  makes  it  relevant  for  firms  to  understand  which  purchasing 
approaches are effective and efficient, and can thus contribute to their overall success and profitability by 
cutting hidden costs of waste, rework, returns, etc. (Janda & Seshardi, 2001). This is especially relevant for 
TCO  systems,  as  gathering  more  refined  information  is  costly  and  purchasing  professionals  in  many 
companies still need to demonstrate the contribution they make to the firm (Carr & Pearson, 1999). 
 
Previous  research  has highlighted the importance of information sharing to the effectiveness of buyer–
supplier relationships (e.g. Bensaou, 1999) and the usefulness of TCO information to support purchasing 
decision-makers by undertaking a Value Chain Analysis (Shank & Govindarajan, 1992). However, due to the 
reluctance of people involved to share the information necessary for inter-firm cost minimization, firms may 
not always realize all gains from buyer-supplier negotiations. Research is therefore needed to untangle the 
interplay between the need to share information to optimize the activities across the supply chain and the 
reluctance to share private information.  
 
In the first manuscript we analyze how information sharing is impacted by the relative power structure 
between buyers and suppliers. The relative power structure is an important element in supply chains and in 
inter-firm relations (Anderson & Dekker; 2005; Buvik & Reve, 2002). Recent research also indicates that 
power differences influence information search strategies during negotiation (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004) 
and that it drives the processing of information about other people (Fiske & Depret, 1996).  
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Manuscript 1 demonstrates that, contrary to what is popularly believed, more refined information (i.e. TCO 
information) does not always result in better outcomes. The results of manuscript 1 also give insights into 
how information is employed to (jointly) solve problems, to share information and to be co-operative, and 
into  how  a  buyer  uses  information  to  signal  his  non-opportunistic  behavior  to  the  other  partner  in the 
relationship. This inspired the research setting for manuscript 2. 
 
Manuscript 2 
Manuscript 2 has been set up as a follow-up study to further investigate the role of information in relational 
signaling and in building trust. The relation between information and trust has received scant attention in the 
literature on inter-firm relations (Tomkins, 2001), certainly when compared to the relation between formal 
controls and trust, which has been extensively studied.   
 
In addition, recent experimental research shows contradicting results on the relation between these trust and 
formal controls. Malhotra & Murnighan (2002) found that the presence of formal control systems inhibits the 
development of trust, whereas Coletti et al. (2005) came to the opposite conclusion: if the nature of the 
control  system  is  such  that  it  initially  provides  economic  incentives  for  cooperation,  a  more  trusting 
relationship  may  develop  out  of  this  cooperation,  and  control  systems  may  eventually  facilitate  the 
development of trust. 
 
Although Coletti et al. (2005) have hinted at the mediating role of control-induced cooperation, their study 
lacks the context of typical interpersonal actions. Like in other prior work they used prisoners’ dilemma 
games to simulate trusting interactions. However, these studies provide no insights into real negotiation 
behavior, and the role of information and the exchange of information that characterize a real negotiation 
setting.  
   
To  overcome  these  shortcomings,  we  designed  an  experiment  that  explicitly  manipulates  the  available 
information and the formal control system, while allowing participants to share their private information. 
This enables us to fully explore the way in which trust is built in the relationship (the how of the trust 
building process) and the role that information plays in this process.  
 
The results of manuscript 2 also contribute to the ongoing discussion on the relation between formal controls 
and trust (i.e. whether they are substitutes or complements). Prior studies (Dekker; 2004; Tomkins, 2001) 
suggested that the relation between information, trust and formal controls may actually be non-linear. The 
results of manuscript 2 provide empirical support for these claims.  
 
Manuscript 3  
The third manuscript continues the line of research and has also been designed to further contribute to the 
discussion on the relation between trust and formal controls in inter-firm relations. This study is survey- 
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based since such set-up allows us to validate some of the findings from the experimental studies in a more 
natural  setting.  It  also  allows  us  to  treat  trust,  control  and  information  as  complex,  multidimensional 
constructs and to study their simultaneous impact on the relation.  
 
In this manuscript we extend the existing models that consider the design of control systems in inter-firm 
relationships (Das & Teng, 2001a; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000), by explicitly incorporating 
information  as  an  important  governance  mechanism  for  inter-firm  relationships.  Based  on  the  existing 
literature on inter-firm control systems, information is identified as a key inter-firm governance mechanism. 
This is in line with the findings of the experimental studies in manuscript 1 & 2.  
 
The  central  aim  of  manuscript  3  is  then  to  discuss  how  trust,  formal  controls  and  information  reduce 
perceived  risk.  Manuscript  3  places  the  decision  maker  at  the  central  core  and  reveals  what  type  of 
governance  mechanisms  are  used  to  counter  different  types  of  perceived  risks.  Risk  perceptions  of  the 
decision makers serve as the heuristic that helps to form their governance mechanisms (Das & Teng, 2001b).  
 
While previous studies on the relation between trust and controls typically treated the different governance 
mechanisms as uni-dimensional constructs, we explicitly model them as multidimensional constructs. By 
doing so, manuscript 3 reveals that the relation between the different governance mechanisms is far more 
complex than simply substitutive or complementary.    
 
Finally, as in manuscript 2, we hypothesize some non-linear relations between information, controls and trust 
(cf. Dekker, 2004; Tomkins, 2001). We make a distinction between buyer-supplier relations with and without 
prior ties and we find some important differences between these two groups in the effectiveness of the 
different governance mechanisms in reducing perceived risk.  
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Manuscript 1: The effect of cost information on buyer-supplier 





We investigate the influence of cost information on buyer-supplier negotiations in different power settings. 
Based on exchange theory, we expect that buyers with detailed cost information and less power than their 
opponent may try to (re)gain control over their own outcomes by sharing information. The results of our 
experiment indicate that the performance disadvantage of less powerful buyers is less pronounced when the 






The  academic  accounting  literature  recurrently  depicts  Total  Cost  of  Ownership  (TCO)  analysis  as  an 
important tool for negotiation between buyers and suppliers (Ellram, 1995a & 1995b; Roodhooft et al., 2003 
& 2005) as the refined cost and cost driver information resulting from a TCO analysis can be used to 
optimize and better coordinate the performance of activities across the supply chain. Previous research has 
highlighted  the  importance  of  information  sharing  to  the  effectiveness  of  buyer–supplier  relationships 
(Bensaou, 1999; Cachon & Fisher, 2000; Cachon & Lariviere, 2001; Gavirneni et al., 1999). Due to the 
reluctance of people involved to share the information necessary for inter-firm cost minimization, firms may 
not realize all gains from buyer-supplier negotiations (Baiman & Rajan, 2002; Drake & Haka, 2005).  
 
The objective of this study is to investigate whether power can motivate a failure to share private TCO 
information,  and  whether  this  might  result  in  less  effective  negotiation  outcomes  between  buyers  and 
suppliers. The relative power structure is an important element in supply chains and in inter-firm relations 
(Buvik & Reve, 2002). Recent research (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Depret, 1996) 
also indicates that power differences influence information search strategies and drive the processing of 
information about other people. This literature suggests thus that power may have a key role in the interplay 
between the need to share information to optimize the activities across the supply chain and the reluctance to 
share private information. 
 
Power can be broadly defined as the capacity to exert influence on other people (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). 
Although power may derive from a variety of “power bases” (French & Raven, 1959), it is the mutual 
dependence  of  individuals  that  allows  power  to  occur.  In  exchange  relations  such  as  negotiations,  B’s 
dependence on A increases with the value of the benefits A can give B, and it decreases with B's access to 
alternative  sources  for  those  benefits  (Emerson,  1972;  Kelley  & Thibaut, 1978). Accordingly, in many 
negotiation studies power has been operationalized as the availability of alternatives (e.g. Giebels et al., 1998 
& 2000; Pinkley, 1995; Pinkley et al., 1994). In this study we use a similar manipulation of power, when we 
analyze how information sharing is impacted by the relative power structure between buyers and suppliers. 
 
Researching  this  topic  is  important  because  purchasing  professionals  in  many  companies  still  need  to 
demonstrate the contribution they make to their firm (Carr & Pearson, 1999). In addition, the supply side of 
companies has become increasingly important over the last few decades. Costs of purchased goods and 
services  represent  the  majority  of  total  costs  for  most  companies (Degraeve & Roodhooft, 2001). It is 
relevant for both powerful and less powerful purchasing firms to understand which negotiation approaches 
will contribute to market success and profitability (Janda & Seshardi, 2001). 
 
Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) information is such a tool of which recurrently has been claimed in the 
literature (Ellram, 1995a & 1995b; Roodhooft et al., 2003 & 2005) that it can be employed by buyers when  
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negotiating with suppliers to optimize and better coordinate the performance of activities across the supply 
chain. This study demonstrates that contrary to what is popularly believed, more refined TCO information 
not always results in better outcomes and that the effect of power on information exchange is an important 
element to explain these results.  
 
The  results  of  our  experiment  show  that  the  performance  disadvantage  of  less  powerful  buyers  is  less 
pronounced when the buyer has detailed TCO information. Based on exchange theory, we expect that buyers 
with detailed TCO information and less power than their opponent may try to (re)gain control over their own 
outcomes by sharing information and by creating an integrative bargaining situation. Detailed analyses of the 
bargaining  behavior  support  this  hypothesis:  we  find  that  bargaining  behavior  mediates the moderating 
effects of cost information on the power to individual profit relation.    
 
The next section reviews the relevant literature and develops hypotheses. The experimental procedures are 
outlined in section three and the results are analyzed in section four. Section five includes discussion and 
suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Exchange models for negotiation 
 
Economic models of negotiation assume rational and self-interested action by all parties. If these economic 
models  provide  fully  accurate  descriptions  of  negotiation  outcomes,  empirical  research  would  be 
unnecessary:  behavior  could  simply  be  deduced  from  theory.  Recent  research,  however,  indicates  that 
negotiation behavior differs from the predictions of game-theoretic models. Building on behavioral decision 
making, research on two-party negotiations suggests that negotiators tend to (i) ignore the cognitions of 
others,  (ii)  be  overconfident,  (iii)  escalate  commitment,  (iv)  assume  that  outcomes  are  fixed-sum,  and 
therefore overestimate the competitiveness of their negotiation, (v) overweight readily available information, 
and (vi) be highly affected by the way their negotiation is framed (for a review see Bazerman et al., 2000). 
Evidence shows that, despite the existence of an agreement zone, deviations from rationality in individual 
decisions lead to disagreements and Pareto-inefficient agreements. Raiffa (1982) has argued that rational 
models are insufficient for either understanding or prescription and that advice to negotiators should depend 
on an understanding of the actual decision process of the opponent, rather than assuming that the other party 
is fully rational. Behavioral decision models and research offers a set of adjustments to rational models.  
 
Exchange models offer some perspective here (Bottom et al., 2006). Exchange models generally describe 
bargaining and negotiation as a process characterized by information exchange, joint-problem solving and 
persuasion (Alexander et al., 1994). A majority of research on industrial negotiations is based on theoretical 
perspectives drawn from both social exchange theory (Druckman, 1977; Gergen, 1969; Thibaut & Kelley,  
  20
1959) and exchange theory (Bagozzi, 1978; Homans, 1974). In this framework, negotiation outcomes (e.g. 
level of buyer and/or seller satisfaction, profits, whether or no agreement is reached) are seen as a complex 
interaction  of  three  constructs:  namely  negotiator  characteristics,  situational  characteristics,  and  the 
characteristics of the negotiation process itself (Campbell et al., 1988). In this view, negotiator characteristics 
and situational characteristics are seen as affecting both process-related behaviors and performance outcomes 
(Alexander et al., 1994). 
 
In this study, we control for negotiator characteristics
1 and focus on two situational characteristics. We test 
the influence of the availability of detailed cost information and the influence of the relative power structure 
of a buyer on the negotiation process and the resulting impact on the negotiation outcomes. First, we briefly 
discuss two basic types of negotiation behavior that may characterize the negotiation process. Then we 
discuss how cost information and power may influence the negotiation process and resulting outcomes.  
 
2.2 The negotiation process  
 
Distributive bargaining and problem solving are the two basic negotiation strategies that purchasing agents 
appear to pursue. Each strategy has a different role in the purchase process.  
 
Distributive  bargaining  (aggressive  or  competitive bargaining) addresses the issue of how the available 
benefits  are  to  be  distributed  between  the  two  parties  (Walton  &  McKersie,  1966).  More  specifically, 
distributive bargaining is characterized by the use of zero-sum or “win-lose” tactics such as communicating 
implicit or explicit threats, making excessive demands, promises, positional commitments, and persuasive 
arguments (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Distributive tactics can be appropriate for issues that are equally valued 
by  both  parties  (i.e.  distributive  issues).  However,  it  has  been  suggested  that  distributive  tactics  are 
counterproductive  when  they  are  inappropriately  applied  to  integrative  issues  and  that  they  set  a 
confrontational tone to the negotiation (Lax & Sebenius, 1986).  
 
Problem solving primarily involves discovering ways to increase the benefits available in the relationship 
(Walton & McKersie, 1966). In purchasing, bargaining is integrative to the extent that purchasing agents 
actively seek coordination with sellers to develop alternative purchasing arrangements that have the potential 
for reducing costs and/or increasing performance. The focus is on seeking an integrative solution that is 
achieved  via  open  and  accurate  informational  exchange,  mutually  concessionary  behaviors,  and  mutual 
respect for individual goals (Campbell et al., 1988). In a coordinative context, the focal negotiator will seek 
to minimize the use of any deleterious influence tactics (e.g. threats) in the negotiation because of his/her 
desire for a mutually beneficial outcome (Dant & Schul, 1992). Coordinative behavior such as open and 
accurate exchange of information and option flexibility have been linked to integrative agreements when 
tradeoffs based on issue priorities are evident (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975).  
                                                 
1 Negotiator characteristics are typically studied in marketing and psychology literature (e.g. Alexander et al., 1994).   
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2.3 Total Cost of Ownership and the concept of Value Chain Analysis 
 
Value Chain Analysis (VCA) is described as a technique that can play an important role in the management 
of supply chain relationships. This analysis was developed by Porter (1985), and in the accounting literature 
further developed by Shank (1989) and Shank and Govindarajan (1992 & 1993). VCA is used to analyze, 
coordinate and optimize linkages between activities in the value chain, by focusing on the interdependence 
between these activities. It facilitates the optimization and coordination of interdependent activities in the 
value chain, which may cross organizational boundaries (Dekker, 2003a). Accounting information is an 
important constituent of VCA.  
 
Traditional management accounting practices often only track the purchase price associated with a particular 
product or supplier and bury the costs of ordering, receiving, inspecting and using purchased goods in 
overhead accounts or general expenses (Carr & Ittner, 1992). By obscuring these additional costs, traditional 
management accounting systems encourage purchasing managers to focus on price and to select the lowest 
bidder without taking into account additional costs this supplier may introduce in the value chain of the 
purchasing organization (Degraeve & Roodhooft, 1999). 
 
Porter's criticism on what are now termed ‘traditional’ accounting systems refers to the inability of those 
systems  to  adequately  support  a  VCA.  Traditional  management  accounting  practices  are  based  on  the 
internally oriented concept of value added, which hinders firms in taking advantage of the opportunities to 
coordinate interdependence in the value chain. The value added perspective focuses on (maximizing) the 
difference between the firm's purchasing costs and selling price. Thereby it ignores linkages in the wider 
value chain, such as the causes of this purchasing price, the costs of activities related to the product, and the 
consequences of the product for the buyer's activities (Dekker, 2003a).  
 
Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) accounting systems account for costs that are caused by buying from a 
certain supplier, such as costs of ordering, delivery, quality and administration (Carr & Ittner, 1992). The 
TCO concept attempts thus to quantify all of the costs related to the purchase of a given quantity of products 
or services from a given supplier (Ellram, 1995a). The TCO approach received considerable attention during 
the last decade (for a review see Wouters et al., 2005).  
 
Many different types of TCO systems have been reported. A recent survey study even suggests that a generic 
model  of  TCO  is not appropriate (Ferrin & Plank, 2002). TCO-based models basically summarize and 
quantify all costs associated with the choice of supplier and subsequently adjust or penalize the unit price 
quoted by the supplier with this figure in some way (De Boer et al., 2001). Some firms have applied a dollar 
based  approach  while  others  have  kept  it  to  some  form  of  weighted  point  method  to  circumvent 
quantification problems (Ellram, 1994 & 1995b). Many TCO systems nowadays are ABC supported. Recent 
literature even defines TCO as an extension of ABC to a boundary-spanning context (Wouters et al., 2005).  
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They assert that TCO can be seen as an application of ABC that quantifies the costs that are involved in 
acquiring and using purchased goods and services. We adopt a view on TCO as it is described by Wouters et 
al. (2005): they explain that TCO presumes the existence of boundary spanning activities and that the intent 
of TCO information is to detect trade-offs along the value chain and to improve profitability by modifying 
how partners do business with each other, such as, which firm undertakes which activities. 
 
The literature suggests that a clear understanding of the TCO is beneficial in many purchasing situations. The 
information derived from a TCO analysis provides decision makers with an objective and easily understood 
argument for supporting and motivating a variety of purchasing decisions. It can be used to compare and 
evaluate different suppliers or supply contracts. The data allow managers to quantify and communicate areas 
of  non-performance  and  to  guide  supplier  performance  improvement  efforts.  It  can  also  be  used  in 
negotiations with suppliers to identify areas requiring contractual performance improvement. Suppliers can 
be  made  aware  of  the  extra  costs  they  generate  and  of  ways  to  improve  their  competitive  position by 
reducing these costs at the buyer side (Ellram, 1995a & 1995b; Monczka et al., 2002; Roodhooft et al., 2003 
& 2005). The cost (and cost driver) information resulting from the analysis can be used, as suggested by 
Porter (1985), to optimize and better coordinate the performance of activities across the supply chain.  
 
Prior research demonstrates that the presentation of costs/accounting data may have important implications 
on decisions. Northcraft & Neale (1986) reported that opportunity costs are relatively abstract and therefore 
less salient, in comparison to outright losses; therefore opportunity costs are more often overlooked. Prior 
research also found that financial quantifications carry more weight in decisions than non-financial data 
(Ittner  et  al,  2003;  Reck,  2001;  Schiff  &  Bento,  2000;  Schiff  &  Hoffman,  1996)  and  that  quantified 
information enhances persuasion, especially if it is regarded as objective (Kadous et al., 2005).  
 
TCO information quantifies the costs that are involved in acquiring and using purchased goods and services 
(Wouters et al., 2005) and makes that the buyer not solely focuses on the price, but also on the other costs. 
This is in contrast with traditional management accounting practices that often only track the purchase price 
associated with a particular product or supplier (Carr & Ittner, 1992). The financially quantified costs in a 
TCO  system  can  be  easily  communicated  and  are  perceived  as  more  objective  and  persuasive.  The 
possession of relevant information for the interactions places the buyer in a good position to work with the 
seller  in  identifying  and  assessing  alternative  courses  of  action  and,  thus,  increases  the  likelihood  that 
problem-solving efforts will be effective. Prior management accounting literature found indeed that common 
behaviors  and  understandings  can  be  built  up  more  readily  if  participants  can  draw  on  a  commonly 
understood  management  accounting  methodology  (Seal  et  al.,  1999).  Their  research  shows  that  the 
specification and sharing of this information can play a central role in inter-organizational negotiations as 
both sides in a manufacturing partnership learn about and respect each other’s constraints and objectives. 
The  possession  of  commonly  understood  accounting  information  serves  thus  an  important  function  in 
relational signaling and in building trust. Therefore we expect that:   
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H1a:   Buyers with TCO information will obtain a higher individual profit in negotiations than buyers 
with more traditional cost information. 
H1b:   TCO information increases a buyer’s level of problem solving behavior. 
 
2.4 The relative power structure 
 
Of all variables that have been identified as factors in negotiations, power is among the most important (De 
Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004). Especially power resulting from the availability of alternative negotiation partners 
is a core element in many negotiations (Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Giebels et al., 2000 & 2003). For 
instance,  sellers  who  know  of  other  buyers  interested  in  their  goods  or  services  are  able  to  exit  the 
negotiation  and  continue  the  negotiations  with  someone  else.  Having  an  alternative  negotiator  at  hand 
reduces  their  dependence  on  the  other  side  and  accordingly  weakens  the  other  party’s  power  position 
(Thibaut  &  Kelley,  1959;  Emerson,  1962).  Empirical  research  indeed  shows  that  negotiators  with  an 
attractive alternative feel less dependent and achieve higher personal outcomes than negotiators with a less 
attractive  or  no  alternative  option  (Pinkley  et  al.,  1994).  People  with  less  power  tend  to  have  lower 
aspirations, demand less, make more concessions, and receive smaller outcomes than those with more power 
(for a review see Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).  
 
H2a:   In an equal power setting buyers will obtain a higher individual profit than in an unequal 
power setting in which the buyer is dependent on the seller. 
 
A buyer’s relative power will affect his level of aggressive bargaining. As supplier competition increases, 
buyers can be expected to capitalize on the natural rivalry among suppliers to keep prices down and to 
promote product and service improvements. The buyer's use of aggressive bargaining tactics, many of which 
involve implicit or explicit threats (e.g. suggesting that the seller is in danger of losing the contract), should 
also be more credible when several suppliers are interested in the purchase contract. Compared to power 
balance, power differences lead to greater use of threats and punishments, making conflict escalation more 
likely (De Dreu, 1995; De Dreu et al., 1998). The increased effectiveness of aggressive bargaining associated 
with high supplier competition should reduce the buyer's need to solve problems with any given supplier or 
group of suppliers, and the marginal benefits of doing so under these conditions often may not be worth the 
cost (Perdue & Summers, 1991). Consequently, we expect that: 
 
H2b:   Buyers  in  an  equal  power  setting  will  use  less  problem  solving  techniques  and  more 
distributive bargaining techniques than buyers in an unequal power setting in which the buyer 
is dependent on the seller.  
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2.5 Interaction effect of power and cost information 
 
As we expect that TCO information has a positive effect on buyer’s use of integrative bargaining, while 
supplier competition (outside options) has a negative effect on buyer’s use of integrative bargaining and a 
positive effect on buyer’s use of distributive bargaining techniques, we can reasonably expect interaction 
effects of power and information on the bargaining process and outcomes. All the more, as information can 
be  regarded  as  a  form  of  power.  After  all  relative  power  manifests  itself  not  only  through  the market 
structure, but also through (private) information (Chatterjee & Ulvilla, 1982), whether that information 
concerns a party’s own or that party’s opponent’s preferences, payoffs or alternatives. 
 
Recent research indicates that power differences influence information search strategies during negotiation 
(Fiske, 1993; De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004). Power not only influences strategic decisions involving demands 
and the use of threats during negotiation. It also drives the processing of information about other people 
(Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Depret, 1996). When people depend on others, they may try to (re)gain control over 
their own outcomes by paying close attention to those persons so as to accurately predict their intentions and 
behaviors.  
 
Gelfand & Christakopoulou (1999) suggest that the interdependence can induce a person to be motivated to 
accurately predict other’s needs, desires, and possible actions, akin to low power individuals.  Several studies 
support this view. Erber and Fiske (1984) found that outcome dependency produced heightened attention to 
information that was inconsistent with someone’s expectations about another person. Copeland (1994) has 
argued that individuals with a power disadvantage have higher impression motivation than individuals with a 
power advantage. The idea is that lower power individuals may seek situational control by managing positive 
impressions of themselves (Goodwin et al., 2000). De Dreu & Van Kleef (2004) showed that negotiators 
with less power ask more diagnostic than leading questions, and more belief-congruent than incongruent 
questions, when facing a competitive rather than cooperative partner. Their research suggests that this result 
is caused by stronger accuracy and impression motivation among less powerful negotiators and that belief-
congruent rather than incongruent questions produce more positive impressions during negotiations.  
 
Therefore, we expect that buyers with TCO information and less power than their opponent may try to 
(re)gain control over their own outcomes by sharing information and by paying close attention to their 
opponent so as to accurately predict their intentions and behaviors. This way they create a more integrative 
bargaining situation than buyers with TCO information and an outside option, which are more prone to use 
an aggressive bargaining strategy. Buyers without TCO information will not be able to create this integrative 
bargaining situation as they lack the necessary information. Therefore, we expect that:  
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H3:   The performance disadvantage of less powerful buyers is less pronounced when the buyer has 
detailed TCO information because they will use more integrative bargaining strategies and less 
distributive bargaining strategies than more powerful buyers (with TCO information).  
 
 
3. Research method 
 
3.1 Experimental design 
 
The experiment uses a 2 (power: equal versus low) x 2 (detailed TCO information versus more traditional 
cost information) design. The first factor is the relative power between buyers and sellers. Relative power 
was manipulated through the availability of an outside option. Many negotiation studies have operationalized 
power as the availability of alternatives (e.g. Giebels et al., 1998 & 2000; Pinkley, 1995 & 1994). In the case 
of two-sided exit options the written instructions of the buyer and the seller contained a short paragraph 
about the presence of an alternative negotiation partner. Buyers and sellers were equally powerful as they 
had an outside option that would generate a similar profit (namely an outside option of 1000 Euro). This 
outside  option  is  relatively  unattractive  as  higher  gains  can  be  obtained  in  the  game  by  reaching  an 
agreement.  In  the  condition  without  an  outside  option  for  the  buyer,  buyers  were  given  the  standard 
negotiation task without exit options. These buyers had thus no outside option and were fully dependent on 
reaching an agreement with their partner to earn any money
2.  If no agreement was reached they would earn 
nothing, while their partner earned an outside option of 1000 Euro.  
 
The second factor is the buyer’s cost information. Buyers with TCO information had a payoff table with 
detailed cost information (TCO information). The TCO information quantified all relevant costs (in this case 
price, spare parts and maintenance) associated with the purchase of a given quantity of products or services 
from a given supplier (Ellram, 1995a). A dollar based approach is applied as costs are expressed in the same 
currency as the price. Buyers without TCO information only had an indication of the costs and the relative 
importance  of  each  of  the  issues  to  be  negotiated  (cf.  appendix  A).  This  corresponds  to  traditional 
management accounting practices that only track the purchase price associated with a particular product or 
supplier and that bury other costs of purchasing in overhead accounts or general expenses (Carr & Ittner, 
1992). They were informed on the fact that price was the most expensive issue, followed by maintenance and 
then by spare parts. Sellers were the same in each of the experimental cells: they had always an outside 
option of 1000 Euro and full cost and income information.  
 
                                                 
2 Consistent with prior research (for an overview see Wolfe & McGinn, 2005), the individual parties were aware of their own alternatives but not of 
those of the other party. If the buyer had no alternative, it was explained to the buyer that in the short run only the seller she was going to negotiate 
with, could deliver the required machines. This makes the buyer highly dependent, while the seller is unaware of this. This situation allows us to fully 
focus on the effects of the buyer’s situation (information and alternative) and how this affects negotiation behavior and outcomes, without having to 
deal with the complexity of the seller’s perceptions of his or her power over the buyer. This manipulation also has the added advantage of being a 
strong manipulation from the viewpoint of the buyer, without having to deal with the “obvious” result of virtually all of the profits going to the seller 
if the latter would be aware of the full dependence of the buyer.    
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3.2 Subjects and procedures 
 
Participants were recruited from a graduate management accounting course of a Masters program in business 
administration at a large West-European university. The course had covered traditional accounting methods, 
activity-based  costing,  TCO  and  supplier  selection  problems  before  the  experiment  took  place.  The 
experiment was run in a computer laboratory. Participation required appearing at a given place and time, and 
was  restricted  to  one  session  of  maximum  1  hour.  The  opportunity  to  earn  cash,  depending  on  their 
performance, was the only offered incentive. Participants earned 0.5% of their company’s profit (on average 
5.74 Euro; min = 0 Euro; max = 15 Euro). In total there were 208 subjects. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the experimental conditions. Procedures were identical for all treatments. Participants 
were either buyer or supplier.  
 
Buyers  and  suppliers  sat  in  different  rooms  so  that  participants  were  unable  to  identify  their  partner’s 
identity; hence personality effects and collusion were precluded. Participants read the instructions, describing 
their role position and the nature of the bargaining task, and played the game on their own pace. The seller 
started  the game by making a first offer. Participants could send messages along with their offers and 
counteroffers if they so desired. The game ended when (i) an agreement was reached, (ii) a player opted for 
the outside option or (iii) after 10 rounds. In the last case, participants were informed by the computer 
program that time was running out. This happened only in a few cases (4 out of 104).  
 
3.3 The bargaining task 
 
The bargaining task is based on a negotiation game developed by Kelley (1966) and applied by many other 
researchers (e.g. Campbell et al, 1988; De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Neu et al., 1988; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; 
Schurr & Ozanne, 1985). The game was adapted to suit a TCO setting. This means that the payoff tables of 
Kelley’s game were replaced by cost tables for the buyers and cost and income tables for the seller. The 
tables were constructed such that the minimum and maximum profits buyers and sellers could earn were the 
same (cf. appendix A). 
 
Buyers and sellers had to negotiate a lease contract for a set of machines. The buyer could earn a fixed 
income  (of  6000  Euro)  by  selling  end  products  to  an  end  customer.  The  instructions  explained  that 
maintenance and spare parts were needed to run the machines and to produce an end product. Consequently, 
the game involved the simultaneous negotiation of price, maintenance, and spare parts. For each of these 
issues nine different contracts were possible.  
 
Price is an income for the seller, but a cost for the buyer. The price issue was thus distributive in nature. This 
issue was worth the same for each negotiator, with preferences on the issue going in opposite directions. 
Consequently,  one  party’s  gain  was  equal  to  the  other  party’s  loss.  The  task  provided,  however,  an  
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opportunity for the parties to integrate their interests. The buyer had a comparative advantage in taking care 
of the spare parts and the seller had a comparative advantage in maintaining the machines. Since the issue 
that was most valuable to one party automatically was less valuable to the other party, it was possible for 
participants to trade off issues. Such “logrolling”, giving up on less valuable issues to maximize outcomes on 
the most valuable ones, would yield optimal joint outcomes. Optimal joint outcomes were reached when 
buyer and seller agreed on contract 5AZ. In this contract, the distributive issue (i.e. price) is set at the middle 
and the two integrative issues (maintenance and spare parts) are fully traded off. This situation is denoted 
with an asterisk (*) in appendix A. As cost tables were private, participants had to find out the possibility of 
a win-win solution through the process of offers and counteroffers and by exchanging information about 
their interests.  
 
3.4 Dependent variables 
 
3.4 1 Negotiation outcomes 
This study focuses on one key negotiation outcome, namely the individual profit of the buyer. The individual 
profit is the amount of money earned by a buyer at the conclusion of negotiations and is measured as the 
player’s individual profit level associated with final agreement in (the adapted) Kelley’s (1966) negotiation 
simulation.  Although  not  the  core  of  the  analysis,  the  study  also  briefly  discusses  the  results  for  the 
individual profit of the seller and the joint profit for the dyad.  
 
3.4.2 Negotiation behavior   
Negotiation behavior is derived from two sets of measures: a first set is based on interaction analysis and a 
second set is based on participants’ responses to the post-game questionnaire administered immediately 
following the negotiation exercise.  
 
First, interaction analysis (Putman & Fairhurst, 2001) was used for coding verbal behavior to examine 
categories  and  meanings  embedded  in  structural  pattern  of  talk.  The  classification  scheme  is  based  on 
negotiation communication coding schemes used in prior studies (e.g. Alexander et al., 1994; Boles et al., 
2000; De Dreu et al., 1998; Giebels et al., 1998, 2000 & 2003; Neu et al., 1988; Schurr & Ozanne, 1985). 
The  classification  scheme  is  included  in  appendix  B.  Three  judges,  who  were  blind  to  conditions  or 
hypotheses,  coded  each  negotiation  independently.  Inter-rater agreements, expressed in Cohen’s Kappa, 
varied between 0.75 and 0.95, all satisfactory values (Landis & Koch, 1977). After completing the coding, 
the coders compared their coding and reconciled disagreements by jointly revisiting the negotiation messages 
and producing a single set of codes for each subject. Negotiation behavior was determined from analyses of 
these codes.  
 
Messages sent by participants were coded for (a) integrative behavior, measured as information exchange, 
and  (b)  distributive  behaviors  such  as  sending  threats  and  issuing  warnings.  Three  independent  judges 
established  the  participant’s  information  exchange  about  priorities  and  numerical  values  reflecting  
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integrative behavior. Based on Neu et al. (1988), information exchange was coded “0” for participants not 
revealing any information about their cost structure; “1” for participants revealing the relative importance of 
each of the three to be negotiated issues without revealing any numerical values and “2” for participants 
revealing the relative importance of each of the three to be negotiated issues and the numerical values of the 
different contracts. Distributive behavior is a summated scale calculated by adding five behavior types 
together and determining the mean value. The five behavior types are: general threats, exit threats, warnings, 
commitment and punishments (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81).  
 
Second, bargaining behavior was also derived from post-bargaining questionnaires. Participants rated their 
opponent’s bargaining strategies on four items. The different items were derived from prior studies (e.g. 
Campbell et al., 1988) and are listed in appendix B. They measure the overall problem solving approach of 
the buyers as assessed by the seller (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88). Again a summated scale was obtained by 





4.1 Experimental checks 
 
On completion of the task, participants filled out a post-bargaining questionnaire with five-point scales 
checking  for  motivation,  task  understanding  and  their  usage  of  cost  reports.  All  of  the  checks  on  the 
experimental inductions (on cost information relevance and power) are statistically significant and have 
means in the appropriate direction. More powerful buyers judged themselves as more powerful (F(1,102) = 
14.61, p < 0.01) and buyers with TCO information judged the cost information they had more relevant than 
the buyers with traditional cost information (F(1,102) = 41.62, p < 0.01). Checks on procedures, including 
the subject involvement in the task (motivation, fun), their understanding of the instructions and the payoff 
tables and whether they had enough time to complete the exercise, appropriately showed no differences 
between conditions (p > 0.10). Means on these questions indicated that they were highly involved (Mean = 
4.33; st.d. = 0.69), that they assessed the exercise as “fun” (Mean = 4.07; st.d. = 0.70), that they understood 
the instructions (Mean = 4.41; st.d. = 0.77) and the payoff tables (Mean = 4.62; st.d. = 0.51) and that they 
had enough time to complete the task (Mean = 4.40; st.d. = 0.98). We also checked whether participants in 
different experimental cells required an equal amount of time to read the instructions and get familiar with 
the game before actually starting the game. No differences between the experimental conditions were found 
(p > 0.10). Participants needed on average 559 seconds (9.3 minutes) to read the instructions. Analyses 
revealed neither main nor interaction effects for participant gender on negotiation process or outcomes. 
Therefore gender was excluded from further analysis.      
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4.2 Negotiation outcomes 
 
Results
3,4 are reported in Table 1.1. H1a predicted that buyers with TCO information would obtain a higher 
individual  profit  than  buyers  with  more  traditional  cost  information.  As  expected,  buyers  with  TCO 
information obtained significantly higher individual profits (F(1, 100) =  52.90, p < 0.01). As expected in 
H2a, buyers in an equal power setting obtained higher individual profits (F(1, 100) =  14.02, p < 0.01), than 
buyers who were dependent on the seller. The results also yielded a power*cost information interaction (F(1, 
100) = 4.58, p < 0.05). The performance deficit for less powerful buyers actually disappeared when they had 
TCO information: the individual profits of buyers with TCO information, and with or without an outside 
option, do not differ significantly (mean =1148.33 versus mean =1007.69; F(1,54) = 2.46, p > 0.10). The 
performance deficit of less powerful buyers is thus less pronounced when the buyers have detailed TCO 
information, providing support for hypothesis H3.  
 
Table 1.1: Analysis of the negotiation outcome and behavior of the buyer 
Panel A: Summary statistics for the negotiation outcomes and behavior of the buyer
a  
  TCO information  traditional cost information 
    outside option  no outside option  outside option  no outside option 





















































Panel B: ANOVA for the negotiation outcomes and behavior of the buyer
 b  
    cost information  Power  cost information 
* power 



















0.13  1.20 


















     
a   Variable definitions in Appendix C. The cells of the table in Panel A contain, for each of the experimental cells, the means and the (standard 
deviation) for the variables individual profit, information exchange, integrative behavior, requests for information and distributive behavior.  
b   Panel  B  presents  the  results  of  five  ANOVA  analyses.  The  dependent  variables  are  respectively  individual  profit,  information  exchange, 
integrative behavior, requests for cooperation and distributive behavior. Cost information and power are the between-subject factors. Reported 
are the F-statistics. (***), (**), (*) indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
  
                                                 
3  A correlation matrix of all variables included in the study is provided in appendix C. 
4 Analyses were performed for all subjects in the study. However, analyses of the data without including the subjects not reaching agreement yielded 
the same results.   
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Table 1.1 also reports the results of the analyses on the individual profit of the seller and on joint profit. An 
ANOVA on the individual profit of the seller revealed main effects for power and cost information. Sellers 
facing less powerful buyers earn higher individual profits (F(1, 100) =  17.46, p < 0.01). However, sellers’ 
individual profit is lower when they play against buyers with TCO information (F(1, 100) =  15.80, p < 
0.01). Joint profits are significantly higher when the buyer possesses TCO information (F(1, 100) =  15.78, p 
< 0.01).  
 
These results imply that the high individual profits for buyers with TCO information but without an outside 
option are not to be explained by the fact that they know “how to fool” the (more powerful) sellers, but by 
the fact that these dyads realize higher joint profits than dyads in which the buyer has an outside option 
(mean joint profit = 2446.15 versus mean joint profit = 2336.67). Sellers facing a buyer without an outside 
option earn more than their less powerful opponent (mean individual profit buyer = 1007.69 versus mean 
individual power seller = 1438.46), reflecting the power imbalance. These less powerful buyers with TCO 
information are, however, somehow able to earn similar individual profits as buyers with an outside option. 
In order to explain these negotiation results, we analyze the negotiation behavior of the participants.   
 
4.3 Negotiation behavior  
 
In order to test H1b and H2b, analyses were performed on the negotiation behavior variables.  An ANOVA 
on information exchange
5 revealed main effects for cost information (F(1,100) = 6.14, p < 0.05) and power 
(F(1,100) = 4.16, p < 0.05): buyers with TCO information disclosed more information than buyers with 
traditional information and more powerful buyers disclosed less information than less powerful buyers.  
 
An ANOVA on distributive behavior resulted in main effects for cost information (F(1,100)  = 5.77, p < 
0.05) and power (F(1,100)  = 14.20, p < 0.01), and in a significant interaction effect (F(1,100) = 4.89, p < 
0.05). The two main effects are positive. This indicates that TCO information as well as power significantly 
increase the use of distributive bargaining tactics. The interaction effect is also positive, meaning that buyers 
with TCO information and with an outside option significantly use more distributive bargaining techniques 
than buyers in the three other experimental conditions.  
 
Negotiation behavior of the buyer was also assessed by the composite measure of problem solving approach. 
Main effects were found for cost information (F(1,100) = 242.00, p < 0.01) and power (F(1,100) = 15.85, p < 
0.01),  as well as an interaction effect (F(1,100) = 3.44, p < 0.10). Thus, according to the sellers, less 
                                                 
5 Problem solving behavior was also derived from the messages sent by participants. Integrative behavior is based on two measures: the number of 
rewards and the number of positive normative appeals (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70). Cooperative behavior was also assessed by counting the explicit 
requests for cooperation. However, this latter measure did not load with the rewards and the appeals on one factor and was therefore excluded from 
the cooperative behavior measure. An analysis on the composite measure of integrative behavior revealed a main effect for power (F(1,100) = 4.13, p 
< 0.05) and an interaction effect of cost information and power on integrative behavior (F(1,100) = 5.02, p < 0.05). Less powerful buyers use more 
integrative bargaining techniques (F(1,102) = 4.71, p < 0.05) than buyers with an outside option. However, within the group of less powerful buyers, 
buyers with TCO information made more extensive use of integrative bargaining techniques (F(1,46) = 3.40, p < 0.10). An ANOVA on the explicit 
requests for cooperation revealed main effects for cost information (F(1,100) = 10.45, p < 0.01) and power (F(1,100) = 6.39, p < 0.05), as well as an 
interaction effect (F(1,100) = 5.73, p < 0.05). Pairwise comparisons with Tukey tests indicated that buyers with TCO information and no outside 
option request more frequently for active cooperation than buyers in the three other conditions (p < 0.01).   
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powerful buyers used more problem solving techniques than buyers with an outside option and buyers with 
TCO  information  made  more  extensive  use  of  problem  solving  techniques  than buyers with traditional 
information. Overall these results provide strong support for hypotheses H1b and H2b. 
 
4.4 Test of mediation and moderation 
  
Based on exchange theory, we hypothesized a mediation effect of the negotiation process on the negotiation 
outcome (H3). More specifically, we expected that the interaction effect of power and cost information could 
be  explained  by  the  negotiation  behavior.  We  hypothesized  that  negotiation  behavior  mediates  the 
moderating effect of cost information on individual profit. To test this relationship, we use Baron & Kenny’s 
(1986) framework for combining mediation and moderation. We performed the analyses for the two most 
widely used negotiation behaviors, namely integrative (measured as information exchange) and distributive 
behavior (e.g. Giebels et al., 2000), as well as for the measure of the overall problem solving approach of the 
buyers as assessed by the seller. 
 
First, we consider the effect of information exchange. The analysis proceeds in three steps as shown in Table 
1.2. The first step is a regression analysis of power, cost information and their interaction on the outcome 
variable (individual profit). The two main effects were significant and the significant interaction effect 
indicated  moderation.  In  the  second  step,  two  equations  were  estimated.  First  information  exchange  is 
regressed on power, cost information, and their interaction effect power*cost information. Second, individual 
profit is regressed on power, cost information, their interaction and information exchange.  
 
Eventually, in step three, one equation is estimated: individual profit is regressed on power, cost information, 
power*cost  information,  information  exchange  and  the  interaction  term  cost  information*information 
exchange. This last equation is identical to the second Step 2 equation, but the cost information*information 
exchange term has been added. The key question is the extent to which the power*cost information effect on 
individual profit is reduced in moving from Step 2 to Step 3. Information exchange mediates the moderating 
effects  of  cost  information  on  power  if  the  following  conditions  are  met  (Baron  &  Kenny,  1986):  (1) 
power*cost information must have less of an effect on individual profit at Step 3 than at Step 2, and the 
interaction term cost information*information exchange must affect individual profit and (2) in Step 2 cost 
information  should  affect  information  exchange,  which  results  in  power*cost  information  and  cost 
information*information exchange being correlated.  
 
As can been seen in Table 1.2, all these conditions are met: the interaction effect on individual profit is 
reduced in Step 3 and has dropped to a non-significant level. This implies that information exchange and not 
cost information moderates the power to individual profit relation. Hence, information exchange mediates 
the moderating effects of cost information on power.   
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Table 1.2: Three step regression procedure for testing mediation and moderation of information exchange
a 
  Step 1  Step 2  Step 3 
  individual 
profit 






















power  516.26 







power*cost information  -375.62 













      651.51 
(***) 
R²  










a   Variable definitions in Appendix C. The table presents the results of four regression analyses. In Step 1, the dependent variable individual profit 
is regressed on the variables cost information, power and the interaction term power*cost information. In Step 2, first the dependent variable 
information exchange is regressed on the variables cost information, power and the interaction term power*cost information. Then, the dependent 
variable individual profit is regressed on the variables cost information, power, the interaction term power*cost information and information 
exchange.  In  Step  3,  the  dependent  variable  individual  profit  is  regressed  on  the  variables  cost  information,  power,  the  interaction  term 
power*cost information, information exchange and the interaction term cost information*information exchange. Regression coefficients are 
reported. (***), (**), (*) indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
The same three-step-procedure is undertaken for problem solving approach (cf. Table 1.3). The results are 
very similar to the results obtained in Table 1.2. Lastly, the three-step procedure is also undertaken for 
distributive bargaining behavior (cf. Table 1.4). Again we see that the power*cost information effect on 
individual profit is reduced in moving from Step 2 to Step 3 (though it does not drop to non significance). 
This implies that distributive behavior only partially moderates the cost information to individual profit 
relation.  
 




  Step 1  Step 2  Step 3 

























power  516.26 







power*cost information  -375.62 










cost information * problem solving 
approach  
      670.37 
(***) 
R²  










a   Variable definitions in Appendix C. The table presents the results of four regression analyses. In Step 1, the dependent variable individual profit 
is regressed on the variables cost information, power and the interaction term power*cost information. In Step 2, first the dependent variable 
problem solving approach is regressed on the variables cost information, power and the interaction term power*cost information. Then, the 
dependent variable individual profit is regressed on the variables cost information, power, the interaction term power*cost information and 
problem  solving  approach.  In  Step  3,  the  dependent  variable  individual  profit  is  regressed  on  the  variables  cost  information,  power,  the 
interaction  term  power*cost  information,  problem  solving  approach  and  the  interaction  term  cost  information*problem  solving  approach. 
Regression coefficients are reported. (***), (**), (*) indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Table 1.4: Three step regression procedure for testing mediation and moderation of distributive behavior
a 
  Step 1  Step 2  Step 3 
  individual 
profit 









































      -931.62 
(*) 
R²  










a   Variable definitions in Appendix C. The table presents the results of four regression analyses. In Step 1, the dependent variable individual profit 
is regressed on the variables cost information, power and the interaction term power*cost information. In Step 2, first the dependent variable 
distributive behavior is regressed on the variables cost information, power and the interaction term power*cost information. Then, the dependent 
variable individual profit is regressed on the variables cost information, power, the interaction term power*cost information and distributive 
behavior.  In  Step  3,  the  dependent  variable  individual  profit  is  regressed  on  the  variables  cost  information,  power,  the  interaction  term 
power*cost information, distributive behavior and the interaction term power*distributive behavior. Regression coefficients are reported. (***), 
(**), (*) indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
As a last set of analyses, we test for the overall mediation effects of the negotiation process (cf. Table 1.5)
6,7. 
A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted in which dummy variables representing the manipulations 
were entered at Step 1 and the proposed sets of mediators were entered at Step 2 (cf. Weingart et al., 1996). 
Results for regression (1) are very similar to the results we obtained with the ANOVA analysis: both main 
effects and the interaction effect are significant. The R² of the model is 0.41 and is highly significant (p < 
0.01). When the process variables are added to the equation, the interaction effect of power*cost information 
drops to a non-significant level (coefficient = -233.69, p > 0.10). All process variables reach significance. 
Information exchange has a negative impact on individual profit (coefficient = -467.70, p < 0.01). However, 
the  positive  and  significant  interaction  effect  of  cost  information*information  exchange  (coefficient  = 
700.11, p < 0.01) implies that this negative relation between information exchange and individual profit is 
only true for buyers lacking TCO information. Buyers with TCO information and exchanging information 
have a significant higher individual profit. Distributive behavior has a positive effect on individual profit 
(coefficient = 1188.89, p < 0.05), but not for the buyers with power (coefficient = -1181.94, p < 0.05). In 
addition, the R² of the model increased significantly from 0.41 to 0.52 (F for change in R² = 5.76, p < 0.01). 
These results provide support for hypothesis H3, as well as for the exchange model of negotiations. 
 
                                                 
6 The process variables in Table 1.5 are information exchange and distributive behavior (and their interaction with respectively cost information and 
power). Replacing the information exchange variable by the problem solving behavior variable yielded the same results.   
7 Finally, also some sensitivity analyses were performed to test the robustness of the results against different ways of measuring negotiation behavior. 
First, similar results are obtained when information exchange was coded 0 for participants not revealing any information about their cost structure; 1 
for participants revealing the relative importance of each of the three to be negotiated issues (with or without the numerical values). Second, 
participants also rated their own bargaining strategies. The problem solving behavior of the buyer assessed by the buyer is highly correlated with the 
problem solving behavior of the buyer assessed by the seller (Pearson correlation = 0.41, p < 0.01). However, as one of the four items (the item asking 
whether they were honest or deceptive) assessed by the buyer, did not load with the other items on one factor, the problem solving construct is based 
on the seller’s assessment of the buyer’s behavior. Similar results are obtained and conclusions remain the same in case the problem solving approach 
construct combines the items from both the sellers’ and the buyers’ questionnaires.     
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Table 1.5: Hierarchical regression results for individual profit of the buyer
a 
    Equation 1:  
situational characteristics 
Equations 2:  
situational characteristics and negotiation process 
















information exchange    -467.67 
(***) 
cost information*information exchange    700.11 
(***) 
distributive behavior    1188.89  
(**) 
power*distributive behavior    -1181.94 
(**) 
R²  0.41  0.52 




Change in R²   0.11 
F for change in R²  5.76 
(***) 
 
a  Variable definitions in Appendix C. The table presents the results of two regression analyses. First, the dependent variable individual profit is 
regressed on the variables cost information, power and the interaction term power*cost information. Second, the dependent variable individual 
profit is regressed on the variables cost information, power, the interaction term power*cost information, information exchange, the interaction 
term cost information*information exchange, distributive behavior and the interaction term power*distributive behavior. Regression coefficients 
are reported. (***), (**), (*) indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This  paper  examined  the  moderating  effect  of  cost  information  (TCO  information  versus  traditional 
information) on a buyer’s individual profit when buyer power was high or low. The interaction effect of cost 
information and power on buyers’ individual profit is supported. Our results indicate that the availability of 
detailed TCO information can alleviate the disadvantage dependent buyers face vis-à-vis a more powerful 
seller.  This  result  has  profound  managerial  implications.  On  the  one hand, this result implies that less 
powerful buyers can compensate their power disadvantage by gathering more detailed cost information. On 
the other hand, powerful buyers do not seem to be able to use this more detailed cost information to enhance 
their power advantage so as to obtain an even higher individual profit.  
 
We obtained insights into this result by examining the negotiation process. Consistent with exchange theory 
we expected that buyers with detailed cost information and less power than their opponent try to (re)gain 
control over their own outcomes by sharing information and by paying close attention to their partners so as 
to accurately predict their intentions and behaviors. Detailed analyses of the bargaining behavior indeed 
support this hypothesis. We find that more powerful buyers choose a more distributive and less integrative 
strategy. These results confirm findings from prior research (Perdue & Summer, 1991; De Dreu et al., 1998). 
We find also an unexpected positive main effect of cost information on distributive behavior. However, as 
indicated by the interaction effect of cost information and power on distributive behavior, this main effect 
can be explained by the finding that specifically the buyers with TCO information and power are prone to 
use distributive techniques.   
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From these results we can conclude that the manipulation of power and cost information resulted in buyers 
using different negotiation techniques or strategies. The less powerful buyers who have access to TCO data 
will  use  problem  solving  behavior,  whereas  powerful  buyers  rely  on  aggressive  bargaining  techniques. 
Particularly interesting is, however, that the problem solving strategy of less powerful buyers with TCO 
information seems to be effective, whereas the aggressive bargaining strategy of more powerful buyers 
appears to fail. Indeed, we find that the individual profit of these two groups did not significantly differ. 
These results may be explained by the fact that less powerful buyers are able to create a cooperative and 
coordinated relationship, in which the seller is willing to consider the objectives of the buyer. When the 
source  gives  information  about  needs  and  preferences  and/or  makes  concessions  generating  movement 
towards a prominent solution, the target is likely to reciprocate (Campbell et al., 1988; Gouldner, 1960). This 
may explain the higher individual profits for less powerful buyers with TCO information. Less powerful 
buyers lacking TCO information are not able to communicate the right information and are therefore unable 
to create this integrative situation. More powerful buyers, on the other hand, have a false feeling of power 
and choose an aggressive bargaining strategy that, in a tit-for-tat fashion, is responded to by an aggressive 
bargaining strategy of the seller. The aggressive bargaining strategy of the powerful buyer may not be 
effective when he is facing a powerful seller.  
 
First support for these conjectures was found in our follow-up analyses, in which we tested whether the 
moderation effect of cost information on the power to individual profit relation (i.e. interaction effect of 
power and TCO information) can be explained by the choice of a negotiation strategy. We found indeed that 
the interaction effect of power and cost information is mediated by the bargaining behavior of the buyer. 
Furthermore,  a  limited  analysis  of  the  bargaining  behavior  of  the  seller  (not  reported)  disclosed  the 
reciprocate nature of his bargaining behavior. An ANOVA on information exchange of the seller revealed a 
main effect for cost information: sellers facing buyers with TCO information disclosed more information 
than sellers facing buyers with traditional information. Furthermore, we also found that sellers facing a 
powerful buyer with TCO information issued more threats and referred more often to their outside option 
than sellers in the other experimental conditions. Recall that the experimental manipulation for the sellers 
was the same in each of the experimental conditions: sellers had always an outside option and full cost 
information. The differences in bargaining behavior of the sellers across the different experimental cells need 
thus to be explained as a result of their interaction with the buyers. These findings provide support for our 
conjecture that less powerful buyers are able to create a cooperative relationship, in which the seller is 
willing to follow. This resulted not only in higher individual profits, but also in higher joint profits for the 
dyad.  
 
Our results suggest thus that powerful buyers with refined TCO information may not realize all possible 
benefits from buyer-supplier interactions due to their bargaining strategy. Their (false) feeling of power 
causes an increase of distributive bargaining tactics and a reluctance to share the necessary information for 
optimizing the activities across the supply chain (i.e. logrolling of the activities). This implies that powerful  
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buyers may only benefit from more refined accounting information systems if these firms undertake efforts 
to encourage information sharing and to discourage aggressive bargaining strategies of their employees.  
 
Finally, we present some limitations and further research possibilities.  
 
First,  while  the  experimental  context  induced  by  a  simple  negotiation  game  (Kelley,  1966)  allows 
maintaining  control  over  exogenous  variables,  the  scope  for  generalizing  the  conclusions  is  somewhat 
limited.  Other  factors,  such  as  the  incentive  system,  past  negotiation  history,  future  negotiations 
probabilities, etc. have been shown to impact negotiated outcomes but were not manipulated here. Further 
research is necessary to determine the sensitivity of the results to several experimental parameters included 
in the current study. 
 
Second, this study did not manipulate the negotiation context for the seller: the sellers faced the same 
experimental conditions in all four cells. They were always fully informed and powerful. As a consequence, 
our  conclusions  do  not  generalize beyond negotiation settings in which the seller is always at least as 
powerful as the buyer. Further research can alter the experimental conditions and examine the role of TCO 
information from both buyer and seller perspectives. 
 
Third, although optimal joint outcomes are introduced, the paper focuses mainly on the outcome of one 
party. This focus underplays the cost/benefit trade-off of obtaining the additional information needed for 
TCO. It is interesting to consider whether buyers would be willing to incur a cost in order to obtain TCO 
information if it had been efficient to do so.  
 
Fourth, a related issue is the gathering of high quality TCO information. This is not a trivial challenge. In 
TCO systems costs need to be captured with a great level of detail: by supplier and by item purchased 
(Ellram, 1995a). Part of the problem of calculating TCO seems to come from the fact that purchasing 
managers must rely on important information provided to them by other departments in the organization 
(Milligan, 1999). Degraeve et al. (2005) provide case studies of three different industrial components groups 
in a firm to illustrate how a TCO system can be constructed from a firm’s information systems. TCO 
information can be acquired from prior experiences or from comparable transactions and/or suppliers. In its 
most progressive form, however, TCO is a boundary spanning concept that involves supplier cooperation 
and information sharing (Wouters et al., 2005). In the latter case, the TCO knowledge resides (partly) with 
the seller. This may be the case for instance when the buyer has little experience in buying a particular 
product. In this case, the results of the experiment may no longer hold as the seller may only be willing to 
share his information if he is confident that it is not subsequently used against him during price negotiations. 
Or more importantly, if the seller does share the information required by the buyer to calculate his TCO, the 
buyer may have more difficulty to demonstrate his willingness to be vulnerable and to create an integrative  
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bargaining situation. The latter element, as demonstrated by our experiment, is a crucial element for less 
powerful buyers to regain control over their outcomes.  
 
Fifth, our manipulation of TCO information obviously remained a simplification of reality, providing many 
avenues for further research. The focus in this study is on the use of TCO data and on how this information 
influences buyer-supplier negotiations. We took a deterministic approach to TCO information which allows 
us to study the impact of cost information on negotiation behavior and outcomes. The aim was neither to 
describe a value chain and ABC analysis or to discuss how the data can be collected and what the problems 
related to this aspect are (cf. Degraeve et al., 2005), nor to identify and categorize important TCO cost 
drivers (cf. Ferrin & Plank, 2002) or to discuss the drivers for successful adaptation of TCO systems (cf. 
Wouters et al., 2005). However, more research is needed on this topic as survey studies with purchasing 
professionals indicate that firms are unsure about their ability to effectively identify the critical cost drivers 
for estimating TCO (Ferrin & Plank, 2002) and that they are largely in the dark when it comes to making 
TCO calculations (Milligan, 1999).  
 
Future  research  may  consider  aspects  such  as  how  buyers  gather  TCO  data  (e.g.  from  the  seller, 
benchmarking, past experience) and the type of TCO systems (formal vs. informal, standardized vs. unique 
models) installed and how these design aspects impact buyer-supplier relations and negotiations. Interesting 
is also the examination of the effects of imperfect TCO information. In our study, we provided perfect TCO 
information. In a real business environment, TCO information is, however, characterized by mistakes and 
simplifications, which may have important implications on the negotiation process and outcomes. Related to 
this it would be interesting to consider how costs that are difficult to measure (e.g. costs related to downtime 
as a result of poor quality or opportunity costs of lower sales and margins due to consumer dissatisfaction) 
are or can be included in a TCO system. Although ideally TCO systems also account for these costs (Carr & 
Ittner, 1992), most total cost systems do not include this type of costs such as productivity losses resulting 
from increased congestion, confusion and downtime or revenue losses from lost goodwill when defective 
products reach the customer because of the difficulty in measuring these costs reliably (Ittner et al., 2001). 
Note that these costs are typically not recorded in a buyer’s accounting system (Baiman et al., 2000), but 
they  may  represent  a  substantial  cost  in  total  costs  (Ittner  et  al.,  2001). Future research may therefore 
investigate  how  the  negotiation  process  and  outcomes  are  influenced  when these less objective or less 
reliable figures are explicitly included in the TCO system. Finally, further research may consider whether 
audited TCO figures would be considered more reliable and what the implications are of audited (either by a 
third party or by the partner) TCO figures on trust and the relation.  
 
Further research is thus needed to unravel the usefulness of accounting information in inter-firm negotiations 






Experimental cells and corresponding cost tables 
 
  Power 
  No outside option  Outside option 
Cost information     
TCO information  Cell 1 (n= 30)  Cell 2 (n= 26) 
Traditional cost information  Cell 3 (n= 26)  Cell 4 (n= 22) 
 
Cost table for the seller (in cell 1. 2. 3 and 4)
8: 
Price (=income)  Maintenance  Spare parts 
Contract 1  600  Contract A *  1350  Contract R  2250 
Contract 2  1200  Contract B  1200  Contract S  2000 
Contract 3  1800  Contract C  1050  Contract T  1750 
Contract 4  2400  Contract D  900  Contract U  1500 
Contract 5 *  3000  Contract E  750  Contract V  1250 
Contract 6  3600  Contract F  600  Contract W  1000 
Contract 7  4200  Contract G  450  Contract X  750 
Contract 8  4800  Contract H  300  Contract Y  500 
Contract 9  5400  Contract I   150  Contract Z *  250 
 
Cost table for the buyer with TCO information (in cell 1 and 2): 
Income  = 6000     
Price (=cost)  Maintenance  Spare parts 
Contract 1  600  Contract A *  250  Contract R  150 
Contract 2  1200  Contract B  500  Contract S  300 
Contract 3  1800  Contract C  750  Contract T  450 
Contract 4  2400  Contract D  1000  Contract U  600 
Contract 5 *  3000  Contract E  1250  Contract V  750 
Contract 6  3600  Contract F  1500  Contract W  900 
Contract 7  4200  Contract G  1750  Contract X  1050 
Contract 8  4800  Contract H  2000  Contract Y  1200 
Contract 9  5400  Contract I  2250  Contract Z *  1350 
 
Cost table for the buyer with traditional cost information (in cell 3 and 4): 
Income  = 6000     
Price (=cost)  Number of maintenance sessions performed by the 
buyer each month 
Spare parts procured by the buyer from a third 
party each month 
Contract 1  600  Contract A *  1  Contract R  3  
Contract 2  1200  Contract B  2  Contract S  6 
Contract 3  1800  Contract C  3  Contract T  9 
Contract 4  2400  Contract D  4  Contract U  12 
Contract 5 *  3000  Contract E  5  Contract V  15 
Contract 6  3600  Contract F  6  Contract W  18 
Contract 7  4200  Contract G  7  Contract X  21 
Contract 8  4800  Contract H  8  Contract Y  24 
Contract 9  5400  Contract I  9  Contract Z *  27 
                                                 
8 The tables were constructed such that the minimum (-3000 Euro) and maximum profits (5000 Euro) buyers and sellers could earn were the same. 




Measuring negotiation behavior 
 
B1. Behavioral coding categories 
Category  Examples 
Information exchange  -  Maintenance is more expensive for my company than spare parts. 
-  The contracts for maintenance starts at €250 (=contract A) and increases with €250 until €2250 (= 
contract I); the contracts for spare parts starts at €150 (=contract R) and increases with €150 until €1350 
(= contract Z). 
General threats   -  Make a concession or you will be in trouble. 
Exit threats  -  Respond with a concession or I will call another supplier. 
Punishment   -  This negotiation is going nowhere. 
Warnings   -  My company has a policy against uncooperative supplier. 
Positional commitment   -  I refuse to concede any further. 
-  I refuse to drop below my present level. 
 
B2. Buyers’ problem solving approach 
Observed ratings from sellers’ questionnaires (items were reverse coded) 
Do you feel that the person with whom you were paired was more interested in solving your mutual problem, or more self-interested? 
                    1               2               3               4              5 
Solving a mutual problem                                          Self-interested                                                             
Rate your partner’s bargaining strategies on the following scales: 
                    1               2               3               4              5 
Accommodating                                                        Exploitative                                                                 
                    1               2               3               4              5 
Honest                                                                        Deceptive 
                    1               2               3               4              5 





Bivariate correlation matrix (n=104). 
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a  Buyer’s individual profit at the end of game (based on the cost table provided in Appendix A). 
b  Seller’s individual profit at the end of game (based on the cost table provided in Appendix A). 
c  Joint profit is the sum of buyer’s individual profit and seller’s individual profit at the end of game. 
d   Information exchange was coded “0” for buyers not revealing any information about their cost structure; “1” for buyers revealing the relative 
importance of each of the three to be negotiated issues without revealing any numerical values and “2” for buyers revealing the relative 
importance of each of the three to be negotiated issues. 
e   Coded from the messages sent by buyers (based on the behavioral coding scheme in Appendix B1). Based on five distributive behavior types 
(general threats, exit threats, positional commitment, punishments, warnings) with Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81. 
f   Buyer’s problem solving approach based on observed ratings from seller’s questionnaire (based on the four items included in Appendix B2) with 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88.
 
g  Dummy variable, experimentally manipulation: 0 for traditional cost information, 1 for TCO information. 
h  Dummy variable, experimentally manipulation: 0 for buyers with no outside option, 1 for buyers with an outside option.  
 
(*)     Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  





Manuscript 2: How information and controls impact the formation 






This study explores the way trust is built at the level of the inter-firm relationship and the role that controls 
and information play in this process. We use a 3 (no, weak or strong control system) X 2 (traditional versus 
more refined Total Cost of Ownership information) experimental design to investigate the influence of cost 
information  and  its  interaction  with  inter-firm  control  systems  on  buyer-supplier  negotiations  and  on 
resulting  outcomes.  Based  on  Tomkins  (2001)  and  Dekker  (2004)  we  expect some non-linear relations 
between information, controls and trust. In an early phase of the relationship, we expect and find evidence of 
a positive relation between formal controls and trust as well as a positive association between information 
and trust on negotiation outcomes. Furthermore, we find that information and controls form substitutes in the 
formation of trust. We explain these results by explicitly investigating the negotiation process. At a later 
stage in the relation, information has no longer a positive impact on joint profits, while, depending on the 
information available, trust may replace the need for information exchange. We conclude that the negotiation 





1.  Introduction 
 
Inter-firm relationships are characterized by a number of specific risks such as the exchange of sensitive 
information, the fair division of cost and benefits and the appropriation of investments to be made in specific 
assets (Dekker, 2003a). These concerns require cooperating firms to have confidence that opportunistic 
behavior will not occur. Confidence may be derived from the presence of trust or it may be gained from 
formal controls or refined information. It is important for managers to cultivate an optimal mix of these 
governance mechanisms because they interact with each other (Lui & Ngo, 2004) and they are not costless to 
develop (Parkhe, 1993).  
 
Prior studies showed contradictory results on the relation between trust and controls, i.e. whether trust is a 
substitute or a complement for formal control mechanisms. Some prior studies provide evidence of the 
complementary roles of trust and control in cooperative relationships (Luo, 2002; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  
Other researchers argue that the more trust one has, the less control one needs over a partner (Madhok 1995; 
Nooteboom 1996). Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) even found that the presence of control systems inhibits 
the development of trust.  
 
Recent research indicates that the relationship between trust and control is more complex: trust and control 
may be complements or substitutes depending on the situation. Woolthuis et al. (2005) conducted four 
longitudinal  case  studies  to  reveal  that  trust  and  controls  can  be  complements  as  well  as  substitutes, 
depending on the purpose and the content of the formal agreement. Lui & Ngo (2004) showed that the 
relationship between contractual safeguards and cooperative outcomes depends on both the level and the 
type of trust (goodwill trust and competence trust). Fryxell et al. (2002) examined the moderating effects of 
age and partner trust on the relationship between control mechanisms and perceptions of performance in 
international joint ventures (IJVs) and found a positive relation in younger IJVs, but a negative relation in 
more mature IJVs.  
 
One prior study, although in an intra-organizational context, hints at a more dynamic perspective according 
to which the interpersonal interaction involved in the execution of control systems may actually contribute to 
the development of trust. If the nature of the control system is such that it initially provides economic 
incentives for cooperation, a more trusting relationship may develop out of this cooperation, and control 
systems may eventually facilitate the development of trust (Coletti et al., 2005).  
 
Coletti et al. (2005) have hinted at the mediating role of control-induced cooperation, but their study lacks 
the context of typical interpersonal actions. Like in other prior work they used prisoners’ dilemma games to 
simulate trusting interactions. However, these studies do not provide insights into real negotiation behavior, 
such as the use of distributive tactics and the exchange of information that characterize a real negotiation 
setting, and that influences negotiation outcomes.   
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We argue that prior studies have neither fully explored the way in which trust is built in the relationship (the 
how of the trust building process), nor the role that information plays in this process. While several authors 
have raised questions about the relationship between trust, information and control (e.g. Langfield-Smith & 
Smith, 2003; Dekker, 2004; Tomkins, 2001), there is hardly any study on how information and formal 
controls relate to the process of trust building  (Vosselman & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2004).  
 
Our contribution is threefold. First, we conduct the first empirical investigation of the role of information in 
the relation between inter-firm controls and trust. We demonstrate empirically the existence of non-linear 
relations between information, trust and controls (cf. Dekker, 2004; Tomkins, 2001). At an early stage of the 
relation, we find evidence of a positive relation between formal controls and trust as well as a positive 
association between information and trust on negotiation outcomes. Later in the relationship, information has 
no longer a positive impact on joint profits, while, depending on the information available, trust may replace 
the  need  for  information  exchange.  Our  second  contribution  is  the  investigation  of  the  interpersonal 
processes by which trust is built at the level of the relationship. We not only explain negotiation outcomes, 
but also take into account the negotiation process that leads to these outcomes. This process, characterized by 
information exchange and distributive behavior has largely been ignored in the accounting literature. Our 
study demonstrates that the negotiation process, characterized by information exchange, plays a crucial role 
in explaining negotiation outcomes. Third, this study operationalizes more refined cost information as Total 
Cost of Ownership (TCO) information and provides evidence on how TCO may help building a higher level 
of  buyer-supplier  trust.  A  recurring  theme  in  the  accounting  literature  on  TCO  information  is  that  it 
represents an important and useful tool for negotiation between buyers and suppliers (Ellram, 1995a & 
1995b; Monczka et al., 2002; Roodhooft et al., 2003 & 2005). This study is one of the first to provide 
empirical evidence for these claims.  
 
Furthermore, we study the effects of control strength. The everyday use of formal controls leads to questions 
about the ultimate strength of the bonds that they have created. Investigating the effects of contract strength 
has  therefore  been  identified  as  a  clear  avenue  for  new  research  (Malhotra  &  Murnighan,  2002).  For 
example, a weaker control system may fail to provide strong enough incentives for cooperation. In such a 
case,  the  feedback  may  reveal  shirking  and,  as  a  result,  lead  to  heightened  levels  of  distrust  among 
collaborative partners. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section two, the relevant literature is reviewed and 
hypotheses are formulated. Section three covers the research method, whereas results are reported in section 




2.  Literature review and hypotheses 
 
Dekker (2004) and Tomkins (2001) provided interesting insights into the relation between trust and control, 
and between trust and information, respectively. Dekker (2004) argues that the relationship between trust and 
controls may be nonlinear. Until a certain threshold (determined by the relation’s transaction hazards) the 
use of formal controls may be complementary and enhancing to trust. However, since trust is the low-cost 
solution, it will substitute formal controls whenever a sufficient level of control is realized for safeguarding 
the transaction. Partners will not unnecessarily use expensive formal control mechanisms and in addition risk 
damaging the quality of their relationship (Dekker, 2004). This implies that, in an early phase of the relation, 
where trust still needs to be built, one would expect a positive relation between formal controls and trust. 
However, at a later stage in the relation, trust may replace formal controls.  
 
While Dekker (2004) provides us with insights into the relation between trust and formal control systems, 
Tomkins  (2001)  gives  us  a  better  understanding  of  how  information  and  trust  are  related.  While  prior 
literature (e.g. Wicks et al., 1999) conclude that there is an inverse relationship between the willingness to 
trust and the need for information, Tomkins (2001) describes the relationship between trust and information 
during  different  stages  of  the  relationship  life  cycle  as  an inverted U-shape: in the early stages of the 
relationship trust and information are additively related, while later on they become substitutes. Tomkins 
(2001) reasons that it is probably true to say that, at any specific point of time, there is a reasonably strict 
inverse association between information and the level of trust (i.e. trust intensity), but this assumes that the 
level of trust intensity is somehow given, quite independent of any other activity. It ignores the fact that trust 
derives from learned, usually interactive, experiences and that this process itself depends upon information 
as well as appropriate information depending upon the state of trust.  
 
Although the exchange of information and its relation to inter-firm controls and trust has been less well 
investigated, Seal et al. (1999) offer some suggestions on how management accounting may contribute to the 
development of dyadic business relationships. Although their fieldwork revealed that a partnership may be 
organized by the enactment of inter-dependence and through the establishment of shared meanings, these 
common behaviors and understandings can be built up more readily if participants can draw on a commonly 
understood management accounting methodology. Indeed, their research shows that the specification and 
sharing  of  cost  data  can  play  a  central  role  in  inter-organizational  negotiations  as  both  sides  in  a 
manufacturing partnership learn about and respect each other’s financial and commercial constraints and 
objectives. Therefore they submit that, both in inter- and intra-organizational environments, accounting may 
play  a  constitutional  role  in  the  establishment  and  management  of  trusting  and  collaborative  business 
relationships  (Seal  et  al.,  1999).  Thus  accounting  proves  to  be  able  to  serve  an  important  function  in 
relational signaling and thus in building trust. It generates information in order to (jointly) solve problems, to 
share information for allocation purposes, to be cooperative and supporting in a need-situation or to account 
for  a  mishap  (Vosselman  &  Van  der  Meer-Kooistra,  2004).  Ness  &  Haugland  (2005)  came  to  similar  
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conclusions in their case study on the cooperation between the Norwegian Road Authorities (NRA) and a 
private contractor. The initial information-sharing and problem-solving behavior, followed by successful 
implementation, gave the parties positive experiences. These initial positive experiences from exploiting the 
integrative potential led to a reinforcement of trust as a governance mechanism and problem solving as a 
negotiation  strategy.  Such  explicit  and  implicit  information  sharing  made  it  possible  to  understand  the 
partner’s concerns and interests, and the parties learned to identify the integrative potential in different 
situations. Trust and relational norms were reinforced over time, and became important structural conditions 
that fostered a more cooperative climate where both parties yielded on issues to the other’s advantage. It also 
restrained the use of contending tactics (Ness & Haugland, 2005). 
 
So, once one takes a dynamic view of a relationship, one sees that there is likely to be a positive association 
between information and trust at earlier stages of relationship development simply because trust itself cannot 
be increased without further information. However, as trust intensity becomes established at higher levels in 
later stages of the relationship, it is likely that less information will be needed to sustain that relationship 
(Tomkins, 2001).  
 
We can conclude that controls and information serve a similar role in the trust building process and can thus 
be regarded as substitutes. In an early stage, information or controls are required to build up trust; however, 
once a certain level of trust has been established, it is expected that controls and information are less needed 
to sustain the relation. This can be explained through the negotiation process: trust gives rise to expectations 
that the other party will continue to behave cooperatively and non-opportunistically during the remainder of 
the relationship (Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2004). Indeed, exchange theory prescribes that norms 
develop through interactions, as do trust and other key variables (Roloff, 1981). As Ring & Van de Ven 
(1992) point out, relational norms evolve over time, as exchange partners establish behavioral rules for 
processes such as conflict resolution, monitoring, joint problem solving, and the like. 
 
So far, the discussion has been in general terms about the role of information in inter-firm relations. Many 
different forms of inter-firm relations exist, however, each with specific information needs (for a detailed 
listing see Tomkins, 2001). In this study, we focus on buyer-supplier relations and the use of Total Cost of 
Ownership (TCO) information.  
 
Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) accounting systems account for costs that are caused by buying at a certain 
supplier, such as costs of ordering, delivery, quality and administration (Carr & Ittner, 1992). The TCO 
concept attempts thus to quantify all of the costs related to the purchase of a given quantity of products or 
services from a given supplier (Ellram, 1995a). Many TCO systems nowadays are ABC supported (Wouters 
et al., 2005) and the cost (and cost driver) information resulting from the analysis can be used to optimize 
and better coordinate the performance of activities across the supply chain. TCO information can be used 
when negotiating with suppliers to identify areas requiring performance improvement: suppliers can be made  
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aware of the extra costs they generate and the ways to improve their competitive position by reducing these 
costs at the buyer side (Ellram, 1995a & 1995b; Monczka et al., 2002; Roodhooft et al., 2003 & 2005).  
 
We focus on TCO information for two specific reasons. First, it allows us to test recurring claims in the 
literature on the usefulness of TCO information for negotiation between buyers and suppliers (Ellram, 1995a 
& 1995b; Monczka et al., 2002; Roodhooft et al., 2003 & 2005). Although is has often been claimed that 
TCO  information  can  be  used  in  negotiations  with  suppliers  to  identify  areas  requiring  contractual 
performance improvement, empirical evidence is still lacking. Second, by focusing on TCO we can test the 
above expectations on the non-linear relation between trust and information in a concrete context. Although 
it is clear that different inter-firm relations have different information needs, all of them exhibit a staged 
development of the balance between trust and information as the relationship develops (Tomkins, 2001). We 
expect therefore that the relation between TCO information and trust will also be non-linear.  
 
Based on the above observations, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
At an early stage of the relationship  
H1:   TCO  information  has,  through its positive impact on a dyad’s problem solving behavior, a 
positive impact on (a) the dyad’s trust and (b) joint profit.  
H2:   Formal controls have, through their positive impact on problem solving behavior and their 
negative impact on a dyad’s bargaining behavior, a positive impact on (a) the dyad’s trust and 
(b) joint profit. 
H3:   As both formal controls and TCO information help building trust at an initial stage, we expect 
controls and information to form substitutes in their relation to (a) a dyad’s trust and (b) joint 
profit. 
 
At a later stage of the relationship 
H4:   TCO information has, through its positive impact on a dyad’s problem solving behavior, a 
positive impact on joint profit. 
H5:   Trust has, through its positive impact on problem solving behavior and its negative impact on a 
dyad’s distributive bargaining behavior, a positive impact on a dyad’s joint profit. 




3. Research method 
 
3.1 Experimental design  
 
An experiment has been used as research method. The experiment consists of three consecutive negotiation 
games between buyers and sellers
9 and uses a 3 (control system: no, weak or strong) x 2 (information: 
traditional  cost  information  vs.  more  refined  TCO  information)  design.  Manipulation  of  control  and 
information was as follows.  
 
3.1.1 Control system 
The participants under the “strong control system” (SCS) condition were informed that an auditor had been 
hired to supervise the negotiations and that both firms had agreed on this control system (cf. Coletti et al., 
2005). If the auditor observed that a player had shared false or faulty information in order to mislead his/her 
partner, the player would be penalized
10. For the participant this meant that he would earn no bonus for that 
negotiation round. Participants under the “weak control system” (WCS) condition were informed that there 
was a 10% chance that an auditor would observe the negotiations and that both firms had agreed on this 
control system. If the auditor observed that a player had shared false or faulty information in order to mislead 
his/her partner, the player would be penalized in the same way (= no bonus). Participants under the “no 
control system” (NCS) condition did not face the possibility of auditor controls. Once participants had 
completed the two first negotiation rounds, the computer program informed them that no auditor would 
supervise in the final game. Thus, in the last round, the “strong control system”, the “weak control system” 
and the “no control system” conditions are identical in structure. This identical control structure in the last 
game allows us to isolate the effect of trust
11. As a result we can measure and compare the development of 
trust over the different control conditions. This is further explained in the section on the measurement of the 
dependent variables.   
 
3.1.2 Information 
Information was manipulated by providing the buyer with traditional cost information or Total Cost of 
Ownership (TCO) information, the latter being our operationalization of more refined cost information. A 
recurring theme in the accounting literature on TCO information is that it represents an important and useful 
tool for negotiation between buyers and suppliers (Ellram, 1995a & 1995b; Monczka et al., 2002; Roodhooft 
et  al.,  2003  &  2005).  TCO  information  can  be  used  when  negotiating  with  suppliers  to  identify  areas 
requiring performance improvement: suppliers can be made aware of the extra costs they generate and the 
                                                 
9 Inter-firm relations come in a variety of forms and structures – such as joint ventures, minority equity alliances, joint R&D, joint production, long-
term supply agreements, and so on. The type of the relation has significant implications for the roles of trust, control and information (Birnberg, 1998; 
Tomkins, 2001). As our experiment involves the negotiation between buyers and suppliers, our results may not be generalizable to other types of 
inter-firm relations.        
10 The control literature distinguishes between two main modes of formal control: behavioral and outcome control (Ouchi & Maguire, 1975). The 
operationalization of the control system in this experiment focuses on behavioral control as the control system is indented to reduce opportunistic 
behavior (i.e. sharing false information in order to mislead the partner) and not on outcome control. This may restrict the validity of our results to 
behavioral control situations.  
11 In order to avoid end-of-game effects, players ware not aware of the fact that the third round was the last one. This is discussed in more detail in the 
procedure section (3.2).    
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ways to improve their competitive position by reducing these costs at the buyer side (Ellram, 1995a & 
1995b;  Monczka  et  al.,  2002;  Roodhooft  et  al.,  2003  &  2005).  The  cost  (and  cost driver) information 
resulting from the analysis can be used, as suggested by Porter (1985), to optimize and better coordinate the 
performance of activities across the supply chain. The possession of relevant information for the interactions 
places the buyer in a strong position to work with the seller in identifying and assessing alternative courses 
of action and, thus, increases the likelihood that problem-solving efforts will be effective (Barlow & Eisen, 
1983). Buyers with TCO information had a payoff table with detailed cost information showing all costs 
expressed in monetary figures, whereas buyers with traditional information only had an indication of the 
costs and the relative importance of each of the issues to be negotiated. This corresponds to traditional 
management accounting practices that only track the purchase price associated with a particular product or 
supplier and that bury other costs of purchasing in overhead accounts or general expenses (Carr & Ittner, 
1992). Sellers received the same information in each of the experimental cells: they always had full cost and 
income information. This manipulation results in six experimental cells as indicated in Appendix A. 
 
3.2 Subjects and procedures 
 
Participants were recruited from a graduate management accounting course of a Masters program in business 
administration at a large West-European university. The course had covered traditional accounting methods, 
ABC, TCO and supplier selection problems before the experiment took place. The experiment was run in a 
computer laboratory. Participation required attendance at a specific place and time, and was restricted to one 
session of maximum two hours. The opportunity to earn cash, depending on their performance, was the only 
incentive offered. In total there were 294 subjects. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six 
experimental  conditions.  Procedures  were  identical  for all conditions. Participants were either buyer or 
supplier. Buyers and suppliers sat in different class rooms so that participants were unable to identify their 
counterpart;  hence  personality  effects  and  collusion  are  precluded.  Participants  read  the  instructions, 
describing their role position and the nature of the bargaining task, and played the game on their own pace. 
The seller started the game by making a first offer. Every participant played three
12 different, but similar, 
games against the same partner. The games are simplified Kelley (1966) games. During the first two games, 
one third of the dyads were under the no controls situation, one third was under the weak controls situation 
and the last third was under the strong controls situation. After playing two games, the control systems 
disappeared. This meant that all experimental cells were similar with respect to the control system (no 
controls) in the third, last game. However, manipulation of the information remained the same during the 
three  games:  buyers  had  during  the  three  games  either  traditional  information  or  TCO  information. 
Participants could send messages along with their offers and counteroffers if they desired. Each game ended 
when (i) an agreement was reached, (ii) a player opted to end the game, receiving nothing, or (iii) after 10 
bidding rounds. In the last case, participants were informed by the computer program that time was running 
up. This happened only in 2 out of 147 cases. Participants earned 3 Euro for participating, plus a bonus of 
                                                 
12 All participants played three negotiation games. In order to avoid end-of-game effects, all players were informed that they would play anything 
between 2 and 5 rounds against the same counter-partner. In reality, however, all participants played three rounds.  
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0.1% of their company’s profit (on average participants earned 9.26 Euro; min = 4.53 Euro; max = 13.28 
Euro). 
 
3.3 The bargaining tasks 
 
The bargaining tasks are based on a negotiation game developed by Kelley (1966) and have been applied by 
many other researchers over the last decades
13. The game was adapted to suit a TCO setting. This means that 
the “payoff tables” of Kelley’s game were replaced by cost tables for the buyers and cost and income table 
for the seller (cf. appendix B). Participants were not shown their counter-partner’s payoff table; they were 
only able to gain insights into their counter-partner’s profit and costs schedule through the process of offers 
and counteroffers and through the messages they sent throughout the negotiations.  
 
In the first negotiation game, buyers and sellers had to negotiate a lease-contract for a set of machines. The 
buyer could earn a fixed income by selling end-products to an end customer. The instructions explained that 
maintenance and spare parts were needed to keep the machines running and to produce an end-product for 
the end customer. The game thus involved the simultaneous negotiation of three issues: a price contract, a 
maintenance  contract  and  a  spare  part  contract.  For  each  of  these  issues  five  different  contracts  were 
possible. Price was an income for the seller, but a cost for the buyer. Consequently, the price issue was 
distributive in nature. This issue was worth the same for each negotiator, with preferences on the issue going 
in opposite directions. Consequently, one’s gain was equal to the other’s loss. The task provided, however, 
an opportunity for the parties to integrate their interests and thus for win-win situations. The buyer had a 
comparative advantage in taking care of the spare parts while the seller had a comparative advantage in 
maintaining  the  machines.  Since  the  issue  that  was  most  valuable  to  one  party  automatically  was  less 
valuable to the other party, it was possible for participants to trade off issues. Such “logrolling”, giving up on 
less valuable issues to maximize outcomes on the most valuable one, would yield a fully integrative solution 
or Pareto optimal solution. The Pareto optimal solution is the solution whereby no dyad member can improve 
without the opposite party being worse off; no other combination of contracts offers as much or more profit 
to both parties. The Pareto optimal solution was reached when buyer and seller agreed on contract 3AV. In 
this  agreement,  the  distributive  issue  (i.e.  price)  is  set  at  the  middle  and  the  two  integrative  issues 
(maintenance and spare parts) are fully traded off. This situation is highlighted in bold in appendix B. As 
cost tables were private, participants had to find out the Pareto optimal solution through the process of offers 
and counteroffers and by exchanging information about their interests. The second and the third negotiation 
games were very similar. The second game involved the simultaneous negotiation of three issues concerning 
a set of spare parts: a price contract, the delivery time and the payment terms. Buyers were instructed that 
they preferred a short delivery time for the spare parts, but a long payment term as this costs less to them. For 
each issue seven different contracts were available. Again a Pareto optimal solution (4GR) could be reached 
by setting the distributive issue (i.e. price) at the middle contract and by trading off the two integrative issues 
                                                 
13 e.g. De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Neu et al., 1988; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Schurr & Ozanne, 1985 
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(delivery time and payment terms). The third game involved the negotiation for a lease contract of a new set 
of machines and was almost identical to the first game, except that the costs were somewhat different. The 
cost tables for game 2 and 3 are also provided in appendix B. 
 
3.4 Dependent variables 
 
3.4.1 Negotiation outcomes 
Trust  is  the  central  outcome  variable  of  interest.  H2  predicts  that  participants  in  the  “control  system” 
conditions  will  be  judged  as  more  trustworthy  than  those  in  the  “no  control  system”  condition.  This 
prediction depends on the ability of the control system to provide feedback, so that both buyer and seller can 
observe  control-induced  cooperation.  Therefore  we  allow  for  two  periods  of  play  before  assessing  the 
perceived trustworthiness of each participant’s partner. Before playing the last game, participants judged the 
likelihood  that  their  counter-partners  would  honestly  share  information  (=  behave  cooperatively). 
Specifically, they answered, “How likely is it that your partner will cooperate?” on a 7-point Likert scale (cf. 
Coletti  et  al.,  2005).  Trust  may  be  conceptualized  as  the  perceived  likelihood that another person will 
cooperate, absent any economic incentives to do so (Coletti et al., 2005). Because this question was asked 
after game 2, after the prospect of an auditor’s visit had been removed, this question operationalizes our 
definition of trust
14. A dyad’s trust was obtained by averaging the responses of the buyer and the seller per 
dyad
15. A second important outcome variable is the joint profit of the dyad. The joint profit of dyad is the 
total of the buyer’s profit and the seller’s profit at the end of a game. Joint profit is measured after game 1, 
game 2 and game 3.  
 
3.4.2 Negotiation behavior 
Interaction analysis (Putman & Fairhurst, 2001) was used for coding verbal behavior to examine categories 
and meanings embedded in structural pattern of talk. The classification scheme is based on negotiation 
communication coding schemes used in prior studies (e.g. Alexander et al., 1994; Boles et al., 2000; De Dreu 
et al., 1998; Giebels et al., 1998, 2000 & 2003; Neu et al., 1988; Schurr & Ozanne, 1985). The classification 
scheme is included in appendix C. Three judges, who were blind to conditions or hypotheses, coded each 
negotiation independently. Inter-rater agreements, expressed in Cohen’s Kappa, varied between 0.68 and 
0.89, all satisfactory values (Landis & Koch, 1977). After completing the coding, the coders compared their 
coding and reconciled disagreements by together reviewing the negotiation messages and producing a single 
set of codes for each subject. Negotiation behavior was determined from analyses of these codes.  
 
                                                 
14 Our operationalization of trust is not concerned with a partner’s ability to perform in accordance with agreements (competence trust), but with his 
intentions to do so (goodwill trust) (cf. Sako, 1992). The generalizability of our results may therefore be restricted to situations of goodwill trust. 
Furthermore, it is also important to note that our definition of trust differs from a game-theoretic perspective (e.g. Williamson, 1993), which assumes 
that trust occurs when the economic incentives favor cooperative behavior (Coletti et al, 2005).   
15 Results are reported for the dyad’s trust, joint profits and behavior. Analyses for buyers and sellers separately indicate that trust, joint profits and 
behavior results for buyers and seller are very similar for dyads in which the buyer has TCO information. For dyads in which the buyer has traditional 
information, however, buyers earn less and have less trust than their counter-parts.   
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Messages sent by participants were coded for (a) problem solving behavior, operationalized as information 
exchange about numerical values and priorities (b) distributive behavior such as sending threats and issuing 
warnings. The three independent judges established the participant’s information exchange about priorities 
and numerical values reflecting integrative problem solving behavior. Information exchange was coded 0 for 
participants not revealing any information about their cost structure; 1 for participants revealing the relative 
importance of each of the three issues to be negotiated. Distributive behavior is based on five behavior types: 
lies, threats, warnings, commitment and punishments. Each of these five types of distributive behavior was 
coded 1 if the behavior was present in the messages sent by a participant and 0 if not (cf. Neu et al., 1988). A 
participant’s distributive behavior is measured as the average of these five types of behaviors. As with the 
outcome variables, a dyad’s problem solving behavior and distributive behavior were obtained by averaging 
the result for the buyer and the seller.   
 
Appendix D lists the descriptive statistics for each variable in the study, including reliability measures 
(Cronbach’s alpha), which ranged from 0.75 to 0.84. These all exceed the minimum value of 0.70, which is 
usually considered acceptable (Nunnally, 1978). Thus, the items within each variable are highly correlated 
with  one  another  and  therefore  reliable  predictors  of  that  latent  variable  (Hair  et  al.,  1998).  The  high 
reliability  measures  also  provide  confidence  that  the  items  in  each  variable  were  measuring  a  single 
construct. Factor analyses (not reported) indicate that the different distributive behavior tactics load on one 
factor in each negotiation round. Appendix E contains a correlation matrix, which reveals that none of the 
variables are too highly correlated with each other. 
 
 
4.  Statistical analysis and results 
16 
 
The analyses proceed in two stages. First, the effects of controls and information on the trust building 
process and on joint profit are analyzed. Then, in a second stage, we analyze the effects of the built-up trust 
and information on subsequent performance.   
 
4.1 Early stage of the relation  
 
We analyzed the data using 2 x 3 analysis of variance (ANOVA) designs. Table 2.1 presents descriptive 
statistics and ANOVA results for the behavioral variables (problem solving and distributive behavior) and 
for the outcome variables (trust and joint profit). As experimental conditions and results in game 1 and 2 are 
                                                 
16 Some experimental checks were performed before statistical analyses were undertaken. On completion of the task, participants filled out a post-
bargaining questionnaire with seven-point scales checking for motivation, task understanding and their usage of cost reports. Checks on procedures, 
including the subject involvement in the task (motivation, fun), their understanding of the instructions and the payoff tables, and whether they had 
enough time to complete the exercise, appropriately showed no differences between conditions (p > 0.10). Means indicated that they were highly 
involved (Mean = 5.88; st.d. = 1.08), that they assessed the exercise as “fun” (Mean = 5.70; st.d. = 1.13) and that they understood the instructions 
(Mean = 6.39; st.d. = 1.03). Buyers with TCO information judged the cost information they had more relevant than the buyers with traditional cost 
information (F(1,146) = 27.53, p < 0.001). Analyses revealed neither main nor interaction effects for gender of participants on negotiation process and 
outcomes. Because this variable did not influence other measures and did not interact with the experimental manipulations, gender was excluded from 
further analyses.     
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very similar, and in order to make the reporting of the results not unnecessary complex, the results for game 
1 and 2 were averaged. As the experimental conditions changed after the second game, the results on the 
third game are reported separately in the next section.  
 
The first set of ANOVA tests contains the main effects of the type of information (information = 0 for 
traditional cost data and 1 for TCO information) and inter-firm control system (no control system (NCS) = 0, 
weak control system (WCS) = 1, and strong control system (SCS) =2) on dyads’ behavior, on joint profits in 
the first two games and on the dyads’ trust
17. It also induces their interaction. H1 and H2 predict that 
controls, respectively information, will have a positive impact on a dyad’s trust and on a dyad’s joint profit 
and that these results can be explained by the mediating effect of behavior. Furthermore, H3 predicts that 
controls and information form substitutes in their relation to trust and joint profit. In order to test these 
hypotheses, an ANOVA was performed on the trust variable and on the joint profit variable. We find a main 
effect for information (F(1,141) = 5.92, p < 0.05): participants in dyads with TCO information trust each 
other more. This result provides support for hypothesis H1a. As predicted in H2a, we also find a main effect 
for controls (F(1,141) = 5.39, p < 0.01). Thus, after all control system had been removed, participants judged 
their opponent as more trustworthy in the conditions where a control system was in place during the first two 
negotiation rounds than in the condition where control systems were never in place. A Tukey HSD post hoc 
test for homogenous subsets (not reported) reveals that the WCS and the SCS form a homogenous subset, 
whereas the NCS condition forms a separate subset, indicating that the weak control system is equally 
effective in building trust as the strong control system. The significant interaction effect of cost information 
and control system on the trust variable (F(1,141) = 2.78, p < 0.10) indicates that controls and information 
are, to a certain extent, substitutes in their relation to trust. More specific, we find that in the presence of a 
control  system  participants  judge  others  to  be  equally  trustworthy,  irrespective  of  the  cost  information 
available (TCO information or not), but that in the absence of a control system, participants will judge others 
to be more trustworthy when there is TCO information available than when there is no TCO information 
available.  These  results  support  hypothesis  H3a.  An  ANOVA  on  joint  profit  reveals  a  main  effect  for 
controls  (F(1,141)  =  2.51,  p  <  0.10),  indicating  that  dyads  reached  higher  joint  profits  in  the  control 
conditions than in the no control condition (as predicted in H2b). We also find a highly significant main 
effect for information (supporting H1b): participants in dyads with more refined information obtain higher 
joint profits (F(1,141) = 9.65, p < 0.01). Contrary to H3b, no interaction effect of information and control 
system  on  joint  profit  was  found  (F(1,141)  =  0.77,  p  >  0.10).  These  results  imply  that  more  refined 
information as well as control systems have a positive effect on a dyad’s trust and on a dyad’s joint profit. 
However, control systems and refined information only form substitutes in their relation to a dyad’s trust and 
not in relation to joint profits.  
 
                                                 
17 Analyses were performed for all subjects in the study. However, analyses of the data without including the subjects not reaching agreement yielded 
the same results. Very few dyads did not reach an agreement: in game 1 all dyads reached agreement, in game 2 only two dyads out of 147 did not 
reach agreement, while in game 3 three out of 147 dyads did not reach agreement.  
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) and AN(C)OVA results (F-statistic and 




 Variable  No tco;  
NCS 
No tco;  
WCS 

























































 Variable  Information   control system  Information 
* control system 

























 Variable  information   control system  Information 
* control system  Problem solving  distributive 
behavior 





















F-statistics are reported. ***, **, * indicates a p-value of ≤ 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 in a two-tailed test. 
 
(a)  Participants’ assessment of their partners’ trustworthiness on a 7-point Likert scale. Specifically, participants answered “How likely is it that 
your partner will cooperate?” after being told that no control system would be in place in the future. Results wee averaged per dyad. 
(b)    Joint profit of dyad is the total of the buyer’s profit and the seller’s profit. 
(c)  Problem solving is coded 1 if participant shares private cost information, zero otherwise. 
(d)   Based on 5 distributive behaviors (lies, threats, positional commitment, punishments, and warnings).  
 
To test for the mediating effect of behavior, we first performed ANOVA’s to test the effect of controls and 
information on behavior, then in a second stage, ANCOVA’s, with behavior as covariates, are used to test 
the overall effect of controls, information and behavior on trust and joint profits. The ANOVA on problem 
solving behavior reveals that participants in the control conditions display more problem solving behavior 
(F(1, 141) = 3.04, p = 0.05) than participants in the no control condition and that participants in the TCO 
condition  use  more  problem  solving  techniques  (i.e.  share  more  often  private  cost  information)  than 
participants in the no TCO condition (F(1, 141) = 10.67, p < 0.01). Looking at the means and standard 
deviations for problem solving behavior in game 1 and 2, we see that players in the no TCO and NCS 
condition use significantly less problem solving behavior (i.e. they share less often private cost information). 
An ANOVA on distributive behavior for game 1 and 2 revealed a main effect for control system (F(1, 141) = 
16.30, p < 0.01): participants under the control conditions used less distributive bargaining techniques than 
participants  in  the  no  control  condition.  No  effect  of  information  on  distributive  behavior  was  found 
(F(1,141) = 0.01, p > 0.10), nor an interaction effect (F(1,141) = 0.05, p > 0.10). A Tukey HSD post hoc test 
for homogenous subsets (not reported) reveals that, at a 95% confidence interval, the WCS and the SCS form 
a homogenous subset, whereas the NCS condition forms a separate subset, indicating that participants in the 
no control condition use significantly more distributive tactics than participants in the control conditions.  
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This result indicates that the WCS and the SCS are, compared to the NCS, equally effective in reducing 
distributive bargaining tactics.  
 
The  ANCOVA  results  indicate  that  negotiation  behavior  (problem  solving  and  distributive  behavior) 
mediates the effects of information and controls on trust. Once problem solving and distributive behavior are 
added, the main effects of controls on trust and on joint profit drop to a non-significant level, (F(1,139) = 
0.94, p > 0.10) and (F(1,139) = 0.26, p > 0.10) respectively. Also the interaction effect of controls and 
information on trust drops to a non-significant level (from (F(1,141) = 2.78, p < 0.10) to (F(1,139) = 1.40, p 
> 0.10)). Only the main effects of information on trust and joint profits remain significant, although the 
significance level drops substantially in both cases. These results clearly indicate that it is not so much the 
direct effects of the control system, nor of the more refined information that induce higher trust and higher 
joint profits, but that their indirect effect on the negotiation process, characterized by problem solving and 
distributive behavior, explains the negotiation outcomes.     
 
4.2  Later stage of the relation 
 
After analyzing the trust building process
18 in game 1 and 2, we concentrate, in a second stage, on the effect 
of trust and information on negotiation behavior and joint profits after controls had been removed. Based on 
Tomkins (2001), we expect that in later stages of the relationship, it is likely that less information will be 
needed to sustain a relationship as trust intensity becomes established at higher levels. After controls are 
removed, we expect therefore that information and trust have a positive impact on a dyad’s joint profit (H4 
and H5) and that trust and refined information form substitutes in their relation to a dyad’s joint profit (H6). 
To test these hypotheses we ran a set of regressions
19 (cf. Table 2.2).  
 
First, we regressed joint profits on information, trust and their interaction term as independent variables 
Contrary  to  our  predictions,  we  find  no  significant  effects  (coefficient  for  trust  =  0.07,  p  >  0.10  and 
coefficient for information = 0.20, p > 0.10), nor an interaction effect of trust and information on joint profits 
(coefficient = 0.05, p > 0.10). These results indicate that in the third game (when formal controls have been 
removed and a certain level of trust has been built up) the joint profit of the dyad is not significantly higher 
for  dyads  in  which  the  buyer  possesses  refined  TCO  information  than  when  the  buyer  has  traditional 
information.  Nor  does  the  possession  of  this  information  interact  with  trust  to  explain  joint  profits. 
                                                 
18 It has been suggested that the passing of time may reflect learning in the task as well as “trust”.  However, some further analyses on the data rule 
out major learning effects. First, the number of pairs reaching the Pareto optimal solution in the three different negotiation games is respectively 20, 
10 and 33 (out of 147 dyads). Thus even in the third game the number of dyads reaching the Pareto optimal solution is rather low (around 22%). 
Second, if important learning effects would exist, the dispersion between the mean joint profit and the Pareto optimal solution would diminish over 
time. However, this dispersion remains stable over the three games (respectively 10%, 9%, and 11%).     
19 As trust is not a categorical variable regression analyses are used in the second part instead of ANOVA’s.  
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) and regression result for the third game 
Mean (standard deviation) 
















Mean (standard deviation) 
 Variable  Low trust (trust <3.76) 
(n=74) 
High trust (trust >3.76) 
(n =73) 












Regression (relation information and trust) 
 Variable  Constant  Information  Trust  Information * trust 










































Regression (relation problem solving and trust) 





































Regression (relation controls and trust) 
 Variable  Constant  Control system  Trust   Control system*trust 









Regression coefficients are reported.. ***, **, * indicates a p-value of ≤ 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 in a two-tailed test. 
 
(a)    Joint profit of dyad is the average of the buyer’s profit and the seller’s profit. 
(b)    Problem solving is coded 1 if participant shares private cost information, zero otherwise. 
(c)    Based on 5 distributive behaviors (lies, threats, positional commitment, punishments, and warnings).  
 
Results become more interesting, however, if we consider the negotiation process. We performed similar 
regressions  on  problem  solving  and  distributive  behavior:  we  find  that  information  has  no  longer  a 
significant impact on negotiation behavior in game 3, while trust is highly significant in explaining both 
problem solving behavior as well as distributive behavior. It is therefore interesting to look at the combined 
effect of trust, information and behavior. While trust and information have no main effects, nor an interaction 
effect on joint profit, we notice that the problem solving behavior of the participants has a highly significant 
and positive effect on joint profits in the third game (coefficient = 0.63, p < 0.00). Recall that trust has a 
positive and highly significant effect on problem solving behavior (coefficient = 0.10, p < 0.00). These 
results indicate that, although trust has no significant direct effect on joint profits (coefficient 0.07, p = 0.28); 
trust has indirect effect on joint profits through its significant impact on problem solving behavior.  
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In order to more fully understand the role of problem solving behavior, we performed some detailed analyses 
on the relation between information, the exchange of this information (i.e. the problem solving behavior) and 
trust. We regressed therefore the exchange of information in the third game, represented by the problem 
solving behavior variable, the trust variable and their interaction on joint profits. We ran this regression three 
times: once for the full sample, once for the dyads in which the buyer possess TCO information and once for 
the dyads in which the buyer possess traditional information. For the full sample, we see that, problem 
solving  behavior  becomes  highly  significant  in  explaining  joint  profits  (coefficient  =  1.32,  p  <  0.05). 
However, in contradiction to what we expected, we find, for the full sample, no interaction effect of problem 
solving behavior and trust on joint profits. Running the same regression for two sub samples separately, 
namely for the dyads with TCO information and the dyads with traditional information, yields however 
different and interesting results. For the sub sample with traditional information, we find no main effects, nor 
an interaction effect on joint profits. For the sub sample with TCO information, however, we see in Table 2.2 
that problem solving behavior (coefficient = 1.45, p < 0.01) and trust (coefficient = 0.13, p = 0.11), although 
the latter to a somewhat lesser extent, are important factors in explaining joint profits in the third game. Both 
variables have a positive effect on joint profits. However, we also notice a significant negative interaction 
effect of problem solving and trust (coefficient = -0.26, p < 0.05). This result provides support for our 
prediction on the substitution effects of trust and information in later stages of the relation.
20. We conclude 
that H6, namely that trust and the exchange of refined information form substitutes in their relation to joint 
profit for dyads for which a certain level of trust has been built up, holds as long as the buyer possesses 
refined TCO information. However, no substitutive effects are found when the buyer possess traditional 
information.  
 
Finally, we also analyze the relation between controls and trust at a later stage of the relation. We ran a 
regression to check whether control systems remain to have an impact on the negotiation outcomes after they 
have been removed and a certain level of trust has been built. Although we find no significant effect of 
controls on joint profit (p > 0.10), we do find a significant effect of trust on joint profits (coefficient = 0.18, p 
> 0.10). This result indicates that trust may replace the need for controls at a later stage of the relation. 
However, if we control for information (not reported), we find that nor the control system nor trust, but the 
available information explains the joint profits in the third game.      
 
 
                                                 
20 Finally, some sensitivity analyses were performed to test the robustness of the results against different ways of measuring negotiation behavior. 
After game 3, participants rated their own and their counter-partner’s bargaining strategies with respect to information exchange. Information 
exchange was measured as the average of the participant’s assessment of their own and their partner’s bargaining strategy. Similar results are obtained 
and conclusions remain the same in case the exchange of information is assessed by the participants themselves. 
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5.  Conclusion and further research 
 
This study explores the way in which trust is built at the level of the relationship and the role that controls 
and information play in this process. Prior studies on this topic focused on trust and control and their effect 
on negotiation outcomes, without paying attention to the negotiation process leading to these outcomes. By 
setting up an experiment in which we use a set of negotiation games with potential for integrative solutions, 
we provide more insight into the role of information in strengthening the links between control, trust, and 
cooperation in the negotiation process. 
 
Based on Tomkins (2001) and Dekker (2004) we expected nonlinear relations between trust and controls and 
between trust and information. More specific, based on Dekker (2004), we hypothesized that, in an early 
stage of the relation, where trust still needs to be built, a positive relation between formal controls and trust. 
However, in a later stage in the relation trust may replace these formal controls. Based on Tomkins (2001), 
we reasoned that as the relationship matures from the initial state of low level of trust, there will be a positive 
association between trust and information, but as trust intensity becomes established at higher levels in later 
stages of the relationship, it is likely that less information will be needed to sustain that relationship.  
 
We provide evidence that controls and refined TCO information have a positive impact on a dyad’s trust and 
on a dyad’s joint profit in an early stage of a relationship. These results are explained through the mediating 
effect of controls and TCO information on a dyad’s bargaining behavior. Furthermore, we also find that, as 
expected, both controls and TCO information can help building trust in an initial stage of the relationship. 
This implies that, in an early stage of the relationship, controls and TCO information form, to a certain 
extent, substitutes in the trust building process.  
 
In a second stage, we tested the relation between trust and information on the negotiation process and 
outcomes after controls have been removed. We expected that trust would, through its mediating effect on a 
dyad’s bargaining behavior, have a positive impact on a dyad’s joint profit and that trust and information 
would  form  substitutes  in  their  relation  to  a  dyad’s  joint  profit.  Partial  support  was  found  for  these 
expectations: the relation holds when the buyer possesses more refined TCO information.  
 
This study thus provides empirical support for what earlier studies (Ness & Haugland, 2005; Seal et al., 
1999; Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2004) have suggested on how management accounting may 
contribute to the development of dyadic business relationships. Accounting information proves to be able to 
serve an important function in relational signaling and thus in building trust. Information sharing made it 
possible to understand the partner’s interests and to identify the integrative potential in different situations. 
Trust  and  relational  norms  were  reinforced  over  time,  and  became  conditions  that  fostered  a  more 
cooperative climate and restrained the use of distributive behavior. 
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This study shows that the specification and sharing of cost data play a central role in inter-organizational 
negotiations.  We  conclude  that  the  negotiation  process,  characterized  by  information  exchange  and 
distributive behavior, plays a crucial role in explaining negotiation outcomes and we argue that prior studies 
on this topic have failed to fully explore the negotiation and the trust building process. The results of this 
study indicate that future research should pay more attention to behavior of people involved to explain 
outcomes in accounting setting.  
 
Finally, we also studied the effects of formal control strength. Although not the core objective of this study, 
we were interested to see whether a weaker control system would provide similar results as a strong control 
system or on the other hand, whether this weak control system may fail to provide strong enough incentives 
for cooperation. Our results indicate that the weak (and in theory, less expensive) control system is equally 
effective as the strong (and more expensive) control system in reducing distributive tactics and in building 
trust. However, our manipulations of weak and strong controls were exemplars in some sense. Other contract 
types provide open ground for future research. Further research can give for instance more insights into the 
boundary conditions within which a control system will or will not positively affect cooperation and trust. 
The logical next step is to identify the boundary conditions within which a control system will positively 
affect cooperation and trust. 
 
With this study we provide some important contributions to the discussion on the relations between trust, 
information and controls. Of course, many other possible extensions are conceivable which can make a 
contribution to the understanding of when, why and how benefits of more accurate information are obtained 
in inter-firm negotiation settings.  
 
While the experimental context induced by a simple negotiation game (Kelley, 1966) allows maintaining 
control over exogenous variables, the scope for generalizing the conclusions is somewhat limited. Other 
factors, such as the incentive system, future negotiations probabilities, etc. have been shown to impact 
negotiated  outcomes  but  were  not  manipulated  here.  Further  research  is  necessary  to  determine  the 
sensitivity of the results to several experimental parameters included in the current study. 
 
Further research may manipulate different types of control mechanisms. In this study, the control system was 
introduced to manipulate the fair exchange of sensitive information. Control mechanisms implemented to 
counter some other important risks in inter-firm relationships, such as the fair division of cost and benefits, 
and the appropriation of investments to be made in specific assets, can be a fruitful direction for further 
study.  
 
Apart  from  studying these formal accounting controls, it may also be interesting to study the informal 
information systems. It is important to examine these social motives and values because individuals make 
decisions in a broad social context that serves to frame behavior and outcomes. It is for in stance interesting  
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to understand whether (and how) the relative distribution of rewards, in addition to the absolute distribution 
of rewards, affects the control and management accounting systems to motivate individuals to reveal private 
information or exert high levels of effort.  
 
We expected and found evidence that trust and information may substitute each other in later stages of the 
relationship. Over time one could also expect the developing level of trust to influence the use of controls. 
Malhotra & Murnighan (2002) investigated in two experiments the effects of the use and removal of binding 
and non-binding contracts. When binding contracts were removed, trust dropped significantly. In contrast, 
non-binding contracts led to considerable cooperation, and their removal reduced trust less than removing 
binding contracts. However, as in our study, it was never the decision maker that decided to remove the 
control  system,  but  it  was  the  counterpart  (which  was  in  fact  the  computer)  that  made  this  decision. 
Furthermore, it was clearly in the economic best interest of the decision maker to accept all contracts. It 
would be interesting to design an experiment in which decision makers could decide themselves to remove 
controls (or reduce the level of control), especially if it may not be in the best interest of the decision makers 
to keep the control system (e.g. when the control system in not costless). Interesting is then to examine what 
factors may lead to a (faster) relaxation of control systems or whether keeping control systems would harm 
the relation.  
 
Furthermore, our manipulation of TCO information obviously remained a simplification of reality. In our 
study, we provided perfect TCO information. In a real business environment, TCO information is not perfect, 
but characterized by mistakes and simplifications. Further research can examine the effects of imperfect or 
uncertainty in the TCO information on the negotiation process. Future research may also consider aspects 
such as how buyers gather TCO data (e.g. from the seller, benchmarking, past experience), the type of TCO 
systems (formal vs. informal, standardized vs. unique models) installed and how these design aspects impact 
buyer-supplier relations and negotiations.  
 
We focused on buyer-supplier relations and TCO data to test the expectations on the non-linear relation 
between trust and information in a concrete context. Although it is clear that different inter-firm relations 
have different information needs, Tomkins (2001) predicts that all of them exhibit a staged development of 
the balance between trust and information as the relationship develops. Tomkins (2001) makes a conceptual 
distinction between different types of information for inter-firm relations. It would be interesting to extend 
the scope of this research from TCO data to other types of information for inter-firm relations (e.g. Type 1 
and Type 2 information as distinguished by Tomkins (2001)) and to investigate whether the relation between 
these types of information and trust are also non-linear.  
 
Because of the way we measured trust, the validity of our results may be restricted to situations of goodwill 
trust. The operationalization of trust in this study was not concerned with a partner’s ability to perform 
according to agreements (competence trust), but with his intentions to do so (goodwill trust) (cf. Sako, 1992).  
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It would be interesting to see whether the results also stand in situations of competence trust. Similarly, the 
operationalization of the control system focuses on behavioral control as the control system is indented to 
reduce opportunistic behavior (i.e. sharing false information in order to mislead the partner) and not on 
outcome  control.  It  would  be  interesting  to  study  in  future  research  whether  outcome  controls  (e.g.  a 
maximum level of allowable joint costs and thus a required minimum level of joint profits) would yield 
similar results.  
 
Not only the type of information, the type of trust and the type of control system, but also the type of the 
relation  may  have  significant  implications  on  the  results.  Further  research  should  therefore  investigate 
whether the results found in this study also hold beyond buyer-supplier relationships. Other types of inter-
firm relationships could be joint ventures, joint R&D, joint production, and so on. For instance, Das & Teng 
(2001a) suggest that goodwill trust has a more significant role in joint ventures than in non-equity alliances 
and  thus  that  individual  and  team-level  trust  building  may  be  more  promising  in  joint  ventures.  This 
contingent approach is important because a mismatch could be costly to an alliance (Das & Teng, 2001a). 
 
Lastly,  insights  from  this  study  need  to  be  examined  by  using  alternative  methods  involving  different 
settings, subjects and operationalizations to further investigate the proposed hypotheses and the obtained 







  Control system  
  No controls in game 1 & 2;  
no controls in game 3 
(NC, NC, NC)  
Weak controls in game 1 & 2;  
no controls in game 3 
(WC, WC, NC) 
Strong controls in game 1 & 2;  
no controls in game 3 
(SC, SC, NC) 




(n= 24 dyads) 
Cell 2 
(n= 26 dyads) 
Cell 3 




(n= 25 dyads) 
Cell 5 
(n= 24 dyads) 
Cell 6 
(n= 24 dyads)  
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Appendix B. Payoff tables of the three negotiation games. 
GAME 1: buying machines 
 
Payoff table of the seller (all cells) 
Price  Maintenance  Spare parts 
Contract  Income 
(€) 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
1  2000  A  1350  R  2250 
2  3000  B  1050  S  1750 
3  4000  C  750  T  1250 
4  5000  D  450  U  750 




Payoff table buyer with TCO (cell 1, 2 and 3) 
Income = 8000     
Price  Maintenance  Spare parts 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
1  2000  A  250  R  150 
2  3000  B  750  S  450 
3  4000  C  1250  T  750 
4  5000  D  1750  U  1050 




Payoff table buyer with traditional information (cell4, 5 & 6) 
Income = 8000     
Price  Maintenance  Spare parts 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
Contract  # 
maintenance 
sessions 
Contract  #  
spare 
parts 
1  2000  A  1  R  2 
2  3000  B  3  S  6 
3  4000  C  5  T  10 
4  5000  D  7  U  14 
5  6000  E  9  V  18   
GAME 2: buying spare parts 
 
Payoff table seller (all cells) 
Price  Delivery time  Payment terms 
Contract  Income 
(€) 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
1  2300  A  1900  R  1250 
2  2650  B  1600  S  1050 
3  3000  C  1300  T  850 
4  3350  D  1000  U  650 
5  3700  E  700  V  450 
6  4050  F  400  W  250 
7  4400  G  100  X  50 
 
Payoff table buyer with TCO (cell 1, 2 and 3) 
Income = 6700     
Price  Delivery time  Payment terms 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
1  2300  A  50  R  100 
2  2650  B  250  S  400 
3  3000  C  450  T  700 
4  3350  D  650  U  1000 
5  3700  E  850  V  1300 
6  4050  F  1050  W  1600 
7  4400  G  1250  X  1900 
 
Payoff table of buyer with traditional information (cell 4, 5 & 6) 
Income = 6700     
Price  Delivery time  Payment terms 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
Contract  # weeks for 
delivery 
Contract  # weeks for 
payment 
1  2300  A  1  R  19 
2  2650  B  5  S  16 
3  3000  C  9  T  13 
4  3350  D  13  U  10 
5  3700  E  17  V  7 
6  4050  F  21  W  4 
7  4400  G  25  X  1   
GAME 3: buying new machines 
 
Payoff table of the seller (all cells) 
Price  Maintenance  Spare parts 
Contract  Income 
(€) 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
1  2100  A  2100  R  550 
2  2675  B  1600  S  425 
3  3250  C  1100  T  300 
4  3825  D  600  U  175 




Payoff table buyer with TCO (cell 1, 2 and 3) 
Income = 6500     
Price  Maintenance  Spare parts 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
1  2100  A  50  R  100 
2  2675  B  175  S  600 
3  3250  C  300  T  1100 
4  3825  D  425  U  1600 




Payoff table buyer with traditional information (cell 4, 5 & 6) 
Income = 6500     
Price  Maintenance  Spare parts 
Contract  Cost 
(€) 
Contract  # 
maintenance 
sessions 
Contract  #  
spare 
parts 
1  2100  A  2  R  2 
2  2675  B  7  S  12 
3  3250  C  12  T  22 
4  3825  D  17  U  32 
5  4400  E  22  V  40    
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Appendix C. 
Behavioral coding categories. 
 
Variables  Coding categories  Examples 
Problem solving  Information exchange  -  Price is for me the most expensive issue, then spare part. Maintenance is less 




-  I have an outside option off 1500 Euro. 
 
 
General threats    -  Make a concession or you will be in trouble. 
-  Respond with a concession or I will call another supplier. 





-  My company has a policy against uncooperative supplier. 
 
Distributive behavior 
Positional commitment   -  I refuse to concede any further. 







Game  Variable  Theoretical 
range 
 
Actual Range  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Cronbach’s alpha 
Problem solving (a)  0 – 1  0 – 1  0.46  0.45  n/a 
Distributive behavior (b)  0 – 1  0 – 1  0.13  0.18  0.76 
Game 1    
Joint gain (c)  0 – 4.80  3.20 – 4.80  4.31  0.31  n/a 
Problem solving (a)  0 – 1  0 – 1  0.46  0.45  n/a 
Distributive behavior (b)  0 – 1  0 – 1  0.12  0.20  0.84 
Game 2 
Joint Gain (c)  0 – 4.00  0.00 – 4.00  3.62  0.49  n/a 
After game 2, 
before game 3  Trust (d)  1 – 7  1.00 – 6.50  3.76  1.16  n/a 
Problem solving (a)  0 – 1  0 – 1  0.34  0.42  n/a 
Distributive behavior (b)  0 – 1  0 – 0.70  0.10  0.16  0.75 
Game 3 
Joint Gain (c)  0 – 5.20  0 – 5.20  4.60  0.85  n/a 
 
Descriptive statistics for variables (across different experimental cells) 
(a)  Problem solving is coded 1 if participant shares private cost information, zero otherwise. 
(b)  Based on 5 distributive behaviors (lies, threats, positional commitment, punishments, warnings). Each of these distributive behavior tactics was 
coded 1 if present and 0 otherwise. Distributive behavior is the average of these five variables.    
(c)  Joint gain of dyad is the total of the buyer’s profit and the seller’s profit of the final agreement. 
(d)  Participants’ assessment of their partners’ trustworthiness on a 7-point Likert scale. Specifically, participants answered “How likely is it that 
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1               
Distriutive1  -0.01  -0.32 
(**) 
0.04  0.06  0.02  1             
Distributive2  0.01  -0.29 
(**) 
-0.08  -0.06  -0.10  0.41 
(**) 
1           
Distributive3  -0.07  -0.20 
(*) 




1         
Joint profit1  0.30 
(**) 
0.12  0.36 
(**) 
0.15  0.17 
(*) 
0.03  0.00  -0.07  1       
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Correlation coefficients (n=147)   
  *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 




Manuscript 3: Information as an inter-firm governance mechanism, and its 






This paper identifies information as an inter-firm governance mechanism and examines how the use of 
different inter-firm governance mechanisms (information, formal control and trust) affect perceived risk. We 
test our hypotheses with a cross-sectional sample of 287 transactions between buyers and their suppliers of 
IT products and services. A key finding of this study is that, besides formal control and trust, information 
constitutes an important inter-firm governance mechanism. The findings also highlight the importance of 
studying the multidimensional nature of trust, control and information to reveal what type of governance 
mechanisms are used to counter different types of perceived risks. Finally, the results also emphasize the 
importance of taking into account the life cycle of the inter-firm relationship: we distinguish relations with 
prior ties from those without prior ties and we find that controls and information are more effective in 
reducing perceived risk at early stages of the relation, while trust becomes more important at later stages of 
the relationship.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Inter-firm relations are increasingly popular ways to leverage core competencies, to penetrate new markets, 
to protect old ones and/or to learn or acquire new strategic capabilities (Judge & Dooley, 2006). Inter-firm 
cooperative arrangements provide a way for organizations to pool their resources to create value that each 
partner could not achieve if they acted alone (Inkpen & Ross, 2001). These inter-firm cooperative relations 
are even said to be a source of competitive advantage (Ireland et al., 2002). However, there is also a growing 
body of evidence of a high failure rate in such arrangements (Gerwin, 2004). One important cause is that 
inter-firm relationships are characterized by a number of specific risks such as the exchange of sensitive 
information, the fair division of cost and benefits and the appropriation of investments to be made in specific 
assets (Dekker, 2003a). Firms install governance mechanisms in order to reduce these risks.  
 
The mainstream control literature suggests that there are only two basic approaches to control: formal control 
and social control (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979). Prior studies on inter-firm control systems (e.g. Das & 
Teng, 2001a; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000) also mainly focus on trust and formal controls as 
inter-firm control mechanisms. However, this framework is incomplete. If output and behavior can not be 
accurately measured (requirements for formal controls) and social controls or trust has not yet developed, 
firm need another type of control mechanism to govern the inter-firm relation. In this case, firms may want 
to search more proactively for information about their partner.  
 
In this paper we extend prior models on inter-firm control systems by explicitly incorporating proactive 
information collection as an important governance mechanism for inter-firm relationships. By reviewing the 
existing literature on inter-firm control systems, information emerges as an important tool for governing 
relations with partners, especially in situations where formal controls are difficult to install (e.g. because of 
high uncertainty and/or strong dependencies) and where trust has not (yet) developed (e.g. in an early stage 
of the relation).  
 
After we have identified information as an inter-firm governance mechanism, we discuss how trust, formal 
controls and information reduce perceived risk. Our study places the decision maker at the central core and 
reveals what type of governance mechanisms are used to counter different types of perceived risks. Risk 
perceptions of the decision makers serve as the heuristic that helps form their governance mechanisms (Das 
& Teng, 2001b).  
 
Importantly, our study treats trust, control, information and risk as complex, multidimensional constructs. 
Previous  studies  on  the  relation  between  trust  and  controls  typically  treated  the  different  governance 
mechanisms as uni-dimensional constructs. This has produced ambiguous conclusions about the relationship 
between these governance mechanisms. 
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Based  on  Tomkins  (2001)  and  Dekker  (2004)  we  hypothesize  some  non-linear  relations  between 
information, controls and trust. We make a distinction between buyer-supplier relations with and without 
prior ties and expect that perceived risk is reduced more effectively by formal controls and information at 
early stages of the relation (no prior ties) and by trust at later stages of the relation (relations with prior ties). 
 
Finally, we empirically test the simultaneous effects of multiple governance mechanisms on perceived risk. 
This is important as firms often implement multiple controls systems simultaneously (for an overview of 
current control practices in inter-firm relations see Anderson et al., 2006).   
  
We test our propositions using a sample of 287 buyer-supplier inter-firm transactions on IT purchases. We 
find that the combined impact of trust, control and information leads to reduced perceived risk in inter-firm 
relations. A key finding of this study is that information constitutes an important inter-firm governance 
mechanism.  While  formal  controls  and  trust appear to be more effective in reducing perceived risk at 
respectively early stages and later stages of the relation, information constitutes an inter-firm governance 
mechanism that reduces perceived risk in early stages of the relation as well as at later stages of the relation.  
 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  two  brings  together  the  literature  to  identify  proactive 
information  collection  as  an  inter-firm  governance  mechanism  and  reviews  the  literature  on  risk  and 
governance mechanisms in inter-firm settings to develop the hypotheses. Section three describes the data 
collection  and  the  variable  measures.  Section  four  reports  the  results  of  estimating  different  inter-firm 
governance mechanisms on two types of perceived risk. Finally, section five concludes with a summary of 
the key results, a discussion of the limitations of the study and directions for further research. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Proactive information collection as an inter-firm governance mechanism 
 
The mainstream control literature suggests that there are only two basic approaches to control: formal control 
and social control (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979). The first approach emphasizes the establishment and 
utilization of formal rules, procedures, and policies to monitor and reward desirable performance. Formal 
controls  either  measure  the  behaviors  (behavioral  control)  or  the  outcomes  of  these  behaviors  (output 
control). The characteristics of formal controls are that they are designed to measure performance, that 
desired output and/or behavior are specified from the beginning and that this requires that either the output is 
measurable or the transformation process (i.e. the desired behavior) is known (Das & Teng, 2001a). The 
second approach relies on the establishment of norms, values, culture, and the internalization of goals to 
encourage  desirable  behavior  and  outcome  (Eisenhardt,  1985).  Trust  can  be  regarded  as  an  important 
component of social control (Adler, 2001; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Dekker, 2004). Social control or trust  
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can not be designed explicitly; it may develop from norms, beliefs, values, etc. and can be shaped by frequent 
interactions, meetings and negotiation (Das & Teng, 2001a). 
 
Eisenhardt  (1985)  has  suggested,  based  on  Thompson  (1967)  and  Ouchi  (1979),  that  the  choice  of  an 
appropriate control mode depends on two task characteristics: task programmability (or knowledge of the 
transformation  process)  and  output  measurability.  Task  programmability  refers  to  the  degree  to  which 
managers understand the transformation process in which appropriate behaviors are to take place. Output 
measurability refers to the ability to measure outputs in a precise and objective manner. Output control is 
appropriate with high output measurability and low task programmability. Behavior control works best in the 
opposite situation: high task programmability and low output measurability. If both behaviors and outcomes 
can be measured, than either behavioral or output control can be used. Finally, when the task is neither 
programmed nor has a measurable outcome, then the alternative control strategy of minimizing divergence of 
preferences (i.e. social control) becomes appropriate (Eisenhardt, 1985).  
 
This well-established model for studying the design of management control systems typically focus on 
control  systems  within  an  organization.  Only  a  few  comprehensive  frameworks  consider  the  design  of 
control systems in inter-firm relationships. These frameworks also focus on formal control systems and trust. 
For example, Das & Teng (2001a) modeled the relationships between control systems, trust and risk in 
various  types  of  inter-firm  relationships  and  van  der  Meer-Kooistra  &  Vosselman  (2000)  developed  a 
comprehensive  model  of  management  control,  which  was  based  on  principles  of  Transaction  Cost 
Economics, but which integrated the role of trust.  
 
Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman (2000) argue that the presence of trust for governing the relationship 
between cooperating parties is especially important in situations characterized by uncertainty and strong 
dependencies between the parties owing to specific investments, because in such situations it is difficult to 
install appropriate formal controls or contracts. In this type of situations formal contracts will in the course 
of time require changes and revisions. In the case of trust between the parties they will assume at the drafting 
stage of the contract that such revisions will be made to the satisfaction of all parties and thus is it easier for 
these parties to reach agreements (van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000).  
 
This line of reasoning assumes that trust can be used as an alternative for formal controls. It also assumes that 
the level of trust is somehow given quite independent of any other activity. It ignores the dynamic process of 
building trust and the role that information has in that (Tomkins, 2001). Close relationships are usually not 
created overnight and they take time to build: trust derives from learned, usually interactive, experiences and 
that process itself depends upon information (Tomkins, 2001).  
 
These  frameworks  on  inter-firm  control,  with  their  focus  on  formal control systems and trust, are thus 
incomplete. If transaction and situation characteristics prevent partners to install appropriate formal controls  
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and  the  relation  has  not  (yet)  built  high  enough  levels  of  trust,  cooperating  firms  will  need  another 
governance mechanism to achieve sufficient confidence that cooperation will be successful. In this case, 
firms may want to search more proactively for information
21 about their partner. Although the need for other 
types of governance mechanisms than formal control and trust become clear when the latter has not (yet) 
developed  and  when  output  and  behavior  can  not  be  accurately  measured,  proactively  searching  for 
information can also be effective when formal controls and/or trust are present.   
 
Although Das & Teng (2001a) do not explicitly consider information as an inter-firm governance tool, as 
many other authors, they emphasize the importance of being open and free about sharing information in the 
process  of  building  trust.  Anderson  &  Sedatole  (2003)  also  emphasize  the  key  role  of  exchange  of 
information in the control of inter-firm relations. Reputation and social knowledge about a partner firm are 
important  factors  in  alliances.  To  this  end,  partner  firms  need  to  proactively  collect  information about 
various aspects of partner firms (Das & Teng, 2001a). There are two basic ways to collect such information 
(Das & Teng, 2001a): (i) direct and open communication with the partner and (ii) through networking 
activities with other firms. Networking provides a unique way to gain inside information about a firm’s 
competence and alliance history -- which is often not publicly available.  
 
In a case study on IT outsourcing, Langfield-Smith & Smith (2003) explicitly discuss information sharing as 
a  control  mechanism.  Because  of  difficulties  in  task  programmability  and  output  measurability,  formal 
controls were difficult to install, particularly in the early stages of the relationship between the case company 
and its IT supplier. Essential to achieving control in the relationship was the development of trust. This trust 
took  time  to  emerge.  Their  case  study  revealed  that  a  major  trust-building  mechanism  is  proactive 
information collection. The case company was careful to ensure that the outsourcing company that they 
engaged had a strong reputation in the IT industry and strong technical competence. Evidence from the case 
points  to  the  importance  of  establishing  communication  with  the  outsourcer  in  the  early  days  of  the 
relationship,  when  contracts  were  incomplete,  to  set  the  ground  rules  and  expectations  of  each  party 
(Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). Joint dispute resolution allows partners to a relationship to develop a 
strong understanding of perspectives and approaches, and is of particular importance in situations where 
formal controls are difficult to install (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). 
 
Other studies also offer suggestions on how (accounting) information may contribute to the development of 
dyadic business relationships. Seal et al. (1999) show that the specification and sharing of cost information 
can play a central role in inter-firm negotiations as both sides learn about and respect each other’s financial 
and commercial constraints and objectives. Therefore they submit that information may play a constitutional 
                                                 
21 Information is also an important element of formal control systems, however not all information is per definition equal to formal control. Consider, 
for instance, on the one hand a contractual agreement with a supplier on the minimum required quality level and on the other hand a buyer that 
proactively gathers information about the quality reputation of a certain supplier. In both cases information plays a crucial role. However, while the 
first situation represents a type of formal control, the second situation can not be regarded as formal control: the objective is not to measure 
performance, no requirements are specified and the output/behavior is not measured. Still, the buyer gathers this information to reduce (perceived) risk 
and to govern his relation with the supplier. In the latter case, information should thus also be considered as a type of governance mechanism – but 
distinct from formal controls.  
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role in the establishment and management of trusting and collaborative relationships (Seal et al., 1999). A 
case study on the cooperation between the Norwegian Road Authorities (NRA) and a private contractor 
revealed that explicit and implicit information sharing made it possible to understand the partner’s concerns 
and interests and to learn the integrative potential in different situations (Ness & Haugland, 2005). Trust and 
relational norms were reinforced over time, and became important structural conditions that fostered a more 
cooperative climate (Ness & Haugland, 2005). Information proves to be able to serve an important function 
in relational signaling and thus in building trust (Vosselman & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2004). 
 
In conclusion, although many studies have implicitly referred to the importance of information for governing 
inter-firm relations, proactive information collection has seldom been explicitly studied for that purpose. 
Prior studies on inter-firm governance mechanisms mainly focused on the relation between trust and formal 
controls  (e.g.  Lui  &  Ngo,  2004;  Luo,  2002;  Madhok  1995; Nooteboom 1996; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; 
Woolthuis et al., 2005). The relation between information and formal inter-firm control systems and trust 
received however scant attention in the literature. This may be due to the fact that some authors have argued 
that trust and control reduce perceived risk and that there is no third determinant that is of comparable 
importance (Das & Teng, 2001a). Other authors even assume that contractual and procedural coordination, 
or formal controls and information, are closely linked to each other (e.g. Helper, 1991). Empirical evidence, 
however, suggests that this is not necessarily the case. Sobrero & Schrader (1998)
22 refer to several examples 
of firms having established a high level of procedural coordination without intense contractual coordination, 
and  other  firms  that  have  set  up  considerable  contractual  coordination  without  establishing  significant 
procedural  coordination.  The  study  of  Sobrero  &  Schrader  (1998)  shows  that  both  dimensions  fulfill 
different roles in the governance of inter-firm relations. 
 
In the next sections, we argue that perceived risk
23 is mainly reduced by three inter-firm governance tools: 
trust,  formal  controls  and  information.  Although  their  influences  are  not  independent,  these  inter-firm 
governance mechanisms have distinct characteristics.  
 
Formal control is about influencing the behavior of the partner, so that undesirable outcomes are less likely. 
Formal  control  systems  generally  include  (Christ  et  al.,  2006):  (i)  scrutiny  or  direct  monitoring  and 
                                                 
22  Sobrero  &  Schrader  (1998)  identify  two  fundamental  dimensions  which  characterize  the  structuring  of  inter-firm  relations:  (i)  contractual 
coordination and (ii) procedural coordination. Contractual coordination encompasses contractually determined means to coordinate the behavior of the 
partner in the relationship. Procedural coordination, on the other hand, relates to the mutual exchange of information for the combination of parties 
towards the production of results. It describes the extent to which the parties coordinate their processes by exchanging information, thereby making 
them learn to adjust their activities to each other. These concepts are in line with what we have called formal controls and proactive information 
exchange.   
23 We need to note the critical difference between risk and perceived risk. Risk (or objective risk) is based on the consequences or outcomes of 
alternatives and their probabilities. Risk can be objective because it is something inherent in given situations (Das & Teng, 2001a). On the other hand, 
perceived risk (or subjective risk) is decision makers’ estimate of objective risk. Interestingly, just the perception of opportunism can degrade inter-
firm relationship performance - whether it is real or just perceived (Judge & Dooley, 2006). If members of one organization perceive the other 
organizational members as willing to take advantage of them, then the relationship starts to unravel, or monitoring mechanisms need to be put in place 
(Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Decision makers, thus, may have different estimates about the level of risk in a given situation. While trust enables us to 
act as if the uncertainty that we face is reduced, it does not reduce that actual uncertainty (Tomkins, 2001). Similarly, formal control does not always 
reduce objective risk, as it may be only an ‘illusion of control’. Besides, firms may opt for control that is excessive (Garnsey & Wilkinson, 1994), 
precluding increased productivity that may accrue if a degree of autonomy is granted in alliances. Finally, increased information may reduce perceived 
risk without reducing objective risk because of problems with the technical quality and reliability with the information itself. Accordingly, risk, as 
used in this article, refers to subjective or perceived risk rather than objective risk.  
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observation  of  the  operations  and/or  output,  (ii)  intrusion  or  interference  with  normal  processes  and 
activities, and (iii) a reduction in the controlled firm’s autonomy (i.e., a loss of decision rights). Formal 
control is thus a proactive and interventionist approach and leads to a low risk perception through affecting 
the behavior of the partner (Das & Teng, 2001a).  
 
The role of information is essentially one of uncertainty reduction, which has been widely discussed and 
analyzed,  especially  in  information  economics  (Tomkins,  2001).  In  this  approach,  the  firm  proactively 
collects information about various aspects of partner firms without necessarily doing anything about the 
partner.  So  the  main  thrust  of  gathering  information  is  to  reduce  uncertainty,  rather  than  influencing 
behavior. The information can be gathered through direct communication with the partner or from third 
parties (Das & Teng, 2001a). 
 
Trust,  on  the  other  hand,  entails  a  positive  expectation  about  the  partner,  suggesting  that  unpleasant 
outcomes are less likely (Lane & Bachmann, 1996). Trust is not a behavior (e.g. cooperation) or a choice 
(e.g.  taking  a  risk),  but  an  underlying  psychological  state  to  accept  vulnerability  based  upon  positive 
expectations  of  the  intentions  or  behavior  of  another  (Rousseau  et  al.,  1998).  It  entails  thus  positive 
expectations regarding the other in a risky situation, irrespective of the ability to control the other party 
(Mayer et al., 1995; Serva et al., 2005) and without having full information to confirm that belief (Tomkins, 
2001).  
 
In the next sections, we discuss how different dimensions of theses three governance mechanisms impact 
two dimensions of perceived risk. Risk perceptions of the decision makers serve as the heuristic that helps 
form their governance mechanisms (Das & Teng, 2001b).  
 
2.2 Different dimensions of governance mechanisms and their effect on perceived risk 
 
2.2.1 Perceived risk 
While inter-firm collaborations undoubtedly provide many advantages, they are also quite unstable (Das & 
Teng,  2000;  Parkhe,  1993).  Collaborations  are  vulnerable  to  failure  because  they are exposed to some 
distinct sets of risks. Risk is used to denote both outcome variations in general and negative variations 
specifically  in  outcomes  of  importance  (Das  &  Teng,  2001a).  Prior  literature  has  made  the  distinction 
between two types of risks or control problems that seem especially relevant in the context of inter-firm 
relations: performance risk and relational risk (Das & Teng, 1996, 1999, 2001a & 2001b). 
 
Performance  risk  is  the  probability  that  collaboration  objectives  will  not  be  achieved,  despite  the  full 
cooperation of the partners (Das & Teng, 2001a). This type of risk essentially relates to the management of 
tasks to be performed in the relationship in the pursuit of value creation. Gulati & Singh (1998) and Dekker 
(2004) argue that an important source of performance risk is the coordination of interdependent tasks, while  
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Tomkins (2001) refers to this coordination problem as the mastery of events. Anderson et al. (2000) provide 
an  empirical  investigation  of  interdependencies  in  supply  relations  and  novel  negotiations.  Factors 
influencing  performance  risk  are  elements  such  as  intensified  competition,  demand  fluctuations  and 
changing policies. Lack of competence is also an important constitute of performance risk (Das & Teng, 
2001a).  
 
Relational  risk  reflects  decision-makers'  concerns  about the level of co-operation between the partners. 
Opportunistic behavior by any partner is a source of relational risk. Examples of opportunistic behavior 
include  withholding  or  distorting  information,  shirking  or  failing  to  fulfill  promises  or  obligations, 
appropriation of the partner firm's technology or key personnel, late payments, and delivery of substandard 
products (Parkhe, 1993). Gulati & Singh (1998) and Dekker (2004) refer to this control problem as the 
management of appropriation concerns, while Tomkins (2001) positions the use of information for this type 
of control problem as the development of trust.  
 
The distinction between relational and performance risk is crucial because, depending on which risk is 
perceived to be more of a threat, decision makers may decide on the governance strategy that is best for 
acquiring others’ valuable resources while protecting their own (Das & Teng, 2001b). Indeed for an alliance 
to work, only a certain degree of risk can be tolerated in any particular alliance. Governance structures 
provide a source of control to deal with risks as different forms can mitigate the total risk of the alliance. 
Thus, managers’ perceptions of the risk inherent in a prospective alliance can drive the type of governance 
mechanisms, such as trust, formal controls and information, used to manage the relation.  
 
In the next sections, we explain how different dimensions of formal controls, trust and information reduce 
perceived relational and performance risk.   
 
2.2.2 Formal controls 
There are two main modes of formal control (Ouchi & Maguire, 1975). Organizations can control either by 
measuring the behaviors or the outcomes of these behaviors. Measuring behavior (or behavior control) is to 
ensure that the process is appropriate, while measuring outcomes only (or outcome control) is to rely on an 
accurate and reliable assessment of members’ performance. 
 
Outcome control is essentially a laissez-faire managerial approach (Oliver & Anderson, 1994) that assumes 
that suppliers themselves are best able to determine their direction and level of effort to achieve the goals (de 
Mortagnes  &  Vossen,  1999).  The  buyer  does  not  translate  his  intentions  into  standardized  operating 
procedures for the supplier to perform, but instead sets targets to pursue which are then compared to periodic 
outcomes. Outcome-based control is often administered by means of a ‘carrot and stick' policy, where the 
supplier is not compensated for its efforts unless and until expected outcomes are met. This requires that the 
buyer  has  clearly  set  standards  of  desirable  and  expected  performance,  that  these  can  be  effectively  
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measured, and that the supplier is in a position to reach the objectives more or less on his own. The major 
advantage  of  outcome-based  control  in  the  buyer–supplier  relationship  is  that  it  allows  for  maximum 
supplier autonomy, yet provides both the incentive and responsibility for final results (de Mortagnes & 
Vossen, 1999). A possible disadvantage of outcome controls is the uncertainty associated with judgments 
and  subjectivity  in  ascertaining  that  supplies  meet  specifications.  For  instance,  in  a  study  on  sourcing 
decision  in  the  US  auto  industry,  Anderson  et  al.  (2000)  report that strict design tolerances (i.e. strict 
outcome requirements) for metal parts often increase die development time and costs without producing 
substantially better or different parts.   
 
Behavior-based control, on the other hand, has a more paternalistic approach to supplier management. The 
buyer  has  a  well-defined  idea  of  what  the  supplier  should  do  and  works  to  ensure  that  he  behaves 
accordingly (Oliver & Anderson, 1994). In order to ensure that the desired actions take place, behavior-based 
control mechanisms include standard operating procedures, behavioral performance appraisals, as well as 
close supervision and feedback (Snell & Youndt, 1995). This requires an understanding of what behavior is 
desirable and an ability to ensure that desirable actions occur. A prime advantage of behavior control is its 
directness (Gencturk & Aulakh, 1995). A working paper of Christ et al. (2006), however, provides some 
indications  that  behavioral  control  systems  are  perceived  as  more  intrusive  and  as  a  greater  threat  to 
autonomy and that therefore they may be more damaging to trust and cooperation than outcome control. 
 
Das & Teng (2001a) describe how these formal control mechanisms are related to the different forms of 
perceived risk. Relational risk entails characteristics that favor behavior control -- low output measurability 
and high knowledge of the process. Essentially, relational risk is about partners’ opportunistic behavior. 
Behavior control mechanisms should be used to regulate the conduct of partners to prevent major surprises. 
In this sense, behavior control can effectively reduce relational risk. Situations with high relational risk are 
typically  characterized  by  low  output  measurability.  In  such  situations,  it  is  difficult  for  partners  to 
accurately  measure  the  adverse  consequences  of  relational  risk,  and  thus  to  develop  effective  outcome 
control mechanisms. Outcome control is therefore less relevant for managing relational risk than behavioral 
control mechanisms.  
 
In contrast to relational risk, performance risk is more result oriented, because the latter is about whether or 
not  the  inter-firm  relation  achieves  the  objectives  of  the  partner  firms,  given  satisfactory  cooperation. 
Performance risk accords with low knowledge of the transformation process, coupled with both high and low 
output  measurability.  Given  these  considerations,  outcome  control  appears  to  be  appropriate  since  this 
control is exercised through close monitoring of the outcomes. As performance risk is characterized by low 
knowledge of the transformation process, behavior control will be hard to develop because managers hardly 
know what kind of behavior could help in assuring better performance (Das & Teng, 2001a).   
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2.2.3 Trust 
Trust is a difficult concept to study as it has been defined and classified in many ways (Langfield-Smith, 
2005). Rousseau et al. (1998, p.395) conclude after an extensive cross-disciplinary collection of scholarly 
writings that a widely held definition of trust is as follows: “Trust is a psychological state comprising the 
intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.” 
Most definitions of trust focus thus on exposing oneself to vulnerability. It has been argued that trust is 
particularly relevant to inter-firm relations, as trust is only important in situations where there is risk, and 
risk management is a critical aspect of inter-firm relations (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Das & Teng, 2001b). 
While many definitions of trust exist, two definitions of trust have emerged as particularly relevant to the 
formation and management of inter-firm relations. These are competence trust and goodwill trust (Sako, 
1992). 
  
Competence trust focuses on perceptions of ability and expertise. In an inter-firm setting, competence trust 
relates to the expectation of a partner’s ability to perform its role competently (Sako, 1992). Competence 
trust involves thus the expectation that the partner has the necessary technical and management competences 
at his disposal. Competence trust may be acquired by purchasing existing competences or by investing in 
their  development.  In  the  latter  case  the  outsourcing  party  is  for  example  actively  involved  in  the 
development of a product or service, or there is ‘transfer' of technology to the supplier (van der Meer-
Kooistra  &  Vosselman,  2000).  In  contrast,  goodwill  trust  can  be  defined  as  perceptions of a partner’s 
intention to perform in accordance with those agreements (Ring & van de Ven, 1992; Nooteboom, 1996). In 
case of goodwill trust there are no predetermined professional standards that have to be met (competence 
trust). Goodwill trust is associated with integrity, responsibility and dependability (Das & Teng, 2001a). It 
refers to the mutual expectations of open commitment to each other (Sako, 1992). 
 
The two dimensions of trust, goodwill trust and competence trust, are closely related to the calculation of 
different types of perceived risk (Das & Teng, 2001a; Lui & Ngo, 2004). This distinction parallels the idea 
that trust is the expectation of a partner fulfilling a collaborative role in a risky situation (Nooteboom, 1996), 
and relies on both the partner’s intention to perform and its ability to do so. Goodwill trust is linked to 
relational risk, and refers to the expectation that a partner intends to fulfill his role in the relationship. 
Goodwill trust would reduce the perception of relational risk, simply because a positive assessment of one's 
intentions would lead to a belief that opportunistic behavior is less likely (Das & Teng, 1998). Similarly, it 
can be argued that competence trust would reduce perceived performance risk because of a positive belief in 
one's ability. Competence trust refers thus to the expectation that partners have the ability to fulfill their 




The role of information as an inter-firm governance mechanism has been extensively discussed in section 
2.1. Tomkins (2001) positions the use of information, including accounting, in inter-firm relationships in a 
broader framework by relating it to two purposes, the mastery of events and the development of trust. These 
two purposes refer to the two control problems discussed earlier: the coordination of interdependent tasks 
and the management of appropriation concerns, as identified by Gulati & Singh (1998) and Dekker (2004), 
or more generally to performance risk and relational risk.  
 
Tomkins (2001) distinguishes two main types of information to help counter these control problems. Type 1 
information is information that relates to the willingness to trust; that is what is needed to create trust and 
check on the state of the relationship. Examples are information on the reputation for price, quality and 
delivery of the supplier, information on the supplier’s values, integrity and ethics, as well as information on 
the supplier’s likelihood to stay in business and the adaptiveness of the supplier’s technology development to 
the buyer’s needs. Type 2 is information required for mastery of events by that relationship as an entity 
itself. Type 2 information thus concerns planning what each party is going to do. Examples of Type 2 
information  include  agreed  expectations  of  each  other  on  the  way  to  cooperate,  scenarios  with  broad 
consensus on relationship option values and possibilities for extending the relationship to new businesses, 
markets, technologies etc. These two types of information are not totally separate from each other, but there 
is  a  different  emphasis  in  content  of  the  information  needed  mainly  to  plan  and  make  decisions  on 
collaborative futures compared to that needed mainly for building trust in the actions of ones partners 
(Tomkins, 2001). The difference lays thus in the purpose of the information. 
 
It  can  be  concluded  from  the  above  discussion  that  formal  controls,  trust  and  information  are 
multidimensional constructs and that they are important factors in reducing perceived risk in inter-firm 
relations. However, the discussion reveals also that some aspects of these inter-firm governance mechanisms 
will be more effective in reducing perceived performance risk than perceived relational risk and vice versa. 
More specific we expect that
24: 
 
H1:   Perceived relational risk will be reduced more effectively  
a)  by goodwill trust than by competence trust  
b)  by behavior control than by outcome control 
c)  by Type 1 information than by Type 2 information. 
 
H2:   Perceived performance risk will be reduced more effectively  
a)     by competence trust than by goodwill trust  
b)     by outcome control than by behavior control  
c)     by Type 2 information than by Type 1 information. 
                                                 
24 Hypotheses H1a&b and H2a&b have been proposed before (e.g. by Das & Teng, 2001a).  To our knowledge, their propositions have never been 
empirically tested.    
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The diagram in appendix A depicts the different hypotheses. The effects of goodwill trust, behavioral control 
and Type 1 information on perceived relational risk are represented by full arrows as these governance 
mechanisms  are  expected  to  reduce  perceived  relational  risk  more  effectively  than  competence  trust, 
outcome control and Type 2 information. The latter effects are therefore represented by dotted arrows. The 
mirror picture situation exists for the effects of the governance mechanisms on perceived performance risk. 
The effects of having a prior relation with the supplier are discussed in the next section.      
 
2.3 Substitutes or complements: a dynamic view 
 
Prior  studies  on  inter-firm  governance  mechanisms  mainly  focused  on  the  relation  between  trust  and 
controls, i.e. whether trust is a substitute or a complement for formal control mechanisms. These studies 
show contradictory results. Some prior studies provide evidence of the complementary roles of trust and 
control in cooperative relationships (Luo, 2002; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Other researchers argue that the 
more trust one has, the less control one needs over a partner (Madhok 1995; Nooteboom 1996). Malhotra & 
Murnighan (2002) even found that the presence of control systems inhibits the development of trust. Recent 
research, however, indicates that the relationship between trust and control is more complex: trust and 
control may be complements or substitutes depending on the situation. Woolthuis et al. (2005) conducted 
four longitudinal case studies to reveal that trust and controls are both complements and substitutes. Lui & 
Ngo (2004) showed that the relationship between contractual safeguards and cooperative outcomes depends 
on both the level and the type of trust (goodwill trust and competence trust).  
 
In conclusion, there is still a lot of ambiguity on the relation between trust and formal controls and whether 
they  form  complements  or  substitutes.  The  existing  literature  also  failed  to  fully  explore  the  role  that 
(accounting) information plays in this process (Vosselman & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2004). We believe that 
this ambiguity arises because of two main reasons. First, previous research typically treated the different 
governance  mechanisms  as  uni-dimensional  constructs.  Second,  the  literature  has  ignored  the  dynamic 
relation between these governance mechanisms. 
 
Adopting a more contingent perspective, Das & Teng (2001a) have suggested that the relation between 
control and trust may not be the same across all situations. Although Das & Teng (2001a) recognize the 
multidimensional nature of trust and controls, their study remains ambiguous on the relation between these 
two governance mechanisms. On the one hand they propose (p. 265) that goodwill trust and competence 
trust will enhance the effectiveness of controls (behavior as well as outcome control), on the other hand, they 
also propose (p. 264) that both outcome control and behavior control will undermine goodwill trust and 
competence trust in an alliance. These at first sight contradictory propositions may be reconciled if we take a 
dynamic view on the relation. 
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Dekker (2004) and Tomkins (2001) hint at a more dynamic perspective and provide interesting insights into 
the relation between trust and control, and between trust and information, respectively. Dekker (2004) argues 
that the relationship between trust and controls may be nonlinear. Until a certain threshold
25 (determined by 
the relation’s transaction hazards) the use of formal controls may be complementary and enhancing to trust. 
We  expect  therefore  that  the  first  proposition  of Das & Teng (2001a), namely that goodwill trust and 
competence trust will enhance the effectiveness of controls holds for relations at an early stage. A certain 
level of trust is needed in order to implement effective controls over a partner in an alliance (Das & Teng 
1998). Behavior control and outcome control work better with the presence of trust (Das & Teng, 2001a). 
Without a certain level of trust, it will be difficult to accept outcome measurements and to follow specified 
behavior patterns.  
 
However, since trust is the low-cost solution, it will substitute formal controls whenever a sufficient level of 
control is realized for safeguarding the transaction. Partners will not unnecessarily use expensive formal 
control mechanisms and in addition risk damaging the quality of their relationship (Dekker, 2004). We 
expect thus that at later stages of the relationship formal control - that is, behavior control and outcome 
control - may undermine trust. The employment of strict rules (behavioral control) and objectives (outcome 
control) means that suppliers’ goodwill and competence is thrown in doubt. As a result, an atmosphere of 
mistrust  is created. We maintain therefore that Das & Teng’s (2001a) second proposition, namely that 
outcome control and behavior control will undermine goodwill trust and competence trust, holds for relations 
with a prior relation. This implies that, in an early phase of the relation, where trust still needs to be built, 
one would expect a positive relation between formal controls and trust. However, at a later stage in the 
relation, trust may replace formal controls.  
 
Tomkins  (2001)  gives  us  a  better  understanding  of  how  information  and  trust  are  related.  While prior 
literature (e.g. Wicks et al., 1999) conclude that there is an inverse relationship between the willingness to 
trust and the need for information, Tomkins (2001) describes the relationship between trust and information 
during  different  stages  of  the  relationship life cycle as an inverted U-shape: in the early stages of the 
relationship trust and information are additively related, while later on they become substitutes. Tomkins 
(2001) reasons that it is probably true to say that, at any specific point of time, there is a reasonably strict 
inverse association between information and the level of trust (i.e. trust intensity), but this assumes that the 
level of trust intensity is somehow given, quite independent of any other activity. It ignores the fact that trust 
derives from learned, usually interactive, experiences and that this process itself depends upon information 
as well as appropriate information depending upon the state of trust. The findings in Langfield-Smith & 
Smith’s (2003) case study on IT outsourcing support this dynamic view on the relation between trust and 
information. Evidence from the case points to the importance of proactive information collection in the early 
                                                 
25 Dekker (2003a) argues that this “threshold” not necessarily relates to the stage of the relationship, but rather to the level of trust at a certain point in 
time (which may also result from other sources than prior interactions) and the need for control. This is a valid argument and we recognize that other 
sources may determine the level of trust at a certain point in time, but still it is widely recognized that having a prior relation is an important 
determinant for the level of trust. Having a prior relation has even often been used as a proxy for trust (e.g. Dekker, 2003b).   
  78
days of the relationship to establish ground rules and expectations. This enabled the development of trust 
over time. 
 
Based on this dynamic view of a relationship, and taking into account the multidimensional nature of the 
different governance mechanisms we discussed above, we expect that:  
 
H3:   At an early stage of the relation, perceived relational risk will be reduced more effectively by 
(a) behavioral control and by (b) Type 1 information than by goodwill trust. At later stages of 
the relation, goodwill trust will substitute behavioral controls and Type 1 information and 
perceived  relational  risk  will  be  reduced  more  effectively  by  goodwill  trust  than  by  (c) 
behavioral controls and by (d) Type 1 information.  
 
H4:   At an early stage of the relation, perceived performance risk will be reduced more effectively 
by (a) outcome control and by (b) Type 2 information than by competence. At later stages of 
the relation, competence trust will substitute outcome controls and Type 2 information and 
perceived relational risk will be reduced more effectively by competence trust than by (c) 
outcome control and by (d) Type 2 information. 
 
 
3. Data and method 
 
3.1 Data collection 
 
We obtained the data for this study through a survey instrument. The population of our study was drawn 
from Amadeus
26. Companies were required to meet the following criteria
27 for inclusion in the study: (i) 
located in Flanders, (ii) number of employees between 50 and 250 and (iii) either one of the following two 
criteria: either a turnover between 10 million and 50 million Euro or total assets between 10 million and 43 
million Euro. This resulted in a list of 1538 medium sized firms, all of whom were contacted by telephone. 
Characteristics of the population are provided in Panel A of Table 3.1. Survey participants were pre-screened 
using a structured telephone interview and those who agreed to participate identified the most important IT 
investment made within the last five years. Of those contacted, 275 were eliminated as unsuitable
28 and 668 
refused to participate.  
 
                                                 
26AMADEUS is a Pan-European financial database, created and distributed by Bureau Van Dijk, containing information on approximately 8 million 
public and private companies in 38 European countries. To be included in AMADEUS, Belgium companies (as for many other countries) must 
comply with at least one of the following criteria: (i) operating revenue equal to at least 1 million Euro, (ii) total assets equal to at least 2 million Euro 
and (iii) number of employees equal to at least 15.   
27 Inclusion criteria (ii) and (iii) were based on the Commission recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises (2003/361/EG). 
28 Reasons for exclusion: (i) 137 firms were not contactable (e.g. wrong telephone number, firm had gone out of business, location change and general 
organizational change), (ii) 98 firms were a subsidiary with no individual IT investment decision rights, and (iii) 41 firms belonged to the same group 
as another firm already in the sample (i.e. key informant was already identified for another firm in the group and therefore excluded).  
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Of the firms that initially agreed to participate in the study, a key informant (typically an IT manager) who 
was responsible for IT investments was identified and asked for a direct e-mail address. Subsequently an e-
mail with a direct link to the on-line survey instrument was send to 595 key informants. An extensive 
contacting procedure was used over a time period of 10 weeks. Respondents were first pre-notified by 
phone, which is likely to lead to more involvement and commitment by the respondent from the beginning of 
the project (Van der Stede et al., 2005). Secondly an e-mail and two telephone reminders were used to 
increase survey response rates. This procedure resulted in 310 responses, which represent a field response of 
52% (310/595) and an effective response rate of 25% (310/1263). Observations with missing data were 
excluded, which reduced the sample to 287 transactions between medium sized firms and their relation with 
a supplier of IT products and services.  
 
We focus on this type of transactions for some specific reasons. IT purchases and outsourcing are nowadays 
characterized by an unprecedented growth rate and IT outsourcing is expected to continue to grow for the 
foreseeable future (Barthélemy, 2001; Fish & Seydel, 2006). The spectrum of IT products and services 
ranges from relatively routine commodities such as computer supplies and office software licenses to highly 
specialized and customized development projects. While the former transactions are relatively simple, the 
latter  transactions  often  require  relationship-specific  investments  and  a  high  level  of  integration  and 
coordination by both parties (Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Wang et al., 1997; Whang, 1992). The gamut of 
possible  supplier  relationships  ranges  thus  from  purely  transactional,  price-based  interactions  to  highly 
interdependent partnerships (Heckman, 1999).  
 
Extant research has mainly concentrated on large organizations and large-valued IT outsourcing contracts 
(e.g. Arnett & Jones, 1994; Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003; Collins & Millen, 1995; Lacity & Hirschheim, 
1993). Our study focuses on SMEs. SMEs represent over 95% of enterprises in most OECD countries, 
generate a substantial share of GDP and account for well over half of private sector employment (OECD, 
2000). This economic significance makes them worth while to study. Differences between small and large 
firms could lead to different IT items being outsourced and different outsourcing agreements governing these 
arrangements (Rohde, 2004). Many smaller firms do not have designated IT departments and, therefore, are 
less likely to have the same level of IT skills within their organizations (Chan & Chung, 2002). Their limited 
IT resources and expertise make SMEs receptive for outsourcing IT (Barthélemy & Geyer, 2005; Dekker, 
2003b). In fact, many of their IT-related functions are outsourced through necessity (Rohnde, 2004). And 
because of their limited firm size, IT investments often represent substantial investments for SME (Dekker, 
2003b). 
 
Inter-firm control issues are likely to be important in this type of transactions (Dekker, 2003b). First, SMEs 
power  and  skills  to  negotiate  contracts  and  to  manage  contractual  relationships  with  large  outsourcing 
vendors may be limited and the process of contract negotiation is costly and requires expert legal advice that 
is often prohibitive for smaller organizations (Rohde, 2003). Second, opportunistic behavior, high cost, poor  
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quality and service, loss of control and expertise, and over-dependence on supplier are often reported control 
problems  in  IT  outsourcing  relationships  (Barthélemy,  2001).  As  SMEs  often  lack  the  knowledge  to 
adequately  specify  desired  outcomes  and  to  monitor  performance  ex-post,  opportunism  concerns  and 
coordination  difficulties  are  especially  relevant  for  SMEs  (Dekker,  2003b).  Third,  difficulties  in  task 
programmability  and  output  measurability  mean  that  formal  controls  are  difficult  to  implement  in  IT 
outsourcing, particular in the early stages of the relationship (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). Rohnde 
(2004) reports that the manner in which functions are outsourced differ depending on the size of the firm: the 
larger the firm, the greater the reliance on more formal procedures.  
 
Table 3.1: Sample, population and transaction characteristics 
Panel  A.  Characteristics  of the population (N = 1538) and the sample (N = 287). The population was drawn from Amadeus. 
Companies were required to meet following criteria: (i) located in Flanders, (ii) number of employees between 50 and 250 and (iii) 
either one of the following two criteria: either a turnover between 10 million and 50 million Euro or total assets between 10 million 
and 43 million Euro in 2003. The means for the population and the sample are not significantly different at the 0.10 level. 
 




Operating Revenue            Mean                                          
Median 
29 million Euro 
22 million Euro 
28 million Euro 
21 million Euro 






Industry                              Utilities companies  












Panel B. Description of the products and services included in the 287 transactions studied 
 
Product or service included in transaction  Frequency  (max = 287)  Rating used to create measure of product 
complexity 
Standard software  154  1 
Personal computers  94  1 
Work stations  62  1 
Side equipment  71  1 
Cabling  36  1 
Network configuration  91  2 
Mini system  38  2 
Mainframe  39  2 
Computer-controlled machines  10  2 
Branch-specific software  39  3 
Training  65  3 
Instruction  52  3 
Documentation  87  3 
Customized software  87  4 
Consulting  110  4 
Accompaniments  127  4 
Design  30  5 
Tailor-made software  85  5 
 
Table 3.1 Panel B includes a description of the transactions included in the study. The IT product or service 
could range from standard software or hardware to very complex and customized IT investments. This 
resulted in a dataset including transactional relationships that vary from simple market transactions with few 
associated  control  problems  to  extensive  and  complicated  transactions  with  potentially  larger  control 
problems. Based on Anderson & Dekker (2005)
29, we grouped the 18 types of software, hardware, and 
                                                 
29 The data for the study of Anderson & Dekker (2005) come from a database called The external Management of Automation 1995 (mat 95) that was 
developed to study the management of purchased information technology (Batenburg & Raub, 1995). The constructs developed by Anderson &  
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services that may be included in the transaction into five categories that represent increasing demands for 
coordination  and  interaction  between  the  buyer  and  seller  (Table  3.1,  Panel  B).  27%  of  the  responses 
involved standardized transactions, ranging from standard software and hardware to network configurations 
and mainframes, while 36% of the projects involved highly complex purchases such as tailor made software 
and design. This variety allows us to study a large variety in relations and consequent relational risks, 
controls, trust, etc. On average, respondents were 40 years old and worked 11 years in their firms. The 
average (median) buying firm
30 included in the study had an operating revenue in 2003 of 27.88 million Euro 
(20.80 million Euro) and 114 (101) employees. Unlike most of the previous studies on this topic, which 
constrained their sample to single industries (e.g. Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995; Lui & Ngo, 2004; Judge & 
Dooley, 2006), we sought to enhance the external validity of this study by using a broader population across 
different industries. Firms represented the following industries: 13% utilities companies, 40% manufacturing 
firms, 22% construction companies, 25% service companies.  
 
Non-response analysis suggested that non-participating firms did not significantly differ from participating 
firms on these important firm characteristics. Table 3.1 Panel A presents an overview of the population and 
sample characteristics. A question from the structured telephone interview indicated that the main reasons 
for not participating were: (i) 45% had no time, (ii) 10% were not involved in the purchase decisions process 
as IT investments were completely outsourced to a third company, (iii) 7% was not interested, (iv) 7% had a 
company policy not to participate in surveys,  (v) 5% of the key informant was either sick or on holidays and 
(vi) 27% of the companies provided no or another reason (e.g. some firms identified themselves as too small, 
other indicated that their main IT investments were in-house development, or that their company made no IT 
investments). We also compared early-returned questionnaires to late-returned questionnaires on a number of 
variables: respondent’s profile (age, years with company), company size, industry, transaction attributes and 
governance systems to further test for a non-response bias. The assumption of this analysis is that late 
respondents share similar characteristics and response biases with non-respondents. Analyses indicated that 
no significant mean differences exist between early and late respondents. Hence, we found no evidence of 
obvious response bias in the sample.  
 
While we believe that our sample is without response bias, there remains a potential problem of sample 
selection bias. The choice as whether a particular IT investment is internalized or outsourced is determined 
by the transactional hazards in our model (the control variables). For example, exchanges with very high 
levels  of  asset  specificity  or  environmental  uncertainty  may  be  more  often  internalized  and  therefore 
underrepresented in our sample (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). This problem was (partially) countered by focusing 
on SMEs, which typically lack expertise and resources for in-house production, making them receptive for 
outsourcing IT needs. Indeed, our sample does not show a restricted range on these variables. Moreover, a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Dekker (2005) are thus based on survey items included in the dataset originally developed by Batenburg & Raub (1995). The full questionnaire is 
available in The External Management of Automation: Codebook for the Combined Data from the Netherlands and Germany (Buskens & Batenburg., 
2000).     
30 Although the survey was administered exclusively to IT buyers, limited data about suppliers was collected. In 43 cases the identity of the supplier 
was omitted. The remaining transactions involve 155 different suppliers. The maximum number of transactions with a single supplier (IBM) is 16 and 
only six suppliers accounted for 6 or more transactions each (IBM, Dell, Dolmen, HP, Edan and AXI).   
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question from the structured telephone interview indicated that less than 1% of the companies could not 
participate because of internal development.       
 
3.2 Variables and measures 
 
Table 3.2 reports the details of the measurement items and constructs used to operationalize the theoretical 
constructs. Questionnaire items, unless stated otherwise, were measured using a 5-point Likert scale in which 
“1” represented “low degree” and “5” represented “high degree”. Where available, we used measurement 
instruments from the literature to develop constructs. Some items were modified to reflect the specific 
context of the study. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability value for each construct is also reported in Table 3.2. 
The reliability values of the measurement scales all exceed the recommended value of 0.70 (Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994) with the exception of that for Task Complexity, which is marginal at 0.60.  
 
The construct scores are calculated by adding the original scale responses together and determining the mean 
value. Using these summated scores provide some specific benefits (Hair et al., 1998). First, it is a composite 
measure, thus reducing measurement error and representing multiple facets of a concept. Second, it includes 
only the variables that load highly on the factor and excludes those having little impact, which makes 
interpretation  more  easy.  Third,  summated  scales  allow  for  easy  replication  between  samples.  Finally, 
summated scales are not necessarily orthogonal.  
 
A  factor  analysis  is  used  to  verify  the  constructs  that  were  developed  for  the  governance  mechanisms 
(Behavioral  Control,  Outcome  Control,  Type  1  Information,  Type  2  Information,  Goodwill  Trust  and 
Competence Trust). Five factors were extracted, accounting for 66.24% of the variation. The different factors 
clearly indicate that trust, controls and information form different governance mechanisms. Although the 
items  for  Goodwill  Trust  and  Competence  Trust loaded on one factor, we conceptualized them as two 
separate constructs
31 (cf. Lui & Ngo, 2004). Table 3.3 presents the results for the factor analysis. Details of 
the development of the construct follows. 
 
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the measures (in bold and italic) and the items used to construct measures (below the measures) for perceived 
risk, governance mechanisms and transaction characteristics. All items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale unless otherwise 
mentioned. N= 287 transactions 
 
Panel A.  Dependent variables 
Perceived risk  Min  Max  Mean  Sd. 
Perceived Performance Risk (α = 0.78) 
-The supplier’s product/service may not perform as described  













Perceived Relational Risk (α = 0.96) 
-The supplier may not carry out its duties if it is not checked up  
-The supplier may not always do things that it promises to do  
-The supplier may not be fair in its dealings 






















                                                 
31 This is further justified because a factor analysis (not reported) on the full sample (no listwise deletion, n= 302) indicated that the five trust-items 
did load, as expected, on two separate factors.  
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Panel B. Independent variables 
Governance mechanisms  Min  Max  Mean  Sd. 
Outcome Control (α = 0.87) 
-We established specific performance goals for the supplier  
-We monitored the extent to which the supplier attains the performance goals  
-If the supplier did not meet the performance goals, he was required to explain why  
-We gave feedback concerning the extent to which the supplier achieved his goals  

























Behavioral Control (α = 0.91) 
-We monitored the extent to which the supplier followed established procedures  
-We evaluated the procedures the supplier used to accomplish a given task  
-We tried to modify the supplier’s procedures when desired results were not obtained  
-We gave the supplier feedback on how he accomplished his performance goals  
-We participated in the costs of certain activities if they were carried out according to our 
guidelines  

































Information Type 1 (to warrant trust) (α = 0.84)  
Once the supplier was chosen,  the extent to which we pursued following information   
-The reputation of the supplier for quality, price, delivery 
-Likelihood that the seller will continue its activities in a similar way 
-Information on the reliable achievement of milestones (e.g. costs and quality)  
-Adaptiveness of supplier’s technology development to our needs 





























Information Type 2 (to master events collaboratively) (α = 0.78)  
Once the supplier was chosen,  the extent to which we pursued following information   
-Mutual dependence: both the dependence of your company with respect to the supplier and the 
dependence of the supplier with respect to your company 
-Scenario development with broad consensus on relationship option values  
-Agreed expectations of each other on the way to cooperate  





























Competence Trust (α = 0.79) 
-The supplier had been chosen because of good reputation   
-The supplier had been chosen because of rich resources of capital and labor   

















Goodwill Trust (α = 0.84) 
-The supplier had been chosen because he had been fair in negotiations  














Panel C. Control variables 
Transaction characteristics  Min  Max  Mean  Sd. 
Uncertainty (α = 0.75) 
-Difficulty of assessing quality of supplier’s product at delivery  
-Difficulty of comparing different suppliers’ products  


















-Initial contract price to supplier (in Euro): select one of five price ranges where 1 is small and 5 
is large (less than 12 500, between 12 500 & 25 000, between 25 000 & 50 000, between 50 000 









Asset Specificity (α = 0.81) 
If the product failed and had to be replaced, what would have been the loss in terms of 
- time and money associated with replacing the product   
- time and money associated with training your personnel  
- time and money associated with data entry  

























Task Complexity (α = 0.60) 
-No. of components/services bought (select from list of 18 possibilities cf. Panel A) 













Competition (α = 0.85) 
-Number of potential suppliers at time of purchase  













Dependence Buyer (α = 0.80) 
If the supplier failed to deliver, 
- it would be very difficult for our firm to find substitute suppliers  


















-Have your company and the supplier transacted before this particular transaction?  











Table 3.3: Scale development for governance mechanisms 
This table presents the results of a factor analysis of the use of governance mechanisms using Principal Component Analysis as 
extraction method Varimax with Kaiser Normalization as rotation method. Five factors with eigenvalues greater than one explain 
















Type 2  
Info 
We monitored the extent to which the supplier attains the performance goals  0.844         
If the supplier did not meet the performance goals, he was required to explain 
why 
0.811         
We gave feedback concerning the extent to which the supplier achieved his 
goals 
0.781         
We established specific performance goals for the supplier  0.740         
The supplier’s rewards were based upon how his performance compared to the 
goals 
0.604         
We tried to modify the supplier’s procedures when desired results were not 
obtained 
  0.822       
We gave the supplier feedback on how he accomplished his performance goals   0.791       
We monitored the extent to which the supplier followed established 
procedures 
  0.695       
To be able to evaluate the supplier’s methods, the supplier had to report 
periodically 
0.467  0.659       
We participated in the costs of certain activities if they were carried out 
according to our guidelines 
0.498  0.641       
We evaluated the procedures the supplier used to accomplish a given task  0.464  0.640       
Adaptiveness of supplier’s technology development to our needs      0.819     
Information on the reliable achievement of milestones (e.g. costs and quality)      0.786     
Common knowledge of technology development plans      0.664     
Likelihood that the seller will continue its activities in a similar way      0.635     
The reputation of the supplier for quality, price, delivery      0.628    0.410 
The supplier had been chosen because of good reputation        0.787   
The supplier had been chosen because of his technical skills        0.787   
The supplier had been chosen because he had been fair in negotiations        0.716   
The supplier had been chosen because he could be counted on to act as 
expected 
    0.429  0.716   
The supplier had been chosen because of rich resources of capital and labor        0.661   
Agreed expectations of each other on the way to cooperate          0.761 
Scenario development with broad consensus on relationship option values          0.710 
Mutual dependence: both the dependence of your company with respect to the 
supplier and the dependence of the supplier with respect to your company 
        0.707 
Possibilities for extending the relationship to new businesses, markets, 
technologies etc. 
    0.426    0.573 
 
 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
Previous empirical studies on the relation between trust and controls focused on governance efficiency or 
satisfaction (e.g. Lui & Ngo, 2004; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). However, these types of analyses do not reveal 
what type of governance mechanisms are used to counter different types of risks. Therefore this study has two 
independent variables: perceived performance risk and perceived relational risk.  
 
Perceived Performance Risk. We measure perceived performance risk with two items derived from Agarwal 
& Teas (2001). These items reflect the combined performance risk that, after taking into account the control 
systems in place and information gathered, the product may not perform as described or the product may not 
work satisfactorily. The Cronbach’s alpha for this construct is 0.78.  
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Perceived Relational Risk. This measure is based on Das & Teng’s (2001b) approach of measuring relational 
risk. The construct includes four items to assess four types of risks, again taking into account the control 
systems in place and information gathered. We the buyers expects that (i) the supplier may not carry out its 
duties if it is not checked up, (ii) the supplier may not always do things that he promises to do, (iii) the 
supplier may not be fair in its dealings, and (iv) the interests of the supplier may conflict with the buyer’s 
interests. The Cronbach’s alpha for this construct is 0.96. 
 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
Outcome Control. This five-item construct is based on the constructs used by de Mortanges & Vossen (1999) 
and  Jaworski  &  MacInnis  (1989).  The  items  focus  on  setting  targets  and  comparing  outcomes,  without 
interfering in the procedures the supplier uses to obtain his goals. The five statements were: (i) we established 
specific performance goals for the supplier, (ii) we monitored the extent to which the supplier attains the 
performance goals, (iii) if the supplier did not meet the performance goals, he was required to explain why, 
(iv) we gave feedback concerning the extent to which the supplier achieved his goals and (iv) the supplier’s 
rewards were based upon how his performance compared to the goals. Cronbach’s alpha for this construct is 
0.87. 
 
Behavioral Control. The behavioral control construct is derived from the constructs used by de Mortanges & 
Vossen  (1999)  and  Jaworski  and  MacInnis  (1989).  The  construct  includes  six  items  that  focus  on  the 
procedures to achieve certain goals (how goals are obtained, and not so much the extent in which goals are 
obtained). The construct involved the following six statements: (i) we monitored the extent to which the 
supplier followed established procedures, (ii) we evaluated the procedures the supplier used to accomplish a 
given task, (iii) we tried to modify the supplier’s procedures when desired results were not obtained, (iv) we 
gave the supplier feedback on how he accomplished his performance goals, (v) we participated in the costs of 
certain activities if they were carried out according to our guidelines and (vi) to be able to evaluate the 
supplier’s methods, the supplier had to report periodically. The Cronbach’s alpha for this construct is 0.91. 
 
Goodwill Trust. We measure goodwill trust between the buyer and the seller, as perceived by the buyer, based 
on a scale developed by Zaheer et al. (1998) and Lui & Ngo (2004). The construct includes two items. The 
first item asked whether the supplier had been chosen because he had been fair in negotiations and the second 
whether the supplier had been chosen because he could be counted on to act as expected. The construct has a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.84. 
 
Competence Trust. This construct is based on Lui & Ngo (2004)’s scale for competence trust. We added one 
item to reflect the importance of technical skills in IT purchase decisions. The items asked whether the 
supplier had been chosen for (i) his good reputation, (ii) his rich resources of capital and labor and (iii) his 
technical skills. The Cronbach’s alpha for this construct is 0.79. 
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Type  1  Information.  The  information  constructs  are  derived  from  Tomkins’  (2001)  detailed  listings  of 
information characteristics for Type 1 and Type 2 information. Type 1 information is information to warrant 
trust. The construct consists of five items. More specifically, we asked buyers to indicate to which extent 
following information was pursued or exchanged: (i) the reputation of the supplier for quality, price, delivery, 
(ii) the likelihood that the seller will continue its activities in a similar way, (iii) information on the reliability 
of achieving milestones (e.g. costs and quality), (iv) adaptiveness of supplier’s technology development to the 
buyer’s needs and (v) mutual knowledge of technology development plans. The Cronbach’s alpha for this 
construct is 0.84.  
 
Type 2 Information. The Type 2 information construct was also derived from Tomkins (2001) detailed listings 
of information characteristics. Type 2 information is information to master events together. The construct 
consists of four items. More specific, we asked buyers to indicate to which extent following information was 
pursued or exchanged: (i) mutual dependence, (ii) scenario development with broad consensus on relationship 
option  values,  (iii)  agreed  expectations  of  each  other  on  the  way  to  cooperate and (iv) possibilities for 
extending  the  relationship  to  new  businesses,  markets,  technologies  etc.  The  Cronbach’s  alpha  for  this 
construct is 0.78.  
 
Control variables. We included several control variables to further specify the model. Transaction Cost 
Economics is based on the notion that firms choose efficient organizational forms or governance structures 
based  on  transactional  issues,  such  as  firm-specific  investments  and  uncertainty.  Empirical  work  in  the 
Transaction Cost literature uses transaction properties and characteristics of the relationship between the 
transacting  partners  to  proxy  for  transaction  hazards  that  explain  firms’  choices  about  organizational 
boundaries (e.g. Anderson & Dekker, 2005). Milgrom & Roberts (1992) identified five characteristics of 
transactions that give rise to information asymmetries and opportunistic hazards: (i) uncertainty in assessing 
performance,  (ii)  infrequency  of  transacting,  (iii)  investments  in  transaction-specific  assets,  (iv)  task 
complexity, and (v) interdependencies with other transactions. In our research setting, interdependence among 
transactions does not apply (cf. Anderson & Dekker, 2005): although the IT purchases are often comprised of 
bundles of products and services (i.e. task complexity), they typically do not reflect a bundle of products and 
services purchased from different suppliers (i.e. interdependence). The other transaction characteristics are 
represented in our analysis.  
 
The constructs for transaction characteristics (Uncertainty, Asset Specificity, Task Complexity and Size) were 
derived from Anderson & Dekker (2005). Uncertainty (α = 0.75) reflects the difficulty of defining ex ante 
and verifying ex post the products and services for which the parties are contracting. Asset specificity (α = 
0.81) refers to exposure of the transacting parties to ex post opportunistic hold-up that is caused by significant 
investments in human or physical assets that have little or no value outside of the transaction. Task complexity 
(α  =  0.60) introduces ambiguity about the cause of possible transaction failure, which in turn makes it 
difficult to apportion blame between the transacting partners. In addition, complexity creates a need for  
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coordination among transaction partners. Size is used as a proxy for transaction frequency, which is intended 
to capture the degree to which future transaction opportunities serve as a bond against opportunism in the 
present period. Complex IT transactions are unlikely to be repeated in substance for any pair of transaction 
partners. However, it makes sense to control for size as large IT projects take some time to complete and are 
typically paid in installments in proportion to work completed (Anderson & Dekker, 2005).  
 
Two critical characteristics of the relationship are the buyer’s dependence (i.e. supplier bargaining power) and 
competition in supplier markets (Porter, 1980). Dependence Buyer (α = 0.80) was derived from Buvik & 
Reve  (2002)  and  reflects  the  buyer's  costs  and  efforts  associated  with  the  replacement  of  the  supplier. 
Competition (α = 0.85) was derived from Anderson & Dekker (2005). As compared to other measures of 
transaction  and  relation  characteristics,  the  intensity  of  competition  in  the  supplier’s  product  market  is 
typically a relationship characteristic that reduces transaction hazards. Finally we also identified whether 
partners had transacted before or not. We measure Prior Relationship as dummy variable (cf. Lui & Ngo, 
2002). Its value equaled 1 if the buyer and the supplier had previous dealings, and 0 otherwise. Panel C of 
Table 3.2 provides a detailed description of the control variables. 
 
4.  Results 
 
Table 3.4 provides a correlation matrix of the constructs. The correlation matrix shows that all governance 
mechanisms  are  positively  correlated  with  one  another,  while  each  of  the  governance  mechanisms  is 
negatively correlated with perceived performance risk and relational risk. Not surprisingly, we find that the 
two types of formal control, the two types of trust and the two types of information are positively and 
relatively highly correlated (respectively 66%, 59% and 55%). However, these values do not present serious 
concerns  for  multicollinearity.  Furthermore,  we  find  almost  no  significant  correlations  between  the 
transaction characteristics and the two forms of perceived risk. Perceived risk is thus more strongly correlated 
with  the  governance  mechanisms  in  place  than  with  the  characteristics  of  transaction.  The  transaction 
characteristics are positively correlated with formal controls, but to a lesser extent with information and trust. 
Finally, as expected, we notice that having a prior relation is highly correlated with most of the variables in 
the study: having a prior relation is negatively correlated with perceived risk as well as with the use of formal 
controls. On the other hand, a prior relation is positively correlated with both types of information. Finally, 
although prior studies have repeatedly used prior relation as a proxy for trust (e.g. Gulati & Singh, 1998; 
Dekker, 2003b), we only find modest correlations between prior relation and trust. This is consistent with 
other studies that also only found a moderate correlation between prior relation and these two forms of trust 
(e.g. Lui & Ngo, 2004).  
 
We  used  multiple  OLS  regressions  to  examine  the  hypothesized  effects  of  governance  mechanisms  on 
perceived performance risk and perceived relational risk. Table 3.5 reports the regression results of the 
relation between perceived risk (relational as well as performance risk) and the different types of governance 
mechanisms for the full sample (N = 287). Results presented in this table are used to discuss hypotheses H1  
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and  H2.  Table  3.6  presents  the  regression  results  of  the  joint  effects  of  different  types  of  governance 
mechanisms on perceived risk for the full sample as well as for sub-groups of buyer-supplier relations with 
(PR, N = 164) and without (NPR, N = 123) a prior relation. Table 3.7 presents the regression results of the 
joint effects of different types of governance mechanisms and their interaction effects on perceived risk for 
the two sub-groups of buyer-supplier relations (PR vs. NPR). Tables 6 and 7 are used to test the hypotheses 
on the dynamic view of the relation (H3 and H4). Model fit is acceptable with significant F-values (p ≤ 0.01) 
and R
2 values ranging from 0.14 to 0.42 for all specifications. In each cell we report the coefficient estimate, 
the t-statistic (in parentheses) and the standardized coefficients. Standardized means that for each datum the 
mean is subtracted and then divided by the standard deviation. As a result all variables have a mean of 0 and 
a standard deviation of 1. This enables comparison of variables of differing magnitudes and dispersions. Only 
standardized b-coefficients (beta weights) can be compared to judge relative predictive power of independent 
variables. Interpretation of the results follows. 
 
Table 3.4: Pearson correlation matrix 
This table reports the Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables. N = 287 and ***, **, * indicates that the 
correlation is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level in a two-tailed test. 
 
  1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  9.  10.  11.  12.  13.  14.  15. 
1. Perceived Performance Risk 
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2. Perceived Relational Risk 
0.31 
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4.1 Relation between perceived risk and the different dimensions of the governance mechanisms  
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that perceived relational risk will be reduced more effectively by goodwill trust (H1a), 
behavior control (H1b) and by Type 1 information (H1c), than by respectively competence trust, outcome 
control and Type 2 information. In accordance with H1a, we observe in Model 1 of Table 3.5 a strong and 
negative impact from goodwill trust on perceived relational risk (b = -0.44, p < 0.01). On the other hand, we  
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find no significant effect of competence trust on relational risk. Although competence trust is negatively 
correlated with relational risk (r = -0.14, p < 0.05 in Table 3.4), this effect is not significant once we control 
for goodwill trust. Model 2 in Table 3.5 provides support for hypothesis H1b. As expected, we find a strong 
negative effect of behavioral controls on relational risk (b = -0.23, p < 0.01). No significant effect of outcome 
control on relational risk is found. Finally, we tested whether perceived relational risk is more effectively 
reduced by Type 1 information than by Type 2 information. The Pearson correlation matrix in Table 3.4 
indicates  that  Type  1  as  well  as  Type  2  information  are  strongly  and  negatively  related  with  perceived 
relational risk (respectively r = -0.36 and r = -0.16). Model 3 in Table 3.5 indicates that only Type 1 (b = -
0.45, p < 0.01) significantly reduces relational risk when both types of information are regressed on perceived 
relational risk. Together these results provide strong support for hypothesis H1.   
 
Table 3.5: Relation between perceived risk and governance mechanisms 
This table presents the regression analyses of the relation between perceived risk and the different types of governance mechanisms. 
The dependent variable in models 1-3 is perceived relational risk (a composite construct of four items measured on a 5-point Likert 
scale as presented in Table 3.2 Panel A) and the dependent variable for models 4-6 is perceived performance risk (a composite 
construct of two items measured on a 5-point Likert scale as presented in Table 3.2 Panel A). In each cell we report the coefficient 
estimate, the t-statistic (in parentheses) and the standardized coefficients. N= 287 and ***, **, * indicates a p-value of ≤ 0.01, 0.05, 
0.10 in a two-tailed test. 
  Perceived relational risk  Perceived performance risk 





































   







































































































































































F value  8.77***  5.01***  7.03***  9.89***  6.37***  8.21*** 
R2  0.22  0.14  0.19  0.24  0.17  0.21 
Adj R2  0.20  0.11  0.16  0.22  0.15  0.19  
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Models 4, 5 and 6 examine whether perceived performance risk is reduced more effectively by competence 
trust (H2a), by outcome control (H2b), and by Type 2 information (H2c) than by respectively goodwill trust, 
behavioral control and Type 1 information. Model 4 shows that goodwill trust as well as competence trust 
both significantly reduce perceived performance risk. The effect of competence trust is stronger than the effect 
of goodwill trust (beta = -0.32, p < 0.01 vs. beta = -0.15, p < 0.05). This result supports hypothesis H2a. 
Model  5  shows  that  outcome  control  (beta  =  -0.25,  p  <  0.01)  is  more  effective  in  reducing  perceived 
performance risk than behavioral control (b = -0.13, p > 0.10). These results provide strong support for 
hypothesis H2b. Finally, the data also supports H2c: Model 6 shows that Type 2 information (beta = -0.29, p < 
0.01) is more effective than Type 1 (beta = -0.16, p < 0.05) in reducing perceived performance risk. Together 
these results strongly support H2. 
 
4.2 The joint effects of different governance mechanisms on perceived risk 
 
Our expectations of the effects of the different dimensions of the governance mechanisms on the different 
types of perceived risk are thus supported by the data. Models 7 and 8 in Table 3.6 test the overall effect of the 
different governance mechanisms on respectively perceived relational risk and perceived performance risk to 
examine the relative importance of these different governance mechanisms.  
 
For the full sample, the results indicate that in particular trust and information reduce perceived risk, while 
control systems seem less effective. First, behavioral control does not significantly reduce perceived relational 
risk once we control for goodwill trust and Type 1 information. Secondly, the significance of outcome control 
in reducing perceived performance risk drops substantially if we control for competence trust and Type 2 
information (from 1% level to 10% level). 
 
However, Models 7 and 8 indicate that there are some important differences between the two sub-groups (PR 
vs. NPR). First, we discuss the results for perceived relational risk. The results show that perceived relational 
risk for the NPR group is mainly reduced by Type 1 information (beta = -0.25, p < 0.05) and by behavioral 
control (beta = -0.22, p < 0.10). Furthermore, we notice that for the NPR group the effectiveness of goodwill 
trust in reducing perceived relational risk drops to a non-significant level if we control for behavioral control 
and Type 1 information. For, the NPR group, we find even an unexpected significant and positive effect of 
competence trust on relational risk (b = 0.30, p < 0.05). Competence trust and relational risk are uncorrelated 
(r = 0.00, ns) for this sub-group (not reported). The effect of competence trust on relational risk becomes 
positive once we behavioral control for goodwill trust. Perhaps one reason for this unexpected effect is that 
buyers that have not transacted before with a particular supplier, are willing to compromise on relational risk, 
as long as the supplier has the technical skills at his disposal. As competence trust increases, a firm may 
actually expose itself to higher risks of opportunism (Das & Teng, 2001a; Madhok, 1995). If the buyer is 
confident of the supplier’s ability to perform as expected, he may increase the scope of cooperation. This may  
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lock the buyer firm in and expose it to the risk of opportunistic behavior from the partner. High competence 
trust may therefore increase vulnerability to opportunism (Lui & Ngo, 2004). 
 
Table 3.6: Relation between perceived risk and governance mechanisms for groups with and without a prior 
relation 
This table presents the regression results of the joint effects of different types of governance mechanisms on perceived risk for the full 
sample as well as for sub-groups of buyer-supplier relations with (PR, N = 164) and without (NPR, N = 123) a prior relation. The 
dependent variable in model 7 is perceived relational risk (a composite construct of four items measured on a 5-point Likert scale as 
presented in Table 3.2 Panel A) and the dependent variable for models 8 is perceived performance risk (a composite construct of  two 
items measured on a 5-point Likert scale as presented in Table 3.2 Panel A). In each cell we report the coefficient estimate, the t-
statistic (in parentheses) and the standardized coefficients. ***, **, * indicates a p-value of ≤ 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 in a two-tailed test. 
 
On  the  other  hand,  the  results  for  the  PR  group  indicate  that  goodwill  trust  and  Type  1  information 
significantly  reduce  perceived  relational  risk.  Interestingly,  the  standardized  coefficients  indicate  that 
goodwill trust is almost twice as effective in reducing perceived relational risk as Type 1 information (beta = -
0.41 vs. beta = -0.22, both p < 0.01). In contrast, behavioral control does not reduce perceived relational risk 
for the PR group. Together these results suggest that buyers in the NPR group reduces perceived relational 
risk mainly through gathering Type 1 information and by imposing behavioral controls, while buyers in the 
  Perceived relational risk  Perceived performance risk 
  Model 7  Model 8 

































































































































































































































































F value  7.45***  2.95***  6.01***  9.36***  4.15***  4.60*** 
R2  0.26  0.24  0.32  0.31  0.31  0.27 
Adj R2  0.23  0.16  0.27  0.28  0.24  0.21  
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PR group mainly rely on goodwill trust and in the second place on Type 1 information. These results provide 
support for H3. These findings suggest that partners will not unnecessarily use expensive formal control 
mechanisms and in addition risk damaging the quality of their relationship (Dekker, 2004).  
 
Furthermore,  we  tested  whether  the  dynamic  view  also  holds  for  perceived  performance  risk.  More 
specifically, we expect that perceived performance risk will be reduced more effectively by outcome control 
and Type 2 information for the NPR group and by competence trust for the PR group. Model 8 in Table 3.6 
presents the results. Overall, results for the PR and the NPR group are very similar for both sub-groups. 
Perceived performance risk is in the first place reduced by competence trust and in the second place by Type 
2 information. We find no significant effect of outcome control on perceived performance risk, not even for 
the NPR group. This is not in line with what we expected in H4. In unreported analyses we ran Model 5 for 
two the subgroups (PR vs. NPR) separately. The analyses revealed that outcome control reduces significantly 
performance risk, especially for the NPR group (at the 1% level). However, as can be derived from Model 8, 
the effect of outcome control on perceived performance risk drops for both sub-groups to a non-significant 
level once the model controls for Type 2 information and competence trust. So, contrary to what we expected 
in H4, output control, in comparison to Type 2 information and competence trust, seems less effective in 
reducing perceived performance risk, even at an early stage of the relation. A possible explanation is that 
outcome-based controls require that the buyer can clearly set standards of desirable and expected performance 
and that these can be effectively measured. The rather complex and uncertain nature of the transactions in this 
study (average product complexity = 3.83 and average environmental uncertainty = 3.14 for the NPR group, 
both measured on a scale from 1 to 5) may have prevented the firms to install effective outcome controls
32.  
 
4.3 Does trust substitute information and control at later stages of the relation? 
 
Our  analyses  so  far,  clearly  indicate  that  trust,  control  and  information  are  complex,  multidimensional 
constructs and that they have distinct impacts on two dimensions of perceived risk. Based on Tomkins (2001) 
and Dekker (2004) we expect that the relation between trust and respectively information and formal control 
is non-linear, i.e. we expect that trust complements formal control and information at early stages of the 
relation, while we expect that trust will substitute (to a certain extent) formal control and information at later 
stages. We found already some evidence for these hypotheses through the analyses on the joint effects of the 
different governance mechanisms (cf. section 4.2). In order to more formally test these substitutive effects, we 
ran a set of regression analyses that include the interaction effects between trust and respectively information 
and formal control. The variables were mean-centered to reduce the potential problems of multicollinearity 
before the creation of the interaction terms (cf. Cronbach, 1987). Examination of the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) associated with each regression coefficient showed no serious problems of multicollinearity. Most VIF 
                                                 
32 Some support for this idea is found when Model 8 is performed on a sub-sample of transactions with environmental uncertainty lower than 3.5. In 
this analysis we find that outcome control is an important and significant factor in reducing perceived performance risk, even after controlling for trust 
and information. Despite this support, we can not rule out other explanations. Recall that perceived risk was measured after taking into account the 
control systems in place. An alternative explanation can therefore be that outcome controls were already effectively included to reduce perceived 
performance risk.     
  93
values ranged between 1 and 2, although some interaction terms were associated with higher VIF values, the 
maximum value being 4.5.  These values are well below the recommended threshold value of 10 (Hair et al., 
1998). Table 3.7 presents the results. 
 
4.3.1 The relation between trust and information 
Based on Tomkins (2001), we expect that trust complements the need for information at early stages of the 
relation, while at later stages in the relation, we expect that trust will substitute information. Model 9 on 
perceived performance risk is the same model as Model 7, except that it also introduces the interaction effects 
between trust and information. As expected, we find for the PR group a positive and significant interaction 
effect of goodwill trust and Type 1 information on perceived relational risk (b = 0.21, p < 0.10). This 
interaction effect is not significant for the NPR group (b = 0.07, ns). This result implies that goodwill trust 
substitutes the need for Type 1 information for the PR group, but not for the NPR group. We also find a 
positive  and  significant  interaction  effect  of  competence  trust  and  Type  2  information  on  perceived 
performance risk (b = 0.24, p < 0.05). Again this interaction effect is not significant for the NPR group (b = -
0.13, ns).  
 
In conclusion: although we find no evidence for the complementary role of trust and information for the NPR 
group, we find, as expected in H3, evidence of the substitutive effects of these two governance mechanisms 
for the PR group. Together these results provide support for Tomkins (2001) description of  the relationship 
between trust and information during different stages of the relationship life cycle as an inverted U-shape: in 
the early stage of the relationship both trust and information help reducing perceived risk, while later on these 
two  governance  mechanisms  become  substitutes.  It  is  important  to  distinguish  between  the  different 
dimensions of trust and information since goodwill trust only substitutes Type 1 information and competence 
trust only substitute Type 2 information. 
 
No other interactions between information and trust were identified, except for the NPR group where the 
interaction  term  between  competence trust and Type 1 information has a significant negative impact on 
perceived relational risk (b = -0.33, p < 0.10). This interaction effect should be interpreted in light of the 
positive effect of competence trust on perceived relational risk that we discussed above. We reasoned that 
buyers that have not transacted before with a particular supplier, may be willing to compromise on relational 
risk as long as the supplier has the necessary technical skills at his disposal. The negative interaction term 
takes away this positive effect of competence trust on perceived relational risk for buyers with high levels of 
Type 1 information; this is information to warrant trust. So for buyers with sufficient information on the 
trustworthiness  of  their  partner  (Type  1  information),  competence  trust  no  longer  increases  perceived 
relational risk.  
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Table 3.7: Interaction effects between different governance mechanisms 
This table presents the regression results of the joint effects of different types of governance mechanisms and their interaction effects 
on perceived risk for sub-groups of buyer-supplier relations with (PR, N = 164) and without (NPR, N = 123) a prior relation. The 
dependent variables are perceived relational risk and perceived performance risk (composite constructs as presented in Table 3.2 Panel 
A). Model 9 presents the results for interaction effects between trust and information, Model 10 presents the interaction effects for 
trust and control. In each cell we report the coefficient estimate, the t-statistic (in parentheses) and the standardized coefficients. ***, 
**, * indicates a p-value of ≤ 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 in a two-tailed test. 
 
  Model 9:  Interaction between trust and information  Model 10: Interaction between trust and control 
  Perceived relational risk  Perceived performance risk  Perceived relational risk  Perceived performance risk 
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F value  2.41***  4.92***  3.34***  4.60***  2.63***  5.34***  4.79***  3.86*** 
R2  0.27  0.35  0.34  0.31  0.28  0.37  0.42  0.30 
Adj R2  0.16  0.28  0.24  0.23  0.18  0.30  0.33  0.22  
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4.3.2 The relation between trust and controls 
Model 10 provides the results for the interaction effects between the different types of trust and control. First, 
we discuss the results for perceived relational risk. We find for the NPR group no significant effect of 
goodwill trust and behavioral controls on perceived relational risk. On the other hand, for the PR group, we 
find, as expected a positive and significant interaction effect (b = 0.20, p < 0.10) of goodwill trust and 
behavioral  control  on  perceived  relational  risk.  Although  the  idea  that  goodwill  trust  will  enhance  the 
effectiveness of behavioral controls in an early stage of the relation is not supported by the data, the findings 
support the idea that behavior control undermines goodwill trust for relations with a prior relation (H3). 
Finally, while the interaction term between competence trust and outcome control gives evidence of a strong 
complementary role for the NPR group (b = -0.48, p < 0.01), we see that the interaction effect becomes 
positive for the PR group (b = 0.07, ns). Although the effect is not significant, it provides some support for the 
idea that the complementary role between competence trust and outcome control in an early stage of the 
relation becomes a substituting role at later stages of the relation (H4).  
 
Model 10 also reveals some unexpected interaction effects. For, the NPR group, we find a significant (at 10% 
level) and positive interaction effect of competence trust and outcome control on relational risk. This effect is 
in  line  with  the  other  unexpected  results  we  discussed  above,  namely  that  competence  trust  increases 
perceived relational risk in the NPR group. We reasoned that  a buyer that has not transacted before with a 
particular supplier, is maybe willing to compromise on relational risk, as long as the supplier has the technical 
skills at his disposal. Apparently, imposing outcomes controls increases this effect. A possible explanation is 
that a buyer that has not transacted before with a particular supplier, may focus on reducing performance risk 
by choosing a supplier for whom the buyer has a strong competence trust and for whom he expects that 
outcome controls will be effective, while being aware that this may actually jeopardize his relation with the 
supplier and in fact increase relational risk. So again, by focusing on performance risk, and thus on outcome 
control and competence trust, a firm may actually expose itself to higher risks of opportunism (Lui & Ngo, 
2004; Das & Teng, 2001a; Madhok, 1995).  
 
The second unexpected interaction effect for the NPR group in Model 10 is a significant negative interaction 
effect of competence trust and behavioral controls on performance risk (b = -0.19, p < 0.05). A possible 
explanation is that the increased vulnerability to potential opportunism that arises from high competence trust 
can be countered by formal controls which specify the basic behavior of partners and lay down punishment 
for opportunism (Lui & Ngo, 2004).  
 
5.  Discussion and conclusion 
 
Overall, we believe that this paper refines and extends the literature regarding the interplay between different 
governance mechanisms in inter-firm relationships. It appears that it is the combined impact of trust, control 
and  information  that  lead  to  confidence  in  partner  cooperation  and  reduced  perceived  risk  in inter-firm  
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relations. Primarily building on the studies of Das & Teng (2001a), Tomkins (2001) and Dekker (2004), we 
hypothesize and find evidence of the multidimensional nature of these governance mechanisms. We also 
distinguish between two types of perceived risk: relational and performance risk because depending on which 
risk is perceived to be more of a threat, decision makers decide on the governance strategy that is best for 
them (Das & Teng, 1998, 2001b). A key finding of this study is that information constitutes an important 
inter-firm governance mechanism. Prior studies (e.g. Das & Teng, 2001a) typically focused on the relation 
between trust and controls, ignoring the role of information.  Finally, we distinguished relations with prior ties 
from those without prior ties and we find that formal controls and information are more effective in reducing 
perceived  risk  at  early  stages  of  the  relation,  while  trust  become  more  important  at  later  stages  of  the 
relationship. 
 
More specifically we expected that perceived relational risk is reduced more effectively by goodwill trust, 
behavior  control  and  by  Type  1  information  (i.e.  information  to  warrant  trust),  than  by  respectively 
competence trust, outcome control and Type 2 information (i.e. information for the mastery of events). On the 
other hand, we hypothesized that perceived performance risk is reduced more effectively by competence trust, 
by outcome control, and by Type 2 information than by respectively goodwill trust, behavioral control and 
Type 1 information. In general, we find strong support for these hypotheses. While the statistical impact of 
trust and information is greater than the statistical impact of controls, all of them appear to be important to 
reduce perceived risk.  
 
However, our analyses also reveal that there are some important differences between transactions with and 
without prior ties, supporting the idea of a more dynamic relation. If no prior ties with the seller exist, 
perceived relational risk of buyers is mainly reduced by Type 1 information and by behavioral control. 
However, behavioral controls are replaced by goodwill trust at later stages of the relation. These findings 
suggest that partners will not unnecessarily use expensive formal behavioral control mechanisms and in 
addition risk damaging the quality of their relationship.  
 
We found weaker support for this dynamic view in relation to perceived performance risk. The effects of 
outcome control on performance risk become insignificant once we control for trust and information, even for 
transactions with no prior ties. A possible explanation is that the rather complex and uncertain nature of the 
transactions in this study, may have prevented the firms to install effective outcome controls. Future research 
should examine whether this dynamic view holds for less uncertain environments.  
 
Finally, our analyses on the interaction effects between the different governance mechanisms showed some 
interesting results. Especially the relation between trust and information is interesting as this relation has, to 
our  knowledge,  not empirically been studied in the past. While information is an important governance 
mechanism, we find that, to a certain extent, trust replaces the need for information at later stages of the 
relation. These results provide some support for Tomkins (2001) description of the relationship between trust  
  97
and information during different stages of the relationship life cycle as an inverted U-shape: in the early 
stages of the relationship trust and information are additively related, while later on they become substitutes. 
It is important to distinguish between the different dimensions of trust and information as goodwill trust only 
substitutes  Type  1  information  and  competence  trust  only  substitutes  Type  2  information.  This  finding 
reinforces the observation that it is necessary to identify specific relationships among the different dimensions 
of trust, information and control in inter-firm relations.  
 
Our results have some important implications for managers. For instance, it may be important for firms to 
invest  in  greater  Type  1  information  when  trust  is  based  primarily  on  competence.  This  is  because 
competence  trust  has  the  potential  to  encourage  opportunistic  behavior  and  may  lead  to  less  favorable 
cooperative outcomes. Our analyses also reveal that buyers try to reduce potential dangers of overly relying 
on competence trust by complementing it with behavioral control. It is important for managers to be aware of 
the  need  to  cultivate  an  optimal  mix  of  governance  mechanisms  because  these  governance  mechanisms 
interact with each other. Decision makers also need to be aware of the potential (negative) impact of the 
governance mechanisms they employ on their partner. A recent study of Christ et al. (2006), for instance, 
indicates that behavioral control systems are perceived as more intrusive and as a greater threat to autonomy 
and therefore they may be more damaging to trust and cooperation than outcome control. More research is 
needed  to  understand  the  impact  of  governance  mechanisms  on  the  perception  of  the  partner  (i.e.  the 
controlled firm). Finally, although it is interesting to study risk perceptions of the decision makers as an 
heuristic that helps understand the governance mechanisms they rely on, decision makers should be aware 
that perceived risk does not necessarily coincide with objective risk and that governance mechanisms may 
only provide the illusion of less uncertainty or more control.  
 
Certain caveats are appropriate when interpreting the results of this study. In common with the majority of 
survey research, our study relied on a single informant. Our data reflect thus the perspective of one side of the 
partnership, raising the question whether the respondent was biased. Some studies have employed matched 
pairs of respondents from both transaction parties (e.g., Judge & Dooley, 2006). However, for the issues that 
we address, it is not obvious that a single respondent from the buyer presents serious limitations since this 
study focuses on how governance mechanisms influence the perceived risk of the buyer (cf. Anderson & 
Dekker, 2005). Therefore, we do not believe that the absence of the supplier perspective is a serious threat to 
our conclusions about the influence of governance mechanisms on perceived risk.  
 
Since the data we gathered is essentially not longitudinal in nature, we must consider the possibility that, for 
example,  some  events  (e.g.  the  occurrence  of  transaction  problems  later  in  the  relationship)  causes 
respondents to recall specific elements of the transaction differently than they might otherwise (cf. Anderson 
& Dekker, 2005). To partially offset these concern of recall bias, we carefully framed the reference time for 
each section of the survey. However, our cross-sectional sample design clearly constrains our capacity to 
carefully and fully examine the nature of the dynamics between the different governance mechanisms. Thus  
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longitudinal  data  or  experimental  methods  are  needed  to  further  test  the  dynamics  of  these  complex 
relationships.  
 
We  enhanced  the  external  validity  of  this  study  in  several  ways.  Focusing  on  joint  ventures,  strategic 
alliances, or consortia is a typical approach in many studies, which limits ex-ante the variance in governance 
mechanisms employed (Sobrero & Schrader, 1998). Furthermore, most of the previous studies on this topic 
constrained their sample to single industries (e.g. Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Lui and Ngo, 2004; Judge 
& Dooley, 2006). We focused on a broader population across different industries and included a broad range 
of transactions in our study, including transactional relationships that vary from simple market transactions 
with few associated control problems to extensive and complicated transactions with potentially larger control 
problems. Notwithstanding these efforts to enhance the external validity, this study has some limitations that 
imply caution in generalizing the findings. We restricted our sample to SMEs in Flanders and their relation 
with a supplier of IT products and services as differences between small and large firms can lead to different 
IT items being outsourced and different outsourcing agreements governing these arrangements (Rohde, 2004). 
Moreover,  the  rapid  changing  IT  environment  create  difficulties  in  task  programmability  and  output 
measurability. Formal controls are therefore often difficult to implement in IT outsourcing, particular in the 
early stages of the relationship (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). The relation between, and the need for, 
specific governance mechanisms may be very different in other types of business relationships. Tomkins 
(2001) and Das & Teng (2001a) made detailed listing of respectively information needs and formal control 
needs for different types of relations. For instance, in minority equity alliances competence trust is expected 
to be primordial for the investing firm, while for the recipient firm goodwill trust is expected to be more 
relevant (Das & Teng, 2001a). Examining more closely their proposals appears to be a prime area for future 
research.  
 
Obviously, our models explain only a certain range of the total variation in perceived risk. Clearly, there 
remains much heterogeneity among inter-firm relations and in the contexts in which they are embedded. 
Differences in management structures between the partners, historical events such as a financial crisis and 
competitor responses are some of the many factors that influence inter-firm relations (Fryxell & Dooley, 
2002) and consequently the risk perception of these relationships. This study could be refined with some extra 
control variables that were not included in the study. Das and Teng (2001b) point to a series of psychological 
characteristics of the decision maker (such as trust propensity) that may have an important influence on 
perceived  risk.  Furthermore,  we  only  included  one  observation  per  buyer  firm.  Including  a  series  of 
observations per buyer, would have provided us the possibility to sort out some firm specific effects on inter-
firm  governance  systems,  such  as  culture,  style  of  dealing  with  outside  partners,  etc  (Dekker,  2003b). 
Regardless, it seems unlikely that the inclusion of such controls would have negated our findings. 
 
Off course, further study is required in our understanding about firms’ choices in governance mechanisms. 
Our paper focused on governance mechanisms and how they reduce perceived risk, while we controlled for  
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transaction  and  supplier  characteristics  that  generate  management  control  problems  such  as  size,  asset 
specificity,  task  complexity  and  competition.  Prior  studies  have  indicated  the  importance  of  adapting 
governance  mechanisms  to  these  transaction  characteristics  or  hazards.  Anderson  &  Dekker  (2005),  for 
instance, studied how different sets of terms of contracting (i.e. formal controls) are related to transaction 
characteristics and how misalignment between transaction hazards and several contract dimensions is related 
with  higher  transaction  problems.  Future  research  could  extend  their  research  by  examining  whether 
transaction hazards are related to the distinct dimensions of the governance mechanisms discussed in this 
paper (thus besides formal controls, also trust and information). Furthermore it is also promising to study 
whether these relations are different for transactions with serious problems than for successful transactions, 
i.e. making the link with performance (cf. Anderson & Dekker, 2005).  
 
Another  fruitful  path  for  future  research  is  to  consider  the  cost/benefit  trade-off  between  the  different 
governance mechanisms. Governance mechanisms are not costless to develop (Parkhe, 1993). Our study did 
not take into account the costs related to install or maintain governance mechanisms. This focus underplays 
the cost/benefit trade-off.  
 
Other trade-offs may also need a closer examination: while trust between partners may have many benefits 
(including a reduced perceived risk as described in this paper), recent studies have started to reveal some 
drawbacks of trust such as reduced information search (Krishnan et al., 2006). Future research is needed to 
understand how this affects cooperation and inter-firm performance.  
 
This study reveals the importance of examining control, trust and information simultaneously in future inter-
firm relations research. We hope that this study encourages new thinking and research into the dynamic and 
multidimensional  nature  of  inter-firm  governance  mechanisms,  and  inspires  practitioners  in  inter-firm 
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The main findings of this dissertation were already discussed at the end of each manuscript. In this general 
conclusion, we briefly summarize the main contributions of the different manuscripts to the literature. We 
also address their managerial implications. Finally, we identify some limitations and provide a number of 
suggestions for further research. 
  
1.  Contributions to the literature 
 
The first two manuscripts in this dissertation provide experimental evidence on the usefulness of Total Cost 
of Ownership (TCO) information as a Value Chain Analysis (VCA) tool for inter-firm cost management and 
resulting negotiations between buyers and suppliers. Although VCA has been described as a technique that 
can play an important role in the management of supply chain relationships, the extant literature provided 
little empirical evidence of its usefulness. The relevance of the concept for practice has therefore been 
criticized (Lord, 1996). Manuscript 1 & 2 contributes to this literature by providing evidence on how TCO 
information is used by decision makers for a VCA in inter-firm settings. The experiments show that cost 
information can be used to carry out a Value Chain Analysis (VCA) in order to reveal the cost-reduction 
potential  and to exploit cost reduction potentials across the boundaries of companies.  
 
Manuscript 1 & 2 also contribute to the accounting literature by explicitly testing the usefulness of the Total 
Cost of Ownership (TCO) concept as a tool for negotiation between buyers and suppliers, something that has 
been recurrently claimed in the literature (Ellram, 1995a & 1995b; Monczka et al., 2002; Roodhooft et al., 
2003 & 2005). The idea is that the refined cost and cost driver information resulting from a TCO analysis can 
be used to optimize and better coordinate the performance of activities across the supply chain. However, 
empirical evidence for this claim had not yet been provided. Manuscript 1 & 2 provide evidence on the 
usefulness  of  TCO  information  for  negotiating  with  suppliers.  However,  an  important  condition  is  that 
decision makers must be willing to share their private TCO information.     
 
Manuscript  1  shows  that  contrary  to  what  is  popularly  believed,  more  refined  information  (i.e.  TCO 
information) does not always result in better outcomes. The results of manuscript 1 suggest that powerful 
buyers with refined TCO information may not realize all possible benefits from buyer-supplier interactions 
due to their bargaining strategy. Their (false) feeling of power causes an increase of distributive bargaining 
tactics and a reluctance to share the necessary information for inter-firm cost minimization. This finding adds 
to the literature that highlight the importance of information sharing to the effectiveness of buyer–supplier 
relationships (Bensaou, 1999; Drake & Haka, 2005), by identifying an important factor (i.e. power) that 
influences the usefulness of more refined cost information in buyer-supplier negotiations.  
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These experiment-based manuscripts also add to the undernourished intersection between accounting and 
negotiation.  Although  accounting  information  is  widely  acknowledged  to  provide  the  basis  for  many 
contractual agreements, the impact of accounting information on bargaining behavior has received little 
attention (Luft et al., 1998), especially in inter-firm settings (Peffer, 2000). Our experimental design allows 
us to look at the impact of information on the decision and the negotiation process as it gradually shows 
through actors’ behaviors. These elements received scant attention in the extant inter-firm literature (Ring & 
Van de Ven, 1994). 
 
A final conclusion that we can draw from these experiment-based manuscripts is that information can serve 
as an important governance mechanism in inter-firm relations. Manuscript 1 showed that buyers with detailed 
cost information and less power than their opponent may gain control over their own outcomes by sharing 
information and by creating an integrative bargaining situation. Manuscript 2 provides evidence on how 
accounting information is able to serve as an important function in relational signaling and in building trust. 
Manuscript  2  shows  that  trust  and  relational  norms  were  reinforced  over  time,  and  became  important 
structural  conditions  of  the  relation  that  fostered  a  more  cooperative  climate  and  restrained  the  use  of 
distributive behavior. 
 
This final finding, namely that information can serve as a key governance mechanism in inter-firm relations, 
was further investigated in manuscript 3. Although many studies have implicitly referred to the importance of 
information for governing inter-firm relations, proactive information collection has seldom been explicitly 
studied for that purpose. Prior studies on inter-firm governance mechanisms mainly focused on the relation 
between trust and formal controls (e.g. Lui & Ngo, 2004; Luo, 2002; Madhok 1995; Nooteboom 1996; 
Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Woolthuis et al., 2005). The relation between information and formal inter-firm 
control  systems  and  trust  received  however  scant  attention  in  the  literature.  This  constitutes  the  main 
theoretical contribution of manuscript 3: the study extends prior frameworks on inter-firm control systems 
(e.g. Das & Teng, 2001a; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000) by explicitly incorporating information 
as a governance mechanism for inter-firm relationships.  
 
A final contribution to the literature is that manuscript 2 & 3 provide some important findings that may 
advance the wide-spread discussion in the literature on the substitutive or complementary role of different 
governance mechanisms. Manuscript 2 & 3 provide evidence that controls and information are more effective 
as governance mechanisms at early stages of the relation, while trust becomes more important at later stages 
of the relationship. These results emphasize the importance of taking into account the life cycle of the inter-
firm relationship when studying the relation between different governance mechanisms. Finally, manuscript 3 
also  advances  this  literature  by  treating  trust,  formal  control,  information  and  risk  as  complex, 
multidimensional constructs. Previous studies on the relation between trust and controls typically treated the 
different governance mechanisms as uni-dimensional constructs. This has produced ambiguous conclusions  
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about the relationship between these governance mechanisms. The findings of manuscript 3 clearly indicate 
that perceived relational risk is reduced more effectively by goodwill trust, behavior control and by Type 1 
information (i.e. information to warrant trust), while perceived performance risk is more effectively reduced 
by competence trust, outcome control and Type 2 information (i.e. information for the mastery of events). In 
conclusion, to advance the discussion on the complementary or substitutive effects of different governance 
mechanisms, future research should take into account the life cycle of the relation and the multidimensional 
nature of the governance mechanisms.  
 
2. Managerial implications 
 
This dissertation provides empirical research on the impact of more refined cost and management accounting 
information  on  buyer-supplier  relations  and  outcomes.  Researching  this  topic  is  important  because 
purchasing professionals in many companies still need to demonstrate the contribution they make to their 
firm (Carr & Pearson, 1999). In addition, the supply side of companies has become increasingly important 
over the last few decades. Costs of purchased goods and services represent the majority of total costs for 
most companies (Degraeve & Roodhooft, 2001). It is therefore relevant for purchasing firms to understand 
which negotiation approaches and which inter-firm management accounting and control tools will contribute 
to their success and profitability (Janda & Seshardi, 2001). 
 
Managers, busy with cost system design, often claim that more refined cost systems are costly to design and 
to maintain. In addition, the difficulty of measuring and quantifying the benefits or even the lack of any 
perceived  benefits  derived  from  more  refined  cost  information,  are  often  arguments  for  firms  not  to 
implement more refined costing techniques (Innes & Mitchell, 1995). However, the results of manuscript 1 & 
2 clearly indicate that in some circumstances refined cost information may be very beneficial.  
 
The results of manuscript 1 indicate that the availability of detailed TCO information can alleviate the 
disadvantage dependent buyers face vis-à-vis a more powerful seller. This result has profound managerial 
implications. On the one hand, this result implies that less powerful buyers can compensate their power 
disadvantage by gathering more detailed cost information. On the other hand, powerful buyers do not seem to 
be able to use this more detailed cost information to enhance their power advantage so as to obtain an even 
higher individual profit than less powerful buyers with the same information. Powerful buyers with refined 
TCO information may thus not realize all possible benefits from buyer-supplier interactions due to their 
bargaining strategy. Their (false) feeling of power causes an increase of distributive bargaining tactics and a 
reluctance to share the necessary information for inter-firm cost minimization. This implies that powerful 
buyers may only benefit from more refined accounting information systems if these firms undertake efforts 
(e.g. through incentive systems) to encourage information sharing and to discourage aggressive bargaining 
strategies of their employees. 
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Manuscript 2 provides empirical support for what earlier studies (Ness & Haugland, 2005; Seal et al., 1999; 
Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2004) have suggested on how management accounting may contribute 
to  the  development  of  dyadic  business  relationships.  Decision  makers  learn  from  this  manuscript  that 
accounting information proves to be able to serve an important function in relational signaling and thus in 
building trust or distrust. Managers should be aware that the sharing of detailed information (e.g. TCO 
information) makes it possible to understand the partner’s interests and to identify the integrative potential in 
different situations. On the other hand, the results of manuscript 2 also indicate that buyers with more 
traditional information were unable to signal trustworthy behavior, which resulted in lower levels of trust and 
outcomes. Managers should be aware of this signaling function of (accounting) information.  
 
Finally, the results of manuscript 3 also have relevant implications for managers. It is important for managers 
to be aware of the need to cultivate an optimal mix of governance mechanisms because these governance 
mechanisms interact with each other. For instance, it may be important for firms to invest in greater Type 1 
information when trust is based primarily on competence. This is because competence trust has the potential 
to encourage opportunistic behavior and may lead to less favorable cooperative outcomes. Our analyses also 
reveal that buyers try to reduce potential dangers of overly relying on competence trust by complementing it 
with  behavioral  control.  Decision  makers  need  to  be  aware  of  the  potential  (negative)  impact  of  the 
governance mechanisms they employ on their partner. For instance, in a study on sourcing decision in the US 
auto industry, Anderson et al. (2000) report that strict design tolerances (i.e. strict outcome requirements) for 
metal parts often increase die development time and costs without producing substantially better or different 
parts.   
 
The analyses on the interaction effects between trust and information showed that perceived risk of decision 
makers at later stages of the relation is mainly reduced by trust and that, to a certain extent, trust replaces the 
need for information. Decision makers should be aware that while trust may reduce perceived risk, recent 
studies have started to reveal some drawbacks of trust such as reduced information search (Krishnan et al., 
2006), which may ultimately result in lower outcomes. This is related to the fact that decision makers should 
be  aware  that  perceived  risk  does  not  necessarily  coincide  with  objective  risk  and  that  governance 
mechanisms may only provide the illusion of less uncertainty or more control.  
 
3. Limitations and suggestions for further research 
 
The manuscripts presented in this dissertation provide new insight into the role of information on buyer-
supplier relations and outcomes. Naturally, our research has its limitations and gives rise to several questions 
that  deserve  further  attention.  Also,  since  management  accounting  research  has  only  recently  begun  to 
consider  issues  that  arise  when  firms  transact  (Anderson,  2006;  Anderson  &  Sedatole,  2003),  many 
interesting topics remain. In this section, we will shortly discuss a selection of the most important limitations 
and ideas for future research.    
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Buyer-supplier relations versus other inter-firm relations 
Inter-firm relations come in a variety of forms and structures -- such as joint ventures, minority equity 
alliances, joint R&D, joint production, co-marketing, licensing, long-term supply agreements, and so on. 
Although our discussion so far has sometimes been couched in general terms of inter-firm relations, our 
empirical results are based on buyer-supplier relations.  
 
As the type of the relation may have significant implications for the roles of trust, control and information 
(Birnbirg, 1998; Das & Teng, 2001a; Tomkins, 2001), further research should also investigate whether the 
results  found  in  this  study  hold  beyond  buyer-supplier  relationships.  Tomkins  (2001)  and  Das  &  Teng 
(2001a) make detailed listing of respectively information needs and formal control needs for different types 
of relations. Examining more closely their proposals appears to be a prime area for future research. 
 
One side of the story  
This dissertation mainly focused on the buyer’s perspective of the partnership. The experimental setting in 
manuscript 1 did not manipulate the negotiation context for the seller, while in manuscript 2 only the control 
system of the sellers, and not their information, was manipulated. The cost information of the seller was 
never manipulated. Similarly to the majority of survey research, our survey study in manuscript 3 relied on a 
single informant. For the issues that we addressed in manuscript 3, it is not obvious that a single respondent 
from  the  buyer  presents  serious  limitations  since  this  study  focuses  on  how  governance  mechanisms 
influence the perceived risk of the buyer.  
 
However, further research can benefit from incorporating the view of the seller by altering the experimental 
conditions  and  examining  the  role  of  TCO  information  from  both  buyer  and  seller  perspectives,  or  by 
employing a matched pairs of respondents from both transaction parties (e.g. Judge & Dooley, 2006). This 
would enable us to examine the potential (negative) impact of the governance mechanisms decision makers 
employ on their partner.  
 
Cost benefit trade-off 
Another  fruitful  path  for  future  research  is  to  consider  the  cost/benefit  trade-off  between  the  different 
governance mechanisms. Governance mechanisms are not costless to develop (Parkhe, 1993). Our study did 
not take into account the costs related to install or maintain governance mechanisms. Managers busy with 
cost system design, often claim that more refined cost systems are costly to design and to maintain. This 
focus underplays the cost/benefit trade-off.  
 
Future research could develop experiments to consider whether buyers would be willing to incur a cost in 
order to obtain TCO information if it had been efficient to do so. It has been suggested that field based 
research may be required to better understand the relation between costs and the mechanisms of management 
control that firms employ (Anderson, 2006; Tirole, 1999).   
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The link with performance  
Although  manuscript  1  &  2  explicitly  considered  the  impact  of  information  and  other  governance 
mechanisms on outcomes (e.g. individual profit and joint profits), manuscript 3 did not consider the link with 
performance.  Manuscript  3  placed  the  decision  maker  at  the  central  core  and  revealed  what  type  of 
governance  mechanisms  are  used  to  counter  different  types  of  perceived  risks.  Risk  perceptions  of  the 
decision makers served as the heuristic that helps form their governance mechanisms (Das & Teng, 2001b).  
 
Prior studies on this topic typically regress the different governance mechanisms (i.e. trust and control) on a 
measure of inter-firm relation outcomes. The operationalization of inter-firm relation outcomes has varied 
considerably. Inter-firm outcomes have previously been operationalized as historical accounting measures, 
market-based  measures,  operational  efficiency  measures  and  perceptual  satisfaction  measures  (Judge  & 
Dooley, 2006). Because of this extreme variation, it becomes clear why the findings have yet to coalesce.  
 
One of our targets for additional follow-up work is to make this link with performance and to study whether 
trust, information and formal controls substitute or complement each other. The study of Anderson & Dekker 
(2005) provide an interesting methodology to accomplish this. Anderson & Dekker (2005) studied how 
different sets of terms of contracting are related to a set of transaction characteristics and how misalignment 
between  these  transaction  hazards  and  several  contract  dimensions  is  related  with  higher  transaction 
problems. Future research could extend their research by examining whether transaction hazards are related 
to the distinct dimensions of the governance mechanisms discussed in manuscript 3 (thus besides formal 
controls, also trust and information). Furthermore it is also promising to study whether these relations are 
different for transactions with serious problems than for successful transactions, i.e. making the link with 
performance.  
 
In summary, the recent changes in inter-firm relations have highlighted new and interesting area of research 
in accounting. There already exists a literature which has implications for the design of inter-firm information 
systems. However, a number of interesting issues remain to be addressed.  
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